Research Article |
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Corresponding author: David Umoru ( david.umoru@yahoo.com ) Academic editor: Marina Sheresheva
© 2026 David Umoru, Rashidah Elamah, Beauty Igbinovia.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Citation:
Umoru D, Elamah R, Igbinovia B (2026) Stochastic Effects of Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Monetary-Fiscal Simulation on Exports in Asia. BRICS Journal of Economics 7(2): 211-309. https://doi.org/10.3897/brics-econ.7.e185197
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The study explores the stochastic impacts of the exchange rate fluctuation and the synergistic effects of monetary-fiscal expansion simulations on export growth in Asia. It attempts to fill the gap between theoretical policy development and the practical uncertainty of policymakers in the emerging Asian markets.
The study is based on dual methodological approach. The study is based on a dual methodological approach. First, a Panel System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is used on a panel of Asian economies to identify structural determinants and interaction effects. Second, a Bayesian-estimated Medium-Scale version of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equation (DSGE) is employed to simulate the time-dependent reactions of exports to different policy and uncertainty shocks within twenty years span (the horizon taken to be twenty quarters). DSGE estimation was based on 26 years of historical data (January 1, 2000-December 31, 2025), and the impulse-response functions were simulated with horizon of twenty quarters (five years), which is compatible with canonical frequencies of business cycles taking into cognizance the transmission lags that accompany monetary and fiscal policy interventions required for the confirmation of the DSGE model convergence to the steady state. Besides, the homogeneity of monetary-fiscal policy regime that characterized the post-2000 era provides stability in the estimated deep parameters over the sample thus fulfilling the Lucas critique.
The GMM estimation shows that financial development and credit expansion are the most powerful structural forces of exports. Financial maturity only amplifies the advantages of competitive devaluations, according to the correlation between exchange rates and financial depth. The simulations in DSGE also show a coordinated expansion to be the most powerful stimulus as it will result in the greatest growth of exports of 0.934. A significant dampening in export growth is seen through policy uncertainty which is a big pull of exports in the economies of Asia. Conversely, the level of expansion of money supply, availability of domestic credit, financial development and consumption of energy has a positive impact on exports which in turn brings about the significance of liquidity, financial depth and production capacity in export expansion. The empirical evidence suggests that the competitiveness channel effect in the region of Asia is 0.867%. This gain is, nevertheless, dependent on financial maturity. In the case of the 16 poorest nations, the overall impact of monetary and fiscal expansion is expected to be positive if these economies are coupled with institutional reforms that reduce the cost of energy and debt. The simulated responses reveal stark structural asymmetries across the sample. While nominal exchange rate depreciation and co-ordinated monetary expansions represent extremely effective but necessarily short-lived export shocks - peaking invariably in Quarter four and reverting to the mean in Quarter twelve - the longer-run effects differ markedly. Bayesian inferences confirm that financial development is the only structural parameter that may lead to permanent (non-mean-reverting) export growth. By contrast, institutional weakness in forms of policy uncertainty, energy costs and black market labour exports inflicts significant negative asymmetries upon the fragile. The results show that the only way to avoid cyclical volatility is to prioritise holistic financial market development over short-term macroeconomic policymaking.
The study provides a contribution to the literature by developing a methodological interface between the reduced-form empirical research and structural general-equilibrium modelling in the emerging Asian markets. It separates the structural processes to determine the causal transmission processes of monetary-fiscal synergy and exchange-rate volatility on export growth in a Bayesian DSGE model with diffuse priors adapted to the high-volatility regime typical in developing Asia. The model explicitly measures the sensitivity of the effectiveness of conventional policies that promote exports to policy uncertainty, as well as the fear of floating, which can be unduly precarious in linear panel regressions by including a stochastic volatility factor. The research establishes that the Asian poorest economies are constrained by structural asymmetries. The credibility intervals around the 90% high-posterior-density (HPD) intervals with prior means robustly confirm that, while these countries are equipped with highly elastic short-term absorption capacities to monetary and currency shocks, these economies are by nature incapable of permanently shifting their long-term economic paradigms via cyclical policies. Weak economies disproportionately suffer from policy uncertainty and supply-side restrictions, and are thus more likely to cancel out the effects of positive exchange rates.
Asian Exports, Stochastic Shocks, DSGE Simulation, Monetary-Fiscal Expansion, Exchange Rate Volatility, Financial Development, Policy Uncertainty.
The stochastic model depicts the uncertainty associated with changes in economic variables as a dynamic condition that is influenced both by the general economic trend and by random economic phenomena. Monetary policy transmission and exchange rate responses are not constant but evolving with shifts in global financial conditions and uncertainty (
Thirdly, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies and its influence on investment and export dynamics in different economic contexts has not yet been thoroughly researched (
Fifth, while the influence of financial growth, energy use and policy uncertainty on the transmission of currency and monetary policy impacts to investment and exports has been studied, it remains a relatively under-explored area in the literature (
From the above, this study intends to tackle the following: (1) To assess the role played by the monetary-fiscal policy mix in influencing the stochastic effects of total export growth rate in the 16 least developed countries of Asia. (2) To simulate using the DSGE model, the total exports’ response to the stochastic impacts of the monetary-fiscal policy mix. (3) To derive policy implications for the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in various economic contexts from the empirical evidence and simulation results.
The first section of our study outlines the research problem and highlights areas of the literature that require updating with sophisticated analytical frameworks. The research questions and objectives are also clearly defined to direct the empirical analysis, and the hypotheses put forward are testable propositions based on theoretical expectations. The sections on scope and limitations define the restrictions of the analysis and set realistic expectations for the study’s contributions. The next section is an empirical literature review focusing solely on studies from 2022 to 2024. This ensures that the review presents the most up-to-date findings and methodological advancements. This section summarizes previous research findings from various theoretical perspectives and provides a solid foundation for the empirical analysis. The third section deals with estimation techniques, providing a comprehensive description of the methodology of each approach, detailing their respective pros and cons, and outlining their appropriate usage. This section can be viewed as both a methodological handbook for applying the techniques and a guide to understanding the results. It covers data description and sources, discusses the data sources, and how the variables were constructed and the quality of the data. This information is important for the analysis and its limitations. Section 4 presents the estimated DSGE and system-GMM results, and section five provides a robust discussion of the resulting findings. Section six contains our concluding remarks.
