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Research Article
Assessing BRICS Economic Homogeneity Using Fuzzy C-Means Clustering and Optimum Currency Area Criteria
expand article infoIvan Nosov
‡ Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
Open Access

Abstract

The current state of international economic relations has intensified discussions surrounding various scenarios for financial convergence among the BRICS countries, including the potential adoption of a common currency or alternative means of payment. This paper explores the application of the C-means fuzzy clustering method to assess whether the economies of six BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and Indonesia — exhibit homogeneity with respect to the criteria for an optimum currency area. To achieve this objective, the C-means fuzzy clustering model is applied to a set of economic indicators calculated for each BRICS member state and for a control group of non-BRICS economies, measured relative to those of a designated reference country. Each of the BRICS countries sequentially assumes the role of the reference country. The analysis focuses on how both BRICS and control countries are distributed among the resulting clusters. The findings indicate that the BRICS economies do not demonstrate homogeneity based on optimum currency area criteria because the largest economy in the group — the People’s Republic of China — frequently does not cluster with the other BRICS members. These results provide insights for ongoing discussions about the feasibility of a common BRICS currency by broadening the analytical framework and aiding policymakers in assessing the potential benefits, costs, and implications of deeper monetary integration within the group.

Keywords

BRICS, BRICS currency, Clustering, Fuzzy C-means, Optimum currency area

JEL: C38, C82, F36, F37, F45.

Introduction

Various approaches to financial and monetary convergence among the BRICS countries, including the creation of a shared currency or payment method, have been under discussion for a long time. Recent developments in the international monetary and financial system have reignited these discussions, prompting the monetary authorities of the BRICS nations to collaborate in addressing the challenges related to settling payments for goods and services. Such settlements have become more complex because of constraints on the use of the two dominant global reserve currencies: the US dollar and the euro. At the same time, transactions in national currencies are often suboptimal in terms of national reserve composition and stability. One proposed solution is the introduction of a common BRICS currency or means of payment, which could be issued and utilized in a variety of scenarios.

The theory of optimum currency areas (OCAs) is one of the most influential frameworks for understanding when it becomes economically advantageous for countries to form currency unions. Originally formulated by Robert Mundell (1961) and subsequently supplemented by Ronald I. MacKinnon (1963), Kenen (1981/1969), and others in the 1960s–1970s, in the 1990s, the theory regained prominence in the 1990s by economists, including Paul Krugman (1990). This renewed attention was largely driven by the discussion of the prospects of a single European currency. Numerous studies have employed quantitative methods to examine subgroups within the European Monetary Union (EMU) and assess the extent to which national economies meet the criteria for joining. Much of this research, including the work of Artis and Zhang (1998, 2001, 2002), Boreiko (2002) and Ozer and Özcan (2007, 2008a, 2008b), used fuzzy C-means (FCM) clustering models on datasets that were mostly made up of variables related to optimum currency area (OCA) criteria. Building on these foundations, Sarlin (2011) applied the same dataset and factor calculations developed by Ozer and Ozkan (2007) to examine currency zone configurations with a Kohonen self-organizing map. Agarwal et al. (2013) also used this dataset, extending the FCM methodology proposed by Ozer and Özcan (2008b). They applied additional clustering techniques such as the Gustafson-Kessel and Gath-Geva models, as well as principal component analysis, and used four different indices to determine the optimal number of clusters. Toan Nguyen (2007) used a similar factor calculation methodology for analyzing the homogeneity of East Asian economies. However, in the absence of a central reference country at the time, Nguyen substantially adapted the approach, introducing a new factor to reflect export diversification. This is not the only approach to quantitative assessment of the OCA criteria: Alesina et al. (2002) conducted a study on countries’ attitudes to a particular currency area using their own methodology. The scope of their research also differed, covering almost all countries worldwide and distributing them across the dollar, euro and yen zones.

When evaluating the prospects of the BRICS currency area, researchers adopted various approaches. For example, Quah Chee Heong’s criteria (2016) were similar to those employed by Artis and Chang (2001, 2002) but he expanded the framework to encompass additional factors, such as export diversity, reserve adequacy, and convergence in real economic growth. Instead of using a clustering model, Quah assessed each factor individually to identify the extent to which the BRICS countries aligned with China in different areas. Saji (2017) analyzed the direct intervention behaviors of the central banks of the BRICS countries using a Markov regime-switching model. His findings suggested that the observed convergence in these central banks’ monetary policy behavior could provide a foundation for a monetary union. Zharikov (2023) examined the possibility of the BRICS countries forming an OCA by 2024, from the perspective of exchange rate correlations. He concluded that a currency area comprising Brazil, Russia, South Africa and, with some reservations, India could be formed. However, as China — the bloc’s largest economy and its central economic player — was not sufficiently aligned, the overall feasibility of the BRICS countries forming an OCA was still low. Nach and Ncwadi (2024) used SVAR to analyze the symmetry of four shocks to assess the feasibility of the BRICS OCA. Their results showed that, while the BRICS countries responded symmetrically to external supply shocks, their responses to domestic supply, demand and monetary shocks diverged significantly. Russia, South Africa and Brazil showed some degree of correlation in their responses to monetary shocks.