In recent years, the empirical literature on the relationship between exchange rates and export performance has advanced significantly, in terms of both the methods developed and the complexity of the international economic landscape. From 2022 to 2026, the focus of the study shifted towards the dynamic, non-linear and state-dependent nature of the relationship between exchange rates and exports. This change is driven by greater volatility in exchange rates, geopolitical tensions, uncertainty in financial markets and growing linkages with global value chains (
Studies using Bayesian time-varying parameter models indicate that the effects of exchange-rate movements on trade have become increasingly dynamic and sensitive to economic conditions (
Besides the more traditional exchange-rate and monetary-policy channels, recent work has focused on the policy options that can be used to dampen exchange-rate volatility. Using a Generalized Synthetic Control framework,
Despite these significant contributions, there are still several important gaps in the literature. Firstly, existing DSGE studies often consider shocks one at a time in their impulse response functions, which limits the assessment of joint stochastic effects (
To provide a thorough analysis of the dynamic transmission mechanism and the joint effects of monetary and fiscal policies on export growth, this study adopts a dual methodological framework. This framework integrates a Bayesian-estimated New Keynesian small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a dynamic panel System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. This combination effectively deals with endogeneity and captures the persistence of structures over quarterly data for 26 years, from 2000 to 2025.
The DSGE method provides a microeconomic foundation for the study of the impact of exchange rate changes and monetary policy shocks on domestic investment and exports (
(1)
Note that Ct is consumption, Ht is hours of labour worked, Mt /Pt is real money held, and t is the discount factor. The utility function is specified as:
Household Sector: The utility relation of the household is as given in equation (2).
(2)
The household’s budget constraint is:
PtCt + Mt + Bt + EtBt* = WtHt + Mt–1 + Rt–1Bt–1 + EtRt*B*t–1 + Πt + Tt (3)
where Bt and Bt* are domestic and foreign bonds, Et is nominal exchange rate, Wt is the nominal wage, Rt and Rt* are domestic and foreign interest rates, Πt represents profits from firms, and Tt are transfers.
Domestic Firms: Domestic firms operate in monopolistically competitive markets and face price adjustment costs. The productions function for firm j is as specified in equation (4):
Yt(j) = AtHt(j)αKt–1(j)1–α (4)
where At is the effect of technology, Ht(j) is labor man-hour input, and Kt(j) is capital stock. Capital accumulation follows:
(5)
where It(j) is investment, δ is depreciation rate, and ϕI represents investment adjustment costs.
Price Setting: Firms’ price change or adjustment costs equation is given in (6):
(6)
where ϑp account for price stickiness (price adjustment cost) parameter and πs is steady-state inflation or gross inflation rate that defines the change in current prices by firms relative to previous prices and Y is national output.
Export Sector: The export demand follows a detailed specification that incorporates the key variables of the study:
DEXPt = f [PEXP,t,St,FINDEVt,POLUNCt,Pt*,Yt*,ηEXP,ηFIN,ηY,ηPOL,ξEXP,t} (7)
where DEXPt is total exports, PEXP,t is the domestic export price, St is the nominal exchange rate, Pt* is the foreign price level, Yt* is foreign output/demand, FINDEVt is the financial development index, POLUNCt is the policy uncertainty index, ηEXP is the price elasticity of export demand, ηY is the income elasticity of export demand, ηFIN captures financial development effects on export capacity, ηPOL captures policy uncertainty effects on export performance, ξEXP,t is an export-specific shock. The export price is determined by:
(8)
where μEXP is the export markup, MCt is marginal cost, τEXP,t represents export-related costs including financing costs affected by monetary policy, γFIN captures how financial development reduces export costs, and γPOL captures how policy uncertainty increases export costs. The export firms face working capital requirements that depend on monetary policy:
(9)
where θEXP is the working capital coefficient and ϕWC captures the sensitivity to interest rates.
Monetary policy specification: The central bank follows an enhanced Taylor-type rule that incorporates money supply considerations and responds to both domestic and external conditions interest rate smoothing. The enhanced Taylor-Type rule is as specified:
(10)
Money supply follows an enhanced specification:
(11)
where ρR and ρM are persistence parameters, ϕπ, ϕγ, ϕS, ϕMR, and ϕMY are policy response coefficients, and and are monetary policy shocks.
Credit supply is determined by the specification of equation (12):
(12)
where γCRED captures financial development effects on credit supply and ϕCRED captures interest rate effects.
Fiscal policy: With regard to government expenditure, ĝt is fraction of the deviation of government spending from its steady state, γg is persistence parameter that measure how long the fiscal programs would last or persists and is a fiscal policy shock. The relationship is represented in equation (13).
(13)
Foreign Sector and Exchange Rate: The exchange rate is based on interest parity that incorporates risk premiums, financial development, and policy uncertainty. The foreign sector equations are given as:
(14)
where the risk premium follows an enhanced specification:
(15)
This specification shows that financial development reduces the risk premium (higher FINDEV lowers the risk premium through ψ1 > 0, ψ2 > 0), policy uncertainty increases the risk premium (through ψ3 > 0; credit conditions affect the risk premium (through ψ4); and external debt levels affect the risk premium (through ψ5 > 0). The model includes several stochastic processes that drive the key variables of the study:
Technology shock (in deviation from steady state):
(16)
Export demand shock:
(17)
Policy uncertainty shock:
(18)
Financial development evolution:
(19)
Foreign demand shock:
(20А)
Risk premium shock:
(20)
Monetary policy rate shock:
(21)
Money supply shock:
(22)
Credit shock:
(23)
where all ϵ and ν terms represent white noise innovations with zero mean and unit variance, ât is percentage deviation of technology from its steady state, γa is persistence parameter that measure how long the technology upgrading persists and ea,t is shock innovation. A logarithmic linearization of in its steady state yields a system of linear rational expectations equations that can be solved using standard techniques. The key equations for the study variables are: The log-linearized investment, exports, exchange rates, monetary policy rule, money supply and credit equations are given by equations (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), and (29) respectively.
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
where: , etc. denote log-deviations from steady state; is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for investment; γE,γC, γF, γp, γMS are coefficients capturing exchange; rate, credit, financial development, policy uncertainty, and money supply effects on investment; , , , are elasticities of export demand with respect to prices, foreign income, financial development, and policy uncertainty; , are coefficients capturing real interest rate, money supply, and credit effects on exports. The equations demonstrate the manner in which exports are affected by interest rates, exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables, thereby establishing the foundation for the examination of policy transmission mechanisms. In some countries such as Nepal, Tajikistan and the Philippines remittances tend to compete or even surpass export earnings (
A. Modified Household Budget Constraint: In this case, we need to add remittances (REMt), which are often received in foreign currency and converted at the nominal exchange rate (St), to equation (3) to have equation (30).
(30)
B. Remittance Shock Process: Remittances are largely exogenous to domestic monetary policy, driven by foreign income and external shocks (
(31)
C. Balance of Payments (External Sector) with Remittances: This inflow of remittances essentially changes the exchange rate dynamics by offering a substitute to export-related foreign reserves (
(32)
The informal sector does not pay taxes or comply with proper financial rules, and relies on cash rather than formal credit (Gordon & Li, 2005).
A. Dual labor market: The representative household divides labor into formal (LF,t) and informal (LI,t) so that the disutility of labor on the utility functional becomes:
(33)
B. Informal production function: Informal firms are very labor-intensive and with little or no formal capital or technology modernizing, unlike formal firms that use capital (Kt) and workforce (
(34)
where is the informal sector labor share, and AI,t, is the informal level of technology/efficiency.
C. National output aggregation: The total national output (Yt) follows a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) of formal (YF,t)and informal (YI,t) goods:
(35)
where λ is the structural size/weight of the formal economy, and θ is the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods.
In truly rural regions of the chosen countries the exchange of agricultural products does not always go through fiat money. This affects the way in which monetary policy is transmitted, since the interest rate set by central banks (MPR) only affects the monetized part of the economy (
A. Splitting consumption: Total consumption (Ct) is broken down into monetized consumption (CM,t, which needs fiat money) and barter consumption (CB,t, which needs direct goods exchange and time/search costs).
(36)
B. Money demand (Cash-in-advance constraint): We add a liquidity constraint, which is only applied to the monetized sector. When γ denotes the proportion of purchases to be made using fiat money, the real money balances should satisfy
(37)
C. The Barter search cost: Barter is not without cost; it involves the cost of searching for transactions (
(38)
where κ is the coefficient of friction of barter trade. As monetary policy tightens (i.e. interest rates increase), households will replace monetized consumption (CMt) with barter (CBt), but they will suffer from the increased search costs . The IMF’s creation of medium-scale DSGE models for combined policy analysis demonstrates that these models are increasingly recognised as useful for jointly considering monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macro-policy stability and capital flow management (
DEXPi,t = α1DEXPi,t–1 + β1REERi,t + β2MPRi,t + β3MSi,t + β4CREDITi,t + + β5POLUNCi,t + β6FINDEVi,t + β7ENCONSi,t + μi + λt + ui,t (39)
Where DEXPi,t is export growth in country i at time t, REERi,t is the real effective exchange rate change; MPRi,t is the monetary policy rate; MSi,t is money supply growth; CREDITi,t is credit/GDP growth rate; POLUNCi,t is policy uncertainty index; FINDEVi,t is financial development indicator; ENCONSi,t is energy consumption growth; μi represents unobserved country-specific effects; λt is time-specific effects; and ui,t is the idiosyncratic error term. The export growth model is specified as:
(40)
To capture the effects of monetary-fiscal policy mix, the extended model with policy interactions is thus specified as in equation (41):
DEXPi,t = α1DEXPi,t–1 + β1REERi,t + β2MPRi,t + β3MSi,t + β4CREDITi,t + β5POLUNCi,t + + β6FINDEVi,t + β7ENCONSi,t + β8(MPRi,t × MSi,t) + β9(REERi,t × FINDEVi,t) + + β10(POLUNCi,t × CREDITi,t) + β11(MPRi,t × REERi,t) + μi + λt + ui,t (41)
This extended specification takes into account the monetary policy coordination effects through MPRi,t × MSi,t; financial development enhancement of exchange rate effects through REERi,t × FINDEVi,t; policy uncertainty moderation of credit effects through POLUNCi,t × CREDITi,t and exchange rate-monetary policy interactions through MPRi,t × REERi,t. GOVEXPi,t is government expenditure growth and TAXREVi,t is tax revenue growth. To operationalize all proxy variables for the informal sector, barter and non-monetized trade in the panel System GMM framework, the extended new specification for the dynamic panel export growth equation model (Equation 41) becomes:
(42)
The true marginal effect of monetary policy on exports is no longer just . It is calculated by taking the partial derivative of exports with respect to the monetary policy rate:
(43)
The PGMM model for exports was estimated in order to deal with endogeneity and identification problems across the panel. The PGMM approach combines the first-differenced equation with the levels equation (
(44)
Alternatively, the levels equation can be specified as in (34):
(45)
The additional moment conditions for the levels equation are:
E[ΔDEXPi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 fors ≥ 1 (46)
E[ΔREERi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (47)
E[ΔMPRi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (48)
E[ΔMSi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (49)
E[ΔCREDITi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (50)
E[ΔPOLUNCi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (51)
E[ΔFINDEVi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (52)
These moment conditions require the assumption that the correlation between individual effects and lagged first differences is constant over time, enabling identification of the levels equation parameters (
(53)
The instrument matrix for the system GMM estimator is such that, for the first-differenced equation, we used lagged levels, and for the levels equation, we used lagged first differences of endogenous variables, while strictly operationalizing the exogenous condition for all available lags and leads. Accordingly, the instrument matrix grows with the time dimension but can be collapsed to reduce instrument proliferation (
(54)
where is the residual vector, Zi is the instrument matrix, and W is a weighting matrix. The following optimal weighting matrix was utilized:
(55)
where is the variance-covariance matrix of the error vector. Consequently, we executed a two-step process where the first step involved the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the regression model with the identity matrix as weighting matrix, leading to consistent estimates; and the second step included the application of the residuals from the first step in order to construct the optimal weighting matrix. For the PGMM estimation, we performed also the following tests of specification: the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation to examine for AR(2) in the first-differenced residuals; the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions to settle the validity of instruments; the difference-in-Hansen test to evaluate subsets of instruments; and the instrument rank condition to test model identification. We applied the Windmeijer factor to adjust standard errors for the two-step GMM; the forward orthogonal deviations of the sample size; and the bias correction factor that modifies the coefficient estimates for finite sample bias. The Panel generalized method of moments (PGMM) approach is a commonly used estimation method to address endogeneity concerns in dynamic models with panel data (
For this study, the dependent variable to be analyzed is total export growth (DEXP). DEXP growth was calculated as the yearly percentage change in the value of goods and services exported at constant prices. The export data has been computed by combining merchandise export trade statistics with balance of payments data for services. These were acquired from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, 2025), and the UN Comtrade database (2025). Export data was adjusted for re-exports whenever feasible in order to concentrate on the local production. For the countries where there is a substantial amount of entrepôt trade, the process of distinguishing between domestic exports and foreign goods re-exports was very meticulous. The services include both the traditional and the new forms of digital services trades, depending on the availability of data. The focus on total exports rather than specific export categories allows for a comprehensive analysis of how macroeconomic variables affect overall export performance. The measurement of export performance considers both volume and value effects, recognizing that exchange rate fluctuations can affect export competitiveness through the price effect, while a monetary policy shock may influence the sector’s capacity through its impact on domestic economic conditions and financing availability. The set of control variables is likely to include policy and population uncertainty, financial development, energy consumption and the output gap, as well as the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy tools.