Although different methods of evaluating the feasibility of a BRICS currency area produce different results, several recent studies consistently suggest that South Africa, Brazil and Russia partly comply with the OCA criteria, but there is a general lack of compliance among all five BRICS members (as defined prior to 2024). Evidence of homogeneity among the BRICS countries with respect to OCA criteria — essential for any further steps towards monetary integration — could be bolstered by incorporating a broader range of evaluative factors. The findings of this study could help policymakers to develop a more balanced and informed strategy for promoting international financial convergence within the BRICS framework.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to determine whether the six BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Indonesia — exhibit homogeneity according to the OCA criteria; and second, to find out which of them are most closely aligned. Data from the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and other international organizations were collected and analyzed for the six BRICS economies, as well as for a control group of six non-BRICS countries. For each country, seven indicators representing the OCA criteria were calculated. The FCM algorithm was then used to cluster the researched countries according to these indicators. In the FCM method, the number of clusters is specified in advance, and models are built across a range from two to ten clusters.

The paper consists of four main sections, one of which is subdivided into three parts. The first section outlines the research methodology and comprises three subsections covering the following topics: the selection of countries for analysis and the principle used to assess homogeneity; the criteria for an OCA and their quantitative interpretation in the context of the research; and an overview of fuzzy C-means clustering. The second section describes the main results. The third section discusses the results. The fourth section comprises conclusions and practical recommendations.

Methods

General principles of methodology and country selection

The study examines six BRICS member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, the South African Republic, and Indonesia. These countries were selected because data was available for analysis. If sufficient data become available on the countries that joined BRICS in 2024 — Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE — the study may be expanded to include them.

Data on control countries were added to the dataset to identify their homogeneity. Researchers have previously used a similar technique (Artis & Zhang, 1998, 2001, 2002; Ozer & Özcan, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Sarlin, 2011), in which control countries such as Canada and Japan — and to some extent the United States, which are not members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) — were used to calibrate clustering models. In this study, rather than using control countries to calibrate the level of fuzziness in the clustering, we use them to challenge the distribution of the BRICS countries, allowing BRICS economies to potentially cluster with control economies instead of with each other. In other words, the study examines whether BRICS economies are more homogeneous in relation to each other than to external economies. Thus, control countries are chosen to represent not only non-BRICS economies but also different regions and economic characteristics. In line with previous studies, the United States, Japan and Canada — all of which are developed market economies — are included. To broaden the scope, two emerging or developing market economies were added: Colombia and Turkey, which has applied for BRICS membership. Spain — a developed market country and a member of the EMU — was included to represent the EMU.

This study aims to apply FCM clustering models with different numbers of clusters to observe whether all BRICS countries, or specific subsets of them, consistently form a single cluster. A key focus is to examine whether this grouping persists as the number of clusters increases. The two-cluster model is the most informative scenario and serves as a baseline test of homogeneity. If all the BRICS countries are grouped together in one of the two clusters, this would suggest a significant level of internal similarity and potential distinction from the control group. However, increasing the number of clusters also yields important information. It enables the assessment of whether the BRICS grouping remains intact or begins to fragment, which helps to gauge the robustness of their homogeneity under more granular classification. The primary aim is to determine whether these countries — or a subset of them — consistently form a coherent group, regardless of which non-BRICS economies may also be included in the same cluster. At the same time, it would be useful to find out whether the BRICS countries cluster distinctly from the rest or tend to align with certain external economies.

An important advantage of the FCM method is its ability to provide not only categorical cluster assignments but also quantitative estimates of each country’s degree of association with each cluster, as expressed through membership grades. The algorithm is run for 1000 iterations. For the purposes of this analysis, each country is assigned to the cluster in which it has the highest membership grade, even if that grade is below 0.5.

It is important that in this study a cluster does not represent an actual currency area, but rather a group of countries that exhibit homogeneity with respect to OCA criteria. Including countries within the same cluster means that they are at a similar level of readiness for forming a currency union, whether high or low. This does not imply that these countries are necessarily prepared to establish such a union. In fact, a cluster may consist of countries that have a low level of alignment with OCA standards, indicating limited feasibility for currency integration despite their similarity.

In this context, the concept of a central or “reference country” becomes particularly important. In earlier studies on the EMU, most OCA-related indicators were calculated relative to Germany, which served as the economic benchmark due to its size and level of development. Similarly, within the BRICS framework, China as the largest and most economically advanced member might naturally assume a comparable role. However, when a clustering model is fitted using China as the sole reference country, the results reflect the homogeneity of the other BRICS economies in relation to China but exclude China itself from the comparison. Our objectives, however, involve answering the question: is China homogeneous with the other BRICS countries? This is why the reference country is rotated sequentially, with factors being calculated for each of the other countries — including China — in relation to the new reference country. In this paper, the term “reference country” does not imply a central role in terms of monetary leadership or anchor status; it simply denotes the country relative to which indicators are computed. This approach allows us to assess whether China’s level of readiness for a currency area is comparable to that of other economies. Although cluster distribution shifts with a change in the reference country, the tendency shows whether homogeneity is sustained.

In their paper ‘The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria’ (1996), Frankel and Rose argue that international trade and the correlation of business cycles between countries are endogenous. This implies that economic integration, particularly a monetary union, can enhance the synchronization of business cycles and trade between countries. They conclude that assessing the ability of economies to form an OCA based solely on historical data may be misleading, as these indicators may change once a currency union has been formed. The economies that could not form an OCA according to the criteria prior to unification converge upon joining the currency union. As a result, the area formed can be considered optimum.

Without disputing the endogeneity of criteria or inappropriateness of analyzing historical data in this article, we note that the results of our study are still useful for understanding the initial state of economies before unification. Even if we assume that economies would begin to converge after the decision to form a monetary union and the adoption of appropriate measures, it is useful to imagine the path that participating countries would need to follow before forming an optimum area.

Optimum Currency Area criteria

Mundell (1961) established the basis of the theory of OCAs, proposing that an OCA was founded on the mobility of production factors within the currency area, subject to flexible prices and wages. MacKinnon (1963) observed that the benefits from unification within a currency area increased with the degree of economic openness. Several other criteria were introduced later, including diversification of production and exports, fiscal integration (Kenen, 1981/1969). In addition to these, financial and political integration and the similarity of inflation rates were added to the conditions for an OCA, and later, when the theory of optimum areas was re-evaluated, researchers singled out the similarity of shocks as an important criterion (Mongelli, 2002). The theory gained renewed popularity in the late 1980s and 1990s amid discussions about a common European currency, a topic that Paul Krugman addressed in 1990. As Mongelli (2002) notes, empirical studies in the field of OCA began to appear during this period, examining EMU data and employing econometric and other mathematical methods.

In a series of papers, Artis and Zhang (1998, 2001, 2002) employed the FCM method to address questions concerning the EMU countries’ classification as either “core” or “peripheral” within the monetary union. For FCM clustering, they used quantitative variables reflecting a number of the main conditions of the OCA. Almost all of these factors reflected the proximity of each country to Germany. The authors designated Germany as the ‘central’ country, grouping countries based on how close they were to it according to a number of features. These features included synchronization of the business cycles of each country and Germany; volatility of the real exchange rate of each country’s currency and the German mark (in later calculations and other papers, the euro was used); synchronization of the real interest rates of each country and Germany; openness to trade with Germany; and employment protection legislation ratings calculated independently for each country.

There were some changes in the calculation and use of criteria in the studies of other authors who used the same methodology. For example, Ozer and Özcan (2007) and Sarlin (2011) omitted the rating of labour legislation. Boreiko (2002) omitted both the rating of labour legislation and the synchronization of real interest rates. The indicator of trade openness was calculated relative to the EMU countries (Boreiko, 2002) or EU25 (Ozer & Ozkan, 2007; Sarlin, 2011) rather than Germany. Ozer and Özcan (2007) used different filters to identify the seasonal components necessary for calculating business cycle similarity, and also slightly transformed the correlation coefficients.

The present study focuses on factors that correspond to the key criteria for an optimum currency area (OCA) as identified in the literature. These criteria can be interpreted and measured using mathematical and statistical methods. The symmetry of economic shocks is proxied by the synchronization of business cycles. The similarity of monetary policies, which reflects the cost of relinquishing independent national policy, is assessed through similarities in exchange and interest rates. Inflation convergence is measured by the absolute differences in national inflation rates. Labor market flexibility and labor mobility are approximated using the labor market regulations index. The export product concentration index captures export diversification. Further studies could expand the set of factors. The OCA criteria and the methodology for calculating them in the current study are described in more detail below.

1. The synchronization of the business cycles of the country in question and the reference country was calculated using the correlation of the seasonal components of the monthly intra-annual data on industrial production. Seasonal components are extracted from monthly data on industrial production in absolute values ​​(thousands of US dollars, the base year is 2005) by means of the Hodrick-Prescott filter (H-P filter). Artis and Zhang (2001) point out that this factor is included to assess the symmetry of shocks of two economies. Data for this study are taken from the Global Economic Monitor database, World Bank Databank (World Bank, n.d.-a, GEM Data). Application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter was made by means of the “hpfilter” function of the “statsmodels” package version 0.14.0 for Python version 3.9.7. The documentation recommends a lambda value of 129,600 for monthly data, referencing a detailed study of this issue by Ravn and Uhlig (2001).

2. The volatility of the real exchange rate between the currency of the researched country and that of the reference country is calculated as the standard deviation of the real exchange rate index, expressed in reverse quotation (i.e., units of the reference currency per unit of the country’s currency). While some authors calculate this indicator using the standard deviation of the logarithmic differences in real exchange rates, this study adopts the methodology used by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Central Bank of the Russian Federation, n.d.). The nominal cross-rates between the researched currencies and the reference currency were derived from the official average monthly exchange rates against the US dollar, sourced from the Global Economic Monitor (World Bank, n.d.-a, GEM Data). The real exchange rate indices were computed using monthly year-on-year consumer price indices from the same source. The economic rationale for including the real exchange rate in the dataset is grounded in the assumption that countries with similar monetary policies — affecting both nominal and real exchange rates — will experience smaller bilateral exchange rate fluctuations. Accordingly, the lower the volatility of a country’s exchange rate relative to that of the reference country, the lower the expected cost of transitioning to a shared currency (Artis & Zhang, 2001).

3. The synchronization of the real interest rates of the countries under consideration and the reference country is calculated as the correlation of their respective seasonal components. These components are calculated as the difference between the short-term interest rates and the year-on-year consumer price index. The economic rationale also rests on the assumption that if two countries pursue relatively similar monetary policies, their intra-annual interest rate movements will exhibit comparable patterns. The greater the similarity in these movements, the closer the alignment of their monetary policies — and consequently, the lower the expected cost of transitioning to a shared currency (Artis & Zhang, 2001). Data on consumer price indices are sourced from the Global Economic Monitor (World Bank, n.d.-a, GEM Data), and data on short-term rates — from the OECD database (OECD, n.d., Data). Minor gaps in the time series for Russia and the United States are addressed using linear interpolation. In cases where short-term interest rate data are unavailable — specifically for Brazil and Turkey — substitute data on “instant rates” are used.

4. Trade openness (also trade integration in other studies) is calculated using the formula

(xiBRICS+miBRICS)(xi+mi), (1)

where xi and mi are the total exports and total imports of country i (under consideration) for the period under consideration, xiBRICS and miBRICS are the total exports and total imports of country i to and from the BRICS group of countries. It is important to emphasize that, in this case, the BRICS group comprises ten of its members. Although five of the countries included in the analysis were not BRICS members during the study period, this research assumes that if the BRICS or control countries maintained a trade relationship with them, those interactions should be included in the analysis. Trade integration — or trade openness, as it is sometimes referred to in the literature — has been identified as a key criterion for optimum currency areas (OCAs) by both McKinnon (1963) and Krugman (1990). Data are sourced from the World Bank’s WITS database (World Bank, n.d.-c, WITS Data by countries).