Where applicable, the policy uncertainty index (POLUNC) was calculated using the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) indices developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (
Financial development measures were standardized and combined through the technique of principal component analysis to derive composite indices representing the overall development of the financial sector.
The monetary policy rate variable used by each country’s central bank to enforce monetary policy was utilised. During periods of unconventional monetary policy, shadow rates estimated by financial institutions were employed to model monetary policy shocks when interest rates were constrained by the zero lower bound. These shadow rates factor in the effects of unconventional policy actions, such as quantitative easing and forward guidance (
The research spans 1st January 2000 to 31st December 2025 and uses quarterly observations on 11 variables (explanatory, interacted and control variables) in 16 economies of Asia. A total of 1,664 represent the sample observations that have been acquired by multiplying 26 years by 4 quarters and then further dividing it by 104 time periods. With 16 countries, N = 16 × T = 104. To address the apparent discrepancy between the years and quarters, the analysis uses year on year (YoY) growth at quarterly frequencies. Hence, we do not switch to annual frequency (N=26). We used quarterly frequency (N=104) because we needed to convert our variables into annual changes but measured at each quarterly point. This method reconciles any observed data measurement inconsistency and consequently removes seasonality effects (a comparison between Q1 to Q1), and makes the variables stationary (I(0)). It also provides the high-frequency data needed to bring Bayesian convergence in the DSGE model, and places the observed variables on the growth path of the model using a particular observation equation specified in (5), which provides the annual variation of the variables in relation to the quarterly dynamics.
(56)
Largely, the DSGE model uses the measurement equation to translate annual data changes against the quarterly structural dynamics of the model (
(57)
Where: is the steady-state trend growth rate (estimated or fixed), is the model’s export variable (deviation from steady state) and is a measurement error (optional, to prevent stochastic singularity). For interest rates (MPR) and uncertainty,
(58)
(59)
To interpret the simulations properly, it was necessary to have a clear difference between the estimation sample and the simulation environment. The estimation sample is the historical observations through which the prior distributions of the model may be transformed into posterior distributions, in order to represent the most plausible parameter values in consideration of the data. This sample was randomized with 1664 observations for the 16 Asian countries making the inference on the model on the Asian export development to different macro-economic shocks throughout the 26 years. By comparison, the simulation sample is an experimental design that examines the effect of shocks in a 20-quarter (five-year) horizon, with an initial hypothetical disturbance. These simulations are not predictions to the year 2026; instead, these are controlled experiments, designed to observe the effects of specific shocks, such as a 1% monetary expansion, on the export-led economy under the assumption that the parameters estimated using the sample remain constant.
The selection of the study countries was based on the poorest 16 Asian countries, emerging and developing economies in Asia with differing institutional frameworks, financial development and policy transmission mechanisms. The Asian countries in the sample were classified as low-middle and low-income according to the World Bank (
| Region | Countries Selected | Economic Characteristics (Justification) |
|---|---|---|
| Region | Countries Selected | Economic Characteristics (Justification) |
| South Asia (6) | 1. Afghanistan, 2. Bangladesh, 3. Bhutan, 4. Nepal, 5. Pakistan, 6. Sri Lanka | The economy is characterized by high surplus labor and heavily relies on remittances, thus being susceptible to changes in energy prices (World Bank, 2022; Islam, 2021) |
| Southeast Asia (CLMV + 2) | 7. Cambodia, 8. Lao PDR, 9. Myanmar, 10. Timor-Leste, 11. Vietnam, 12. Philippines | The Factory Asia hub is an illustration of the integration into global supply chains, which are a shift in agricultural to manufacturing industries ( |
| Central Asia & Pacific (4) | 13. Kyrgyzstan, 14. Tajikistan, 15. Mongolia, 16. Papua New Guinea | It has a resource-dependent economy, with an emphasis on both mining and energy industries; resource-locked in Central Asia or closed off by the Pacific Ocean creates unique costs in trade ( |
| Data Sources by Variable | ||
| Variable | Abbreviation | Specific Database Source |
| Export Growth | EXP | IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) provides highly accurate monthly/quarterly bilateral trade data for capturing the rapid textile export shifts in South Asia and global supply chain integrations in Southeast Asia. |
| Real Effective Exchange Rate | REER | Bruegel REER Database / Bank for International Settlements (BIS) calculate REER for 170+ countries for capturing the currency volatility of the resource-dependent Central Asian group facing commodity shocks. |
| Monetary Policy Rate | MPR | IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) cross-reference with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators portal, used the Central Bank Discount Rate for tracking Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Philippines, while for dollarized or tightly managed economies like Timor-Leste or Cambodia, proxy rates via the ADB were utilized |
| Broad Money Supply | MS | IMF IFS (Monetary & Financial Statistics) tracks M2 or Broad Money aggregates. |
| Credit to Private Sector | CRED | World Bank Global Financial Development / ADB Key Indicators reports trade finance statistics for the Southeast Asian manufacturing group World Bank Global Financial Development Database, tracks Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) |
| Financial Development | FINDEV (M2 to GDP Ratio) | IMF Financial Development Index (FDI) |
| Investment / GDP Ratio | DINV | World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI): Gross fixed capital formation for Tracking factory and infrastructure scaling in CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) |
| Gov. Expenditure & Tax Revenue | GOVEXP / TAX | IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) augmented with the CEIC Data which provides excellent, localized high-frequency fiscal data for South and Southeast Asian emerging markets as well as the ADB Key Indicators is an excellent backup for Asian-specific fiscal metrics. |
| Energy Consumption | ENCONS | U. S. EIA / International Energy Agency (IEA) for Tracking energy vulnerability in South Asia and energy-intensive mining output in Mongolia and PNG |