5. Inflation convergence is calculated as the average difference between a country’s inflation rate and the inflation rate in a reference country over a given period. Annual inflation data are sourced from the World Development Indicators database, World Bank (World Bank, n.d.-b, World Development Indicators Data). The convergence of inflation rates with those in the reference country demonstrates the extent to which the two countries are synchronized in their efforts to achieve their targeted inflation rates. Quah (2016) in his analysis calculates this parameter slightly differently, not simply as the difference in inflation rates, but as the modulus of the difference. This approach is logically consistent: if the primary concern is how close the inflation rates are to those of the reference country, disregarding the direction of deviation by using the absolute value may seem appropriate. However, this method can produce misleading results. For example, a country with inflation significantly lower than the reference rate could end up in the same cluster as a country with significantly higher inflation, simply because the magnitude of the deviation is similar. In such cases, the actual difference in inflation between these countries may be substantial. We argue that it is important to consider the direction of inflation rate deviation relative to the reference country. For countries with relatively low inflation, abandoning an effective inflation-targeting regime may result in higher economic costs and so face greater political opposition than in countries with higher inflation. This asymmetry is analytically significant and should be reflected in the evaluation. Accordingly, this study measures inflation convergence as the average difference in inflation rates rather than using the absolute value.

6. The labor market regulations index, a composite taken from Fraser Institute data as part of the Index of Economic Freedom, reflects the flexibility of the labor market, measured from 0 to 10; the closer the index to 10, the less regulated the labor market is (Fraser Institute, 2023, Data by countries). Artis and Zhang (2001) use an analog of this ranking from the OECD as a proxy for labor market flexibility. They also mention that, according to some studies, it is not labor mobility itself that is important, but rather the difference between inter-regional labor mobility within a country and international labor mobility within a region. It should be noted that, while they were able to argue that low labor mobility between European countries is similar to low inter-regional labor mobility within these countries, we cannot claim the same for the BRICS countries. Even if the assumption of low labor mobility within the BRICS countries is correct, there are strong reasons to believe that it will still be significantly higher than intra-country labor mobility within the BRICS group. This group brings together countries whose populations speak languages that differ greatly from one another and often belong to different language families. These language differences will pose a significant obstacle to labor mobility, even when legal regulations are not taken into account. However, it is precisely this final factor that is addressed by the Fraser Institute’s labor market regulations index. The general similarity of the institutions affecting labor market flexibility can help evaluate the extent to which the labor markets of the countries studied could converge, at least on this parameter.

7. The export product concentration index measures a country’s export concentration, which is the opposite of diversification and can therefore be used to determine how similar countries’ export diversification is. This factor was not included in the original series of papers by Artis and Zhang, Ozer and Özcan, and Sarlin. However, it was used by Nguyen (2007) and Quah (2016), who refer to Kenen (1981/1969), who introduced the criterion. Although Quah calculated the export diversification index as the sum of squared shares of export product types, we use the export product concentration index as defined by UNCTAD (UNCTAD, n.d.-a, Data). It is calculated as

Hj=i=1N(Xi,jXj)2-1N1-1N, (2)

where Hj is the product concentration index of exports for country j, Xi,j is the value of exports of product i by country j, Xj is the total value of exports of country j, and N is the number of products exported at the three-digit level of the SITC Revision 3 (UNCTAD, 2019). We use the UNCTAD concentration index rather than the UNCTAD export diversification index because the latter does not represent the variety of exports, but the absolute deviation of a country’s trade structure from the global trade structure. (UNCTAD, n.d.-b, Indicator explanation).

All the calculated factors are standardized before the FCM algorithm is fitted. The factors based on the OCA criteria calculated in reference to China before standard scaling are presented in Table 1. Factors before scaling in reference to other BRICS economies can be found in Appendices 1–5.

Table 1.

Factors based on the OCA criteria before standard scaling with China as the reference country

Group Country Correlation in the industrial production cycle Volatility in the real exchange rate Correlation in real interest rate cycles Trade integrity Convergence of inflation Labor market regulations index Export production concentration index
BRICS India 0.120 0.058 0.168 0.262 3.820 6.157 0.1381
Russia -0.407 0.142 -0.027 0.152 4.277 6.062 0.3206
Brazil -0.257 0.150 0.013 0.237 3.750 5.093 0.1591
South Africa -0.212 0.120 -0.129 0.203 2.983 6.631 0.1391
Indonesia -0.150 0.071 -0.255 0.241 1.993 4.556 0.1416
Control United States -0.086 0.040 -0.263 0.196 -0.171 9.222 0.0939
Canada 0.047 0.057 -0.212 0.091 -0.373 7.867 0.1506
Japan 0.211 0.104 -0.126 0.294 -1.516 7.977 0.1338
Colombia -0.375 0.101 0.207 0.187 1.712 5.82 0.3512
Spain 0.197 0.067 -0.170 0.100 -1.047 6.32 0.0964
Turkey -0.191 0.088 -0.115 0.229 9.465 4.702 0.0727

Fuzzy C-means clustering method

The Fuzzy C-Means (FCM) clustering method is a clustering method in which each element (in our case, countries) of a multidimensional space (whose dimensions are factors; in our case, the seven OCA criteria) is assigned a number between zero and one for each of the initially specified clusters. This is known as the membership grade, or the degree to which a country belongs to a cluster. Hereafter, the membership grade will be defined as the degree to which the j-th country belongs to the i-th cluster, and will be designated as uij. In summary, the membership values for each element in clusters are all equal to one.