| Policy Uncertainty | POLUNC | Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index: (bakerbloomdavis.com). For countries without a dedicated EPU index (like Bhutan or Tajikistan), we used the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Political Stability/Regulatory Quality) or the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). |
| Proxy Variables for the Informal Sector, Barter, and Non-Monetized Trade | ||
| Informal Sector (Currency Demand Proxy) | CURR_RATIO | IMF IFS (Monetary Data) calculates the ratio of Currency Outside Banks (COB) to Broad Money (M2) to capture the expansion of untaxed, cash-based shadow economy activities escaping formal banking. |
| Informal Sector (Physical Input Proxy) | ELEC_GAP | World Bank WDI / U. S. EIA calculated as the difference between total electricity consumption growth and official real GDP growth to proxy energy consumed by unregistered manufacturing and shadow firms. |
| Shadow Economy Index | SHADOW | Medina & Schneider Shadow Economy Database estimates the structural percentage of the shadow economy relative to GDP (interpolated from annual to quarterly data). |
| Non-Monetized Economy (Inverse Monetization) | INV_MON | Calculated directly from IMF IFS / World Bank WDI as 1 - (M2 / GDP). Captures the structural percentage of the domestic economy that relies on non-fiat transactions and is thus insulated from monetary policy transmission. |
| Barter Trade (Agricultural Weight) | AGRIC_VA | World Bank WDI tracks agricultural value-added as a % of GDP to measure rural reliance on subsistence farming and direct goods exchange that bypasses central bank interest rates. |
| Barter Frictions (Rural Population) | RURAL_POP | World Bank WDI / UN Population Division. Tracks rural population as a % of total population, serving as a structural proxy for low banking penetration and high non-monetized transaction volumes. |
Table
| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | Skewness | Kurtosis |
| DINV (%) | 8.67 | 15.23 | -45.67 | 67.89 | 0.78 | 6.23 |
| DEXP (%) | 9.34 | 18.45 | -52.33 | 78.45 | 0.89 | 7.12 |
| REER (log diff) | -0.012 | 0.156 | -0.678 | 0.567 | -0.23 | 5.67 |
| MPR (%) | 7.89 | 4.67 | 2.25 | 25.5 | 2.34 | 9.45 |
| MS (%) | 15.67 | 12.34 | -8.45 | 67.23 | 1.89 | 8.23 |
| CREDIT (%) | 12.45 | 19.67 | -35.67 | 89.23 | 1.45 | 7.89 |
| POLUNC (index) | 0.67 | 1.34 | -2.89 | 4.56 | 0.78 | 4.12 |
| FINDEV (index) | 0.34 | 0.18 | 0.12 | 0.72 | 0.67 | 3.45 |
| ENCONS (%) | 6.78 | 8.94 | -15.67 | 45.23 | 1.23 | 6.45 |
The wide range of -0.678 to 0.567 shows how much the currencies of Asia are exposed to external shocks and how little stabilization capacity there is in these economies that are often caught in the trap of balance of payments problems, political instability and varying levels of foreign exchange reserves. Asian countries have been setting their monetary policy rates at an average of 7.89%, which is considerably higher than in Europe (2.15%) but lower than the African level (12.67%). This situation reflects an inflationary environment that is not excessively high, the macroeconomic volatility that is remarkably greater than that of the advanced economies, and the necessity for the high real interest rates that are needed not only to secure economic stability and attract capital inflows but also to offset the effects of inflation in the long term. Additionally, the standard deviation of 4.67% and the extreme range of 2.25% to 25.5% suggest significant variations in monetary policy across countries and over time. This has often reflected crisis response measures, different levels of institutional capacity for monetary policy implementation, and varying approaches to inflation targeting and exchange rate management. Countries in Asia experience a wide range of volatility, reflecting external shocks, policy changes and global economic conditions. This is indicative of the export-oriented nature of many Asian economies and their integration into the volatile global value chain. With an average growth rate of 15.67% and a high standard deviation of 12.34%, money supply growth reflects the challenges of maintaining monetary stability in contexts with limited institutional capacity for sophisticated monetary policy implementation, as well as the accommodation of rapid economic growth characteristic of developing economies. The high positive skewness of 1.89 indicates frequent episodes of rapid monetary expansion, potentially reflecting crisis response measures, accommodative policies to support growth during economic downturns, or difficulties in controlling monetary aggregates due to financial system development limitations. Credit growth averages 12.45% with exceptionally high volatility (standard deviation of 19.67%), indicating dynamic but unstable financial intermediation characterized by rapid expansion periods followed by sharp contractions. The extreme range from -35.67% to 89.23% reflects the boom-bust cycles typical of developing financial systems with limited regulatory capacity, procyclical lending behavior, and high sensitivity to external financing conditions and policy changes. The financial development index averages 0.34, substantially lower than European levels (0.78) but higher than African levels (0.19), indicating intermediate financial system sophistication with significant room for improvement in access to financial services, capital market development and regulatory framework enhancement. The relatively narrow range of 0.12 to 0.72 indicates that there are ongoing financial development constraints across the region. Even the most advanced Asian countries in this group have relatively limited financial system capabilities compared to those in advanced economies.
Policy uncertainty averages 0.67 with a standard deviation of 1.34, indicating moderate but variable policy predictability that significantly exceeds European levels (0.12) while remaining below African levels (1.23). This pattern reflects the intermediate institutional development characteristic of many Asian developing economies, which have achieved greater policy stability than the poorest African countries but continue to face significant policy uncertainty due to political transitions, external pressures and institutional capacity limitations. Energy consumption growth averages 6.78% with a standard deviation of 8.94%, reflecting the energy-intensive development strategies characteristic of industrializing Asian economies and their focus on manufacturing and infrastructure development. The positive skewness indicates periods of rapid energy consumption growth associated with economic expansion, industrial development and urbanization processes that characterize developing Asian economies. The descriptive statistics reveal that Asian countries occupy an intermediate position between European and African economies across most indicators, suggesting that they represent economies in transition from low-income to middle-income status with corresponding institutional and structural characteristics.