The FCM algorithm can be described as follows: each element (country) is a vector xj = (xj1, ... xjk) in a k-dimensional space, where k is the number of factors (in our case, seven). The distance between elements (vectors), for example, xa and xb, is calculated as the Euclidean (in this study):

d(xa,xb)=xa-xb=p=1k(xap-xbp)2=(xa-xb)T(xa-xb) (3.1)

Like many clustering algorithms, FCM begins with a certain or random initial disposition — in this case, a membership matrix U (of size c × N, c is the number of clusters, N is the number of elements, i.e. countries) and cluster centers vi , i = 1, ... c, where vi is the vector of the center of the i-th cluster (or the i-th centroid). The number of clusters c, as in the case of the classical k-means method, is set a priori and does not change during the course of the algorithm. What changes — by being specified — are the cluster centers and the membership grades of elements in clusters. This occurs due to the minimization of the objective function, which in our case of Euclidean distances and norms appears as in formula (3.2) (Bezdek et al., 1984):

Jm(U,v)=j=1Ni=1c(uij)mxj-vi2, (3.2)

where uij is the grade of membership of the j-th element to the i-th cluster, uij Î [0,1], U = [uij] is the membership matrix c × N, c is the number of clusters, N is the number of elements (countries), xj is the vector of the j-th element (country), vi is the vector of the i-th centroid, m is a so-called “weighting exponent” (Bezdek et al., 1984), or a level of fuzziness (Ozer & Ozkan, 2007, 2008a, 2008b), the measure of the cluster borders imprecision, m Î [1,+¥).

Local minimization of the objective function Jm (U, v) for m > 1 occurs by passing it (U^,v^), which are calculated using the formulas:

v^i=j=1N(uij)mxjj=1N(uij)m,1ic (3.3)

uij^=(p=1c(xj-v^ixj-v^p)2/m-1)-1,1jN,1ic (3.4)

At the beginning of the algorithm, we determine the number of clusters c, the value m, and the method for calculating the distance between elements (in this study, Euclidean). We select some specific or random initial matrix U (q) q = 0, 1, … ITERMAX and centroids. Then we move the centroids to new points v (q + 1), calculated by formula (3.3), recalculate the membership values in the matrix U (q + 1) by formula (3.4), and check whether the objective function (3.2) has decreased. If it has decreased, we shift the clusters again; if not, or if the number of iterations that we have planned for the algorithm has ended, we stop the algorithm and examine the membership matrix.

The measure m varies from 1 to infinity. It can be adjusted, but the default value is 2 (Ozer & Ozkan, 2008a). The question of the optimal number of clusters also arises for researchers who use the clustering algorithm. Ozer and Özcan (2007, 2008a) selected control countries that were not part of the EMU in order to adjust the number of clusters and the value of m, ensuring that they would fall into a distinct cluster. This is not an option for this study as we are not sure that the BRICS countries are homogeneous enough to form a currency area. Therefore, including or excluding the BRICS countries from the group of control countries will not indicate the optimal number of clusters or correctly selected coefficient m. Control countries are still useful for our study as they help us track the behavior of the BRICS countries when the number of clusters changes and determine whether these countries are homogeneous in terms of OCA criteria when the number of clusters increases. The development of a methodology to determine the optimal value of m is a topic for separate research. In this study, this value is set to 2.

The study using the C-means fuzzy clustering method was performed using the skfuzzy package version 0.4.2 for Python version 3.9.7. The random state was 42.

Results

The full results of the clustering can be seen in Appendices 6–11. Short versions of the results for divisions of two to five clusters can be found in Tables 27. The numbers in brackets after cluster names are membership grades for the cluster that includes the country. For every reference country, there are nine cases of clustering for different numbers of clusters, each case is independent of the others. That is why the digital naming of clusters may differ from case to case: there is no form of heredity between cases; in each case, the clustering algorithm allocates countries and names clusters anew. We manually rename clusters containing the majority of the BRICS countries as ‘Cluster A’ (and ‘Cluster A1’ or ‘Cluster A2’ if there are two clusters containing the same number of BRICS countries), as consistency within this cluster is the most important tendency we examine. Other clusters are labelled with the letter B to distinguish them from Cluster A, and a digital postfix is used to differentiate between them.

Table 2.

Cluster distribution and maximum membership grades, with China as the reference country. Short version

Group Country 2 clusters distribution 3 clusters distribution 4 clusters distribution 5 clusters distribution
BRICS India cluster A (0.531) cluster A (0.524) cluster B0 (0.894) cluster A1 (0.243)
Russia cluster A (0.795) cluster B0 (0.84) cluster B2 (0.812) cluster B0 (0.542)
Brazil cluster A (0.889) cluster A (0.492) cluster A (0.539) cluster A2 (0.797)
South Africa cluster A (0.779) cluster A (0.667) cluster A (0.813) cluster A2 (0.582)
Indonesia cluster A (0.543) cluster A (0.662) cluster A (0.506) cluster A1 (0.894)
Control United States cluster B (0.823) cluster B2 (0.713) cluster B1 (0.568) cluster B1 (0.413)
Canada cluster B (0.863) cluster B2 (0.884) cluster B1 (0.914) cluster B1 (0.923)
Japan cluster B (0.672) cluster B2 (0.435) cluster B0 (0.35) cluster B4 (0.969)
Colombia cluster A (0.736) cluster B0 (0.81) cluster B2 (0.764) cluster B0 (0.913)
Spain cluster B (0.834) cluster B2 (0.783) cluster B1 (0.755) cluster B1 (0.745)
Turkey cluster A (0.688) cluster A (0.653) cluster A (0.474) cluster A1 (0.37)
Table 3.

Cluster distribution and maximum membership grades, with Brazil as the reference country. Short version

Group Country 2 clusters distribution 3 clusters distribution 4 clusters distribution 5 clusters distribution
BRICS China cluster B (0.706) cluster B1 (0.555) cluster B1 (0.558) cluster B1 (0.474)
India cluster A (0.693) cluster A1 (0.635) cluster A (0.57) cluster B4 (0.945)
Russia cluster A (0.726) cluster A2 (0.751) cluster B2 (0.741) cluster A (0.574)
South Africa cluster A (0.733) cluster A2 (0.446) cluster A (0.338) cluster A (0.261)
Indonesia cluster A (0.714) cluster A1 (0.781) cluster A (0.847) cluster B3 (0.881)
Control United States cluster B (0.705) cluster B1 (0.55) cluster B0 (0.739) cluster B0 (0.902)
Canada cluster B (0.733) cluster B1 (0.695) cluster B1 (0.607) cluster B1 (0.546)
Japan cluster B (0.687) cluster B1 (0.456) cluster B0 (0.707) cluster B0 (0.47)
Colombia cluster A (0.756) cluster A2 (0.846) cluster B2 (0.829) cluster A (0.881)
Spain cluster B (0.849) cluster B1 (0.855) cluster B1 (0.917) cluster B1 (0.922)
Turkey cluster A (0.544) cluster A1 (0.552) cluster A (0.472) cluster B3 (0.381)
Table 4.

Cluster distribution and maximum membership grades, with India as the reference country. Short version

Group Country 2 clusters distribution 3 clusters distribution 4 clusters distribution 5 clusters distribution
BRICS China cluster A (0.562) cluster B1 (0.408) cluster A (0.327) cluster B1 (0.275)
Russia cluster A (0.733) cluster A (0.679) cluster B0 (0.575) cluster B0 (0.86)
Brazil cluster A (0.836) cluster A (0.614) cluster A (0.671) cluster A (0.828)
South Africa cluster A (0.894) cluster A (0.603) cluster A (0.801) cluster A (0.487)
Indonesia cluster A (0.557) cluster B1 (0.701) cluster B2 (0.889) cluster B4 (0.942)
Control United States cluster B (0.797) cluster B2 (0.676) cluster B1 (0.576) cluster B2 (0.942)
Canada cluster B (0.853) cluster B2 (0.828) cluster B1 (0.83) cluster B1 (0.494)
Japan cluster B (0.668) cluster B2 (0.462) cluster B1 (0.341) cluster B2 (0.33)
Colombia cluster A (0.538) cluster A (0.433) cluster B0 (0.828) cluster B0 (0.525)
Spain cluster B (0.815) cluster B2 (0.681) cluster B1 (0.642) cluster B1 (0.953)
Turkey cluster A (0.727) cluster B1 (0.517) cluster A (0.372) cluster B4 (0.318)
Table 5.

Cluster distribution and maximum membership grades, with Russia as the reference country. Short version

Group Country 2 clusters distribution 3 clusters distribution 4 clusters distribution 5 clusters distribution
BRICS China cluster B (0.625) cluster B1 (0.507) cluster B1 (0.412) cluster B1 (0.326)
India cluster A (0.863) cluster A (0.843) cluster A (0.817) cluster A (0.778)
Brazil cluster A (0.691) cluster B0 (0.775) cluster B2 (0.879) cluster B4 (0.946)
South Africa cluster A (0.841) cluster A (0.819) cluster A (0.708) cluster B0 (0.944)
Indonesia cluster A (0.863) cluster A (0.468) cluster A (0.623) cluster A (0.493)
Control United States cluster B (0.652) cluster A (0.434) cluster B0 (0.769) cluster B2 (0.881)
Canada cluster B (0.835) cluster B1 (0.774) cluster B1 (0.71) cluster B1 (0.599)
Japan cluster A (0.528) cluster A (0.563) cluster B0 (0.763) cluster B2 (0.525)
Colombia cluster A (0.557) cluster B0 (0.542) cluster B2 (0.432) cluster B4 (0.31)
Spain cluster B (0.832) cluster B1 (0.868) cluster B1 (0.902) cluster B1 (0.91)
Turkey cluster A (0.648) cluster A (0.494) cluster A (0.453) cluster A (0.338)
Table 6.

Cluster distribution and maximum membership grades, with the South African Republic as the reference country. Short version

Group Country 2 clusters distribution 3 clusters distribution 4 clusters distribution 5 clusters distribution
BRICS China cluster B (0.52) cluster B1 (0.488) cluster B1 (0.345) cluster B1 (0.309)
India cluster A (0.799) cluster A (0.723) cluster A (0.747) cluster B3 (0.812)
Russia cluster A (0.589) cluster B1 (0.583) cluster B2 (0.429) cluster B0 (0.948)
Brazil cluster A (0.762) cluster A (0.731) cluster A (0.625) cluster A (0.83)
Indonesia cluster A (0.794) cluster A (0.692) cluster A (0.699) cluster A (0.431)
Control United States cluster B (0.681) cluster B2 (0.656) cluster B1 (0.352) cluster B2 (0.345)
Canada cluster B (0.703) cluster B2 (0.724) cluster B1 (0.464) cluster B2 (0.937)
Japan cluster A (0.501) cluster B1 (0.41) cluster B0 (0.924) cluster B3 (0.281)
Colombia cluster A (0.533) cluster A (0.378) cluster B2 (0.815) cluster B0 (0.259)
Spain cluster B (0.779) cluster B2 (0.466) cluster B1 (0.881) cluster B1 (0.904)
Turkey cluster A (0.655) cluster A (0.457) cluster A (0.437) cluster B3 (0.292)
Table 7.