The pronounced fluctuations seen in most variables as compared to the European countries reveal the situation of the higher vulnerability to the external shocks and the limited institutional capability for the economic stabilization, while the generally more moderate levels compared to the African countries point to the existence of somewhat greater institutional development and economic stability. This intermediate position significantly affects the design of policies and economic management. Asian countries must tackle the dual challenge of controlling the volatility associated with developing economies and building the institutional capacity necessary for economic advancement. The combination of high growth rates and high volatility indicates that the Asian economies carry a lot of potential for development, but they will require carefully designed policy frameworks to both manage the risks involved and keep the growth trajectories at the sustainable levels.
The results of the prior distributions reported in Table
| Parameter Description | Parameter Symbol | Microeconomic Definition | Distribution | Prior Mean | Prior Std. Dev | Hyper-parameters (Shape / Scale) | Rationale for Asian Model |
| Inverse Inter-temporal Elasticity | σc | Hand-to-mouth behavior | Normal | 2.50 | 0.50 | N/A | Increased. Reflects severe lack of consumption smoothing due to subsistence living and lack of formal savings. |
| Habit Formation | h | Consumption persistence | Beta | 0.50 | 0.15 | a = 5.056 b = 5.056 | Decreased. Subsistence households consume based on immediate availability, lowering habit persistence. |
| Taylor Rule Inflation | φπ | Central Bank inflation response | Normal | 1.70 | 0.15 | N/A | Maintained. Central banks still aggressively target formal sector inflation to anchor expectations. |
| Taylor Rule Output | φy | Central Bank output response | Normal | 0.12 | 0.05 | N/A | Maintained. Growth mandates remain secondary to exchange rate and price stability. |
| Calvo Price Stickiness | θp | Price adjustment rigidity | Beta | 0.55 | 0.10 | a = 13.063 b = 10.688 | Decreased. Blends rigid formal prices with the highly flexible, daily-adjusted prices of the informal/barter markets. |
| Formal Sector Weight | ω | CES weight of formal goods | Beta | 0.45 | 0.10 | a = 10.688 b = 13.063 | New. Acknowledges that the informal sector generates a massive portion of aggregate national output. |
| Monetization Ratio | γm | Fiat currency reliance | Beta | $0.60$ | 0.10 | a = 13.800 b = 9.200 | New. Captures the cash-in-advance constraint; reflects the percentage of trade that cannot be bartered. |
| Remittance Persistence | ρrem | Stickiness of FX transfers | Beta | 0.85 | 0.05 | a = 42.500 b = 7.500 | New. Remittances are highly persistent and structurally ingrained over long horizons, heavily dictating the REER. |
| General Shock Persistence | ρx | External/Tech shock duration | Beta | 0.50 | 0.20 | a = 2.625 b = 2.625 | Maintained. Captures standard medium-term persistence of external macroeconomic shocks. |
| Informal Productivity Shock | σinf | Informal sector volatility | Inv. Gamma | 1.00 | α = 2.000 β = 1.000 | New Friction Shock. Captures high-frequency unobserved supply-side shocks shifting the shadow economy. | |
| Barter Friction Shock | σbar | Non-monetized trade volatility | Inv. Gamma | 1.00 | α = 2.000 β = 1.000 | New Friction Shock. Captures exogenous shifts in rural liquidity constraints and non-monetized trade access. | |
| Monetary Transmission Shock | σnmt | Credit leakage volatility | Inv. Gamma | 1.00 | α = 2.000 β = 1.000 | New Friction Shock. Accounts for structural leakage in interest rate pass-through due to shallow financial markets. | |
| General Shock Volatility | σz | Exogenous shock magnitude | Inv. Gamma | 1.00 | α = 2.000 β = 1.000 | Maintained. Accounts for the inherently higher macroeconomic volatility in emerging frontier markets. |
Concurrently, the persistence and magnitude of broader external macroeconomic shocks remain firmly elevated within the inverse gamma and beta distributions, a necessary configuration to accommodate the inherent vulnerability of frontier markets to sudden global commodity shifts. This all-inclusive recalibration ensures that the subsequent empirical estimations do not artificially force advanced-economy dynamics onto deeply fragmented, cash-reliant and remittance-dependent nations. The open-economy, small-economy argument suggests that the Asian economies are vulnerable to external shocks due to their integration into the international financial cycle, given the increased macroeconomic volatility it implies (
The analysis of identification, which is summarized in Table
| Parameter | Description | Identification Status | Analysis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parameter | Description | Identification Status | Analysis |
| Monetary Policy Reaction (ϕ₁) | Response of interest rate to inflation | Identified | There is strong identification because changes in interest rates directly affect inflation, which is strongly supported by macroeconomic theory |
| Exchange Rate Sensitivity (α₁) | Sensitivity of exports to exchange rates | Identified | The high identification is obtained by explicit connections to trade data, i.e. exports and exchange rates; informative prior-distribution also reduces uncertainty |
| Export Elasticity to Exchange Rate (β₁) | Sensitivity of exports to exchange rate movements | Identified | The model can be easily identified due to the considerable changes in the interest rates and inflation, which makes it possible to establish a direct nexus between the shock and the empirical data |
| Monetary Policy Shock (σ₁) | Variance of monetary policy shock | Identified | The nominal interest rate’s volatility is the driving force behind parameter identification. By filtering out systematic policy reaction (Taylor-type rule) from the data, we were able to identify σ₁ as the remaining variance of unexplained noise. The evidence of steep curvature supports the view that inflation and/or output would not capture the shock by an endogenous deterministic variable. |
| Fiscal Policy Shock (σ₂) | Variance of fiscal policy shock | Identified | Fiscal policy shocks, such as government spending, have observable impacts on output and prices, providing good identification from macroeconomic data. |
| Risk Aversion Parameter (γ) | Degree of risk aversion in the economy | Weakly Identified | Risk aversion is poorly estimated because it is indirectly related to the observed data. Uncertainty arises due to the data being weakly identified. |
| Inflation Targeting Parameter (π₁) | Responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation deviations | Identified | Strong identification is obtained by the historical behavior of central banks towards inflation, especially in the economies that follow the active inflation-targeting policy |
| Export Demand Sensitivity (η₁) | Sensitivity of exports to external demand | Identified | There is a clear link between the variables and the world trade volumes and external demand for exports, based on historical trade statistics and the current world economic conditions |
| Price Stickiness (φ₁) | Degree of price rigidity | Identified | Price stickiness may be determined through inflation data especially when consideration is given to nominal rigidity or slow price response |
| Output Shock (σ₃) | Variance of output shock | Weakly Identified | In some economies, output shocks are less pronounced and therefore weakly identified. Consequently, estimation uncertainty arises due to low data variability |
Figure
As illustrated in Figure
As shown in Figure
Figure
On the other hand, contractionary monetary policy brings about huge and lasting adverse effects, while the adoption of expansionary monetary policy can lead to the most powerful positive response in exports. These effects are indeed much more significant than those experienced in Europe, as they directly reflect the higher price elasticity and external dependency typical of Asian developing economies (
The chart presented in Figure
As illustrated in Figure
The results of the DSGE export response simulations for the Asian countries included in the study are presented in Table
DSGE export response simulations - Asian countries (posterior means and 90% HPD intervals)
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.04% [-0.01%, 0.08%] | 0.11% [-0.02%, 0.24%] | 0.08% [-0.01%, 0.18%] | 0.03% [-0.01%, 0.07%] | 0.01% [-0.01%, 0.03%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | 0.11% [-0.02%, 0.24%] |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.05% [-0.10%, 0.01%] | -0.12% [-0.21%, -0.03%] | -0.09% [-0.16%, -0.01%] | -0.04% [-0.09%, 0.01%] | -0.01% [-0.03%, 0.01%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | -0.12% [-0.21%, -0.03%] |
| Exchange Rate Depreciation (10%) | -0.45% [-0.65%, -0.25%] | 0.85% [0.55%, 1.15%] | 1.42% [0.95%, 1.88%] | 0.75% [0.40%, 1.10%] | 0.25% [0.05%, 0.45%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | 1.42% [0.95%, 1.88%] |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.08% [0.02%, 0.14%] | 0.22% [0.10%, 0.35%] | 0.45% [0.25%, 0.65%] | 0.68% [0.40%, 0.95%] | 0.72% [0.45%, 0.98%] | 0.55% [0.30%, 0.80%] | 0.72% [0.45%, 0.98%] |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -0.35% [-0.50%, -0.20%] | -0.68% [-0.85%, -0.42%] | -0.52% [-0.70%, -0.30%] | -0.20% [-0.35%, -0.05%] | -0.08% [-0.18%, 0.02%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | -0.68% [-0.85%, -0.42%] |
| Coordinated Expansion | 0.18% [0.05%, 0.30%] | 0.52% [0.35%, 0.70%] | 0.88% [0.60%, 1.15%] | 0.45% [0.25%, 0.65%] | 0.18% [0.05%, 0.32%] | 0.10% [0.01%, 0.20%] | 0.88% [0.60%, 1.15%] |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.12% [0.04%, 0.20%] | 0.38% [0.18%, 0.55%] | 0.35% [0.15%, 0.50%] | 0.15% [0.02%, 0.28%] | 0.05% [-0.02%, 0.12%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | 0.38% [0.18%, 0.55%] |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.28% [-0.40%, -0.15%] | -0.56% [-0.75%, -0.32%] | -0.42% [-0.60%, -0.25%] | -0.18% [-0.30%, -0.05%] | -0.05% [-0.12%, 0.02%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | -0.56% [-0.75%, -0.32%] |
| Informal Sector Expansion (1% Labor Shift) | -0.15% [-0.25%, -0.05%] | -0.52% [-0.70%, -0.38%] | -0.45% [-0.62%, -0.28%] | -0.20% [-0.35%, -0.05%] | -0.05% [-0.15%, 0.05%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | -0.52% [-0.70%, -0.38%] |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑ in Search Costs) | -0.08% [-0.15%, -0.02%] | -0.22% [-0.34%, -0.11%] | -0.18% [-0.28%, -0.08%] | -0.05% [-0.12%, 0.02%] | -0.01% [-0.04%, 0.02%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | -0.22% [-0.34%, -0.11%] |
| Non-Monetized Trade Preference (1σ↑) | -0.10% [-0.18%, -0.03%] | -0.28% [-0.42%, -0.15%] | -0.35% [-0.50%, -0.20%] | -0.15% [-0.25%, -0.05%] | -0.02% [-0.08%, 0.04%] | 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] | -0.35% [-0.50%, -0.20%] |
During the impact phase, export growth shrinks by -0.45 percent, capturing the initial cost shock for export intermediate imports. Although this cost shock is short-lived, a powerful expenditure-switching effect ultimately catapults the export curve to a massive peak expansion of 1.42 percent in the fourth quarter. Despite the audacity of this growth, the confidence interval of 0.95 per cent to 1.88 per cent indicates significant variation across countries in the effectiveness of firms’ responses to a weak currency. To maintain global competitiveness without the whims of currency manipulation, the quantitative findings heavily favour institutional financial development. A one standard deviation positive shock to financial development yields a cumulative increase in the peak effect of 0.72 percent in the 12th quarter. Notably, it is the only shock which leaves a permanent, positive structural boost of 0.55 percent. Although raw domestic credit boom also delivers a quantitative benefit of 0.38 percent peak in the second quarter, the quantitative effects completely evaporate in the long run. On the downside, the simulation shows the devastating impact of domestic volatility and infrastructural gaps. A one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty immediately erodes manufacturers’ trust, triggering a rapid quantitative collapse of -0.68 percent in the second quarter. Physical bottlenecks mirror this psychological damage as a one standard deviation shock to energy intensity requires a -0.56 percent decline in exports. This metric provides the absolute binding constraints imposed by the weak electric grid on industrial production. The multifaceted nature of these constraints results in the need to employ a combined approach to counter these effects, as is the case in the coordinated expansion scenario. Through the simultaneous implementation of monetary, credit and structural interventions, the coordinated shock generates a very robust peak export growth of 0.88 percent in the fourth quarter. This coordinated approach is theoretically demonstrated to be more effective than monetary fiddling, and yields a persistent 0.10 percent impact in equilibrium. But the full extent of the region’s vulnerabilities is laid bare by defining the new structural frictions. A mere one percent shift of labor towards the informal economy unleashes an aggressive factor misallocation, which depresses formal exports by -0.52 percent at its peak. This coefficient exposes the vicious zero-sum competition, where informal markets systematically drain precious human and physical capital from internationally competitive manufacturing industries. Agriculture records its own rural paralysis, captured via the barter friction shock. A one standard deviation increase in search costs for barter induces -0.22 percent peak decline, amounting to the effective isolation of rural surpluses from global monetization opportunities. The effect of this rural isolation is reinforced by a one standard deviation shock to non-monetized trade preferences, which induces a lagging peak negative export shock of -0.35 percent in the fourth quarter. This particular period proves that when domestic agents positively eschew fiat currency for domestic payments, the formal export sector is systematically denied the domestic liquidity needed to fund supply chains. These point estimates demonstrate that unless policymakers decisively break down the pervasive structures of informality and barter, macroeconomic policies will continue to be unable to support sustainable exports.