Cluster distribution and maximum membership grades, with Indonesia as the reference country. Short version

Group Country 2 clusters distribution 3 clusters distribution 4 clusters distribution 5 clusters distribution
BRICS China cluster B (0.557) cluster B1 (0.572) cluster B1 (0.531) cluster B1 (0.458)
India cluster A (0.522) cluster B2 (0.581) cluster B0 (0.34) cluster A (0.26)
Russia cluster A (0.717) cluster A (0.638) cluster A (0.593) cluster B2 (0.945)
Brazil cluster A (0.852) cluster A (0.821) cluster A (0.53) cluster A (0.397)
South Africa cluster A (0.697) cluster A (0.497) cluster A (0.538) cluster A (0.917)
Control United States cluster B (0.759) cluster B2 (0.702) cluster B0 (0.822) cluster B4 (0.909)
Canada cluster B (0.818) cluster B1 (0.526) cluster B1 (0.405) cluster B4 (0.361)
Japan cluster B (0.622) cluster B2 (0.735) cluster B0 (0.661) cluster B4 (0.458)
Colombia cluster A (0.572) cluster A (0.419) cluster A (0.536) cluster A (0.319)
Spain cluster B (0.706) cluster B1 (0.866) cluster B1 (0.872) cluster B1 (0.872)
Turkey cluster A (0.687) cluster A (0.541) cluster B3 (0.943) cluster B3 (0.974)

When analyzing two-cluster scenarios with China as the reference country, the other BRICS countries tend to be included in the same cluster. However, India and Indonesia have low membership grades (Table 2). This pattern persists across all two-cluster configurations for the other reference countries: all non-reference BRICS countries, excluding China, typically cluster together. However, this trend does not hold if the number of clusters increases. Even with the first increase in cluster number, when the third centroid appears, one of the BRICS countries joins the new group, or clusters A1 and A2 form with an equal number of non-reference BRICS countries. In two cases, Russia is the first BRICS country to leave (Tables 2 and 6). In the case of India as the reference country, China and Indonesia are the first countries to leave (Table 4). In the case of Indonesia as the reference country, India is the first country to leave, except for China (Table 7). In the case of Brazil as the reference country, the BRICS countries, except for China, are divided into two clusters, A1 and A2. However, after that, in the case of four clusters, Russia forms a separate cluster with Colombia (Table 3). When Russia is the reference country, the BRICS group loses Brazil in three clusters (Table 5).

A key finding is that, in two cluster cases, China does not appear in cluster A, except when India is the reference country (see Table 4), and even then its membership grade is low. China also joins cluster A in the case of five clusters with India as the reference country and in cluster A1 with Russia in three cluster divisions when the South African Republic is the reference country (Table 6).

In all cases, some non-BRICS countries are present in cluster A (and cluster A1). In cases with two clusters, these countries are Colombia, Indonesia and Turkey. In cases where the reference countries are Russia or South Africa, Japan is also included, though the membership grades in both cases are minimal (see Tables 5 and 6). In some cases, Colombia forms a separate cluster with Russia (and in the case of Russia as the reference country — with Brazil).

Discussion

The clustering results reveal several important patterns. Without the limitations discussed below, one might initially conclude that the BRICS countries, excluding China, exhibit minimal homogeneity as they tend to be grouped together in two-cluster scenarios. However, this apparent pattern is not sustained. Starting with three-cluster models, these countries no longer consistently group together, indicating that any homogeneity beyond a minimal level is unsupportable. Moreover, even in the two-cluster configurations where all five non-reference BRICS countries are placed in the same cluster A, the membership grades for India, Indonesia, and China remain low. In fact, any claim regarding the homogeneity of the BRICS countries (excluding China) should be treated with caution because of issues related to the selection of control countries, as discussed below. Nevertheless, within the current set of controls, there appears to be minimal potential for homogeneity among the BRICS countries, aside from China.

One of the key findings of this analysis is that, unlike the other BRICS countries studied, which exhibit at least minimal homogeneity, China demonstrates virtually none. For instance, in the two-cluster model with India as the reference country, China exhibits a low membership grade, indicating that it lies almost equidistant between the two clusters. (Table 4). This lack of clustering affinity suggests that China, the largest economy among BRICS, does not align closely with the other member countries — at least within the scope of this research. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Zharikov (2023) and Nach and Ncwadi (2024).

It could be argued that the studies by Artis and Zhang (1998, 2001, 2002) and subsequent research using similar methods and factors did not examine Germany’s homogeneity with other European economies. Specifically, Germany consistently served as the reference country, without being tested for its inclusion in the core cluster of economies that meet the criteria for an OCA when alternative central countries are used. However, those studies primarily focused on identifying subgroups within the EMU, such as peripheral countries within the union or prospective new Eurozone members. In contrast, the issue of core and periphery within a potential BRICS currency area becomes relevant only if the idea of establishing such an area is viewed favorably. This, however, remains far from certain. Assessing the homogeneity of the BRICS countries according to OCA criteria represents a necessary step in determining whether the creation of a BRICS currency area is a viable and desirable objective. Therefore, even if it is accepted that China would serve as the central country in a hypothetical BRICS currency union, it is crucial not only to assess whether the other BRICS countries are equally prepared to align with the central country, but also to determine how closely they resemble it — that is, whether they are economically homogeneous with China. This, in effect, is equivalent to evaluating whether China is homogeneous with the rest of the BRICS countries.

Many studies on the European Monetary Union (EMU) do not include export concentration and diversification as factors in their analyses. Yet, the selection of variables can significantly influence clustering outcomes. For example, when the export concentration factor is excluded from the model, the results indicate a seemingly higher degree of homogeneity with Russia joining cluster A in most scenarios (see Appendices 8–13). Although much of the existing literature on fuzzy clustering and OCA omits this factor, we argue that export concentration should be considered a core component of the analysis. The high level of export concentration in some countries within the monetary union, combined with the diversified export and production structures of others, can lead to significant imbalances in the balance of payments within the currency area. Also the transition from a sovereign floating exchange rate to a fixed regime — or a shared currency — may involve substantial economic costs. Including export concentration as a factor in the analysis has frequently resulted in Russia being excluded from the homogeneous group, revealing critical points of risk and underlying disparities in export structures.

Just as the choice of factors significantly influences the clustering results, so does the selection of countries included in the analysis. Adding new countries not only broadens the analytical scope but can also alter the distribution of already-studied countries by shifting the coordinates of the centroids. While the BRICS group is represented as fully as possible based on the available data, the composition of the control group poses a more complex challenge. Control countries are selected not only according to data availability but also to a diverse range of economic characteristics, including levels of market development and geographic regions. The BRICS countries under study may exhibit similarities with various control countries, causing them to form homogeneous clusters with those nations rather than within Cluster A. Thus, the perceived homogeneity of the BRICS group is challenged by the heterogeneity of the control group. However, it is possible that countries not currently in the control group could form new homogeneous clusters with the BRICS countries under study if they were added. Consequently, the apparent minimal level of homogeneity observed thus far may not be reflected if the sample of countries is expanded.

The issue of country selection is a significant limitation, meaning that the conclusion regarding minimal homogeneity among the BRICS countries cannot be asserted with full certainty. However, one key finding can be maintained with greater confidence: China does not exhibit economic homogeneity with the other BRICS countries included in this study, as defined by OCA criteria. While we cannot be certain that there is no configuration of control countries in which the other BRICS members would cease to form cluster A, the current — diversified — set of control countries already reveals that China does not join cluster A. It is theoretically possible to construct a different control group that would shift the centroids in a way that consistently places China within cluster A. However, it is likely that China’s membership grade would remain low in such cases. This hypothesis could be tested in future studies, and there is substantial potential to expand this research. Incorporating additional factors and expanding the set of countries could help refine the results.

In most cases, the boundary between clusters A and B appears to align with the divide between emerging and developed market economies. Japan is a notable exception in Tables 4 and 5. This pattern raises an important question for future research: do emerging and developing countries share enough structural characteristics to make it more likely that they will form homogeneous groups with each other than with developed economies under OCA criteria? If so, does this have implications for the potential trajectory of BRICS expansion? This observation could inform the selection of control countries in subsequent studies. Achieving an appropriate balance of developed and emerging economies within the control group is essential for accurately calibrating the number and composition of comparison countries.

This study holds potential value for decision-making and policy development. The policy-making process may be based on further analysis of the OCA factors considered here, which could help to identify specific areas of divergence among the BRICS countries. Identifying the indicators showing the greatest disparities, such as inflation rates, can inform targeted policy responses. Fuzzy C-means clustering could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of inflation targeting and the preparedness of economies for monetary union following the implementation of policy measures. Examining each individual factor in detail would constitute a separate line of research, offering useful insights into the steps that the BRICS countries would need to take to establish a shared currency or payment system. However, the wide range of relevant economic variables can make it difficult to evaluate a country’s overall readiness. This is where the results and methodology of the current study could be useful.

Another way in which policymakers could utilize the findings of this study would be to evaluate the necessity and feasibility of establishing a BRICS monetary union and a common currency. The OCA framework fundamentally involves weighing the costs, risks, and benefits of monetary integration. Even when focusing solely on the largest or so-called “core” BRICS economies, several structural challenges become evident. These countries are spread across several continents and are separated by vast distances and oceans. Furthermore, their populations belong to a variety of different cultural and linguistic groups. Although these structural circumstances make it particularly difficult for the BRICS countries to satisfy one of the core OCA criteria — namely, factor mobility — policymakers may assume that this weakness could be offset by strength in other OCA criteria, such as trade integration or synchronized business cycles. However, the results of the fuzzy C-means clustering analysis present an overarching view that challenges such optimism. Even when considered collectively, the BRICS economies do not demonstrate a high level of homogeneity. Taken alongside other studies that question the viability of a BRICS currency area, these findings may bolster the argument that such a monetary union is not feasible at present.

Conclusion

The results of this study suggest that the BRICS countries are not homogeneous according to Optimal Currency Area (OCA) criteria, primarily because China does not demonstrate significant homogeneity with the other BRICS members in most scenarios. Although the remaining BRICS economies are often grouped together as a single, homogeneous cluster, this pattern is neither consistent nor robust enough to confirm true homogeneity. Indirect indicators, such as low membership grades and the unstable clustering of these countries as the number of clusters increases, highlight the uncertainty surrounding the OCA compatibility of the BRICS members other than China.

Future research could help to clarify two key issues: first, whether focusing exclusively on the four BRICS countries (excluding China) would reveal greater internal consistency; and second, whether expanding the pool of control countries would alter the observed clustering patterns.

These findings are relevant to policymakers considering the future of financial convergence among the BRICS nations. Furthermore, the relatively consistent grouping of emerging market economies, such as Colombia and Turkey, alongside the BRICS countries suggests that these nations could be potential candidates for future membership.

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