It is evident that structural financial factors engender significant externalities. It is demonstrated that both financial deepening and direct credit expansion function as potent stimuli for trade capacity, with a short-to-medium-term effect. This aligns with the finding of
Table
| Afghanistan | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 2.8 [2.1, 3.5] | 3.5 [2.6, 4.4] | 1.8 [1.2, 2.4] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.5 [2.6, 4.4] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] | -3.5 [-4.5, -2.5] | -5.0 [-6.2, -3.8] | -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] | -1.5 [-2.1, -0.9] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -5.0 [-6.2, -3.8] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] | 1.8 [1.1, 2.5] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.8 [1.1, 2.5] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] | 0.6 [0.2, 1.0] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] | -4.1 [-5.2, -3.0] | -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] | -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -4.1 [-5.2, -3.0] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] | -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] | -2.0 [-2.7, -1.3] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -2.0 [-2.7, -1.3] | -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 2.8 [2.1, 3.5] | 4.5 [3.6, 5.4] | 6.0 [4.8, 7.2] | 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] | 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] | 6.0 [4.8, 7.2] (Q4) |
| Bangladesh | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.9 [0.7, 1.1] | 1.6 [1.3, 1.9] | 2.4 [2.0, 2.8] | 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.4 [2.0, 2.8] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -1.4 [-1.7, -1.1] | -2.8 [-3.4, -2.2] | -4.2 [-5.0, -3.4] | -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -4.2 [-5.0, -3.4] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 5.0 [4.2, 5.8] | 8.5 [7.5, 9.5] | 10.5 [9.3, 11.7] | 6.0 [5.2, 6.8] | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 10.5 [9.3, 11.7] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] | 2.8 [2.4, 3.2] | 4.5 [3.9, 5.1] | 5.8 [5.1, 6.5] | 7.2 [6.4, 8.0] | 7.2 [6.4, 8.0] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 2.5 [2.1, 2.9] | 3.8 [3.2, 4.4] | 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] | 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.5 [-0.7, -0.3] | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.0 [0.0, 0.1] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.1 [-0.2, 0.0] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] | 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] (Q4) |
| Bhutan | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] | -0.3 [-0.6, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] | 5.2 [4.3, 6.1] | 6.8 [5.7, 7.9] | 4.0 [3.2, 4.8] | 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 6.8 [5.7, 7.9] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] | 3.8 [3.1, 4.5] | 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] | 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] | -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.3 [-0.6, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] | 0.6 [0.2, 1.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.0 [-1.3, -0.7] | -2.0 [-2.5, -1.5] | -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] | -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] | -0.6 [-1.0, -0.2] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.3 [0.0, 0.6] | 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] (Q4) |
| Cambodia | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.7 [0.5, 0.9] | 1.3 [1.0, 1.6] | 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] | 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -1.1 [-1.4, -0.8] | -2.4 [-2.9, -1.9] | -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 4.2 [3.5, 4.9] | 7.5 [6.6, 8.4] | 9.2 [8.1, 10.3] | 5.0 [4.3, 5.7] | 1.6 [1.0, 2.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 9.2 [8.1, 10.3] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] | 2.4 [2.0, 2.8] | 3.8 [3.3, 4.3] | 5.0 [4.4, 5.6] | 6.2 [5.5, 6.9] | 6.2 [5.5, 6.9] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.0 [-1.3, -0.7] | -1.9 [-2.4, -1.4] | -2.6 [-3.2, -2.0] | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.6 [-3.2, -2.0] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 2.0 [1.6, 2.4] | 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] | 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] | 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] | 2.6 [2.1, 3.1] | 4.0 [3.4, 4.6] | 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.0 [3.4, 4.6] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.7 [-0.9, -0.5] | -1.6 [-2.0, -1.2] | -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.5 [-0.7, -0.3] | -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] | -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.1 [-0.2, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] | 2.5 [2.0, 3.0] | 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 2.5 [2.0, 3.0] (Q4) |
| Kyrgyzstan | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] | 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] | -1.9 [-2.4, -1.4] | -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] | 6.0 [5.1, 6.9] | 7.6 [6.5, 8.7] | 4.6 [3.8, 5.4] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 7.6 [6.5, 8.7] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 1.9 [1.5, 2.3] | 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] | 4.4 [3.7, 5.1] | 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] | 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.3 [-1.7, -0.9] | -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] | -3.3 [-4.0, -2.6] | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.3 [-4.0, -2.6] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] | 2.9 [2.3, 3.5] | 4.0 [3.2, 4.8] | 2.3 [1.7, 2.9] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.0 [3.2, 4.8] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] | 2.3 [1.8, 2.8] | 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] | -2.6 [-3.3, -1.9] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.6 [-3.3, -1.9] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] | -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] | 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] | 4.2 [3.5, 4.9] | 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 4.2 [3.5, 4.9] (Q4) |
| Laos | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.3 [0.2, 0.4] | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.5 [-0.7, -0.3] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] | 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] | 4.5 [3.6, 5.4] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.5 [3.6, 5.4] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] | 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] | 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] | 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] | -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] | -4.8 [-5.9, -3.7] | -3.0 [-3.8, -2.2] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -4.8 [-5.9, -3.7] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] | 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] | 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] | -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] | -2.0 [-2.7, -1.3] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -1.9 [-2.6, -1.2] | -2.8 [-3.7, -1.9] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.8 [-3.7, -1.9] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -2.2 [-3.0, -1.4] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.2 [-3.0, -1.4] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] | 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] | 5.0 [3.9, 6.1] | 3.2 [2.4, 4.0] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 5.0 [3.9, 6.1] (Q4) |
| Myanmar | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] | 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] | -3.8 [-4.8, -2.8] | -5.2 [-6.5, -3.9] | -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | -5.2 [-6.5, -3.9] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] | 1.9 [1.3, 2.5] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.9 [1.3, 2.5] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] | -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] | -2.4 [-3.2, -1.6] | -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -1.3 [-1.7, -0.9] | -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] | -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] | -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.7 [0.5, 0.9] | 1.3 [0.9, 1.7] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] | 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] | -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] | -1.7 [-2.3, -1.1] | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] | 4.4 [3.5, 5.3] | 5.8 [4.6, 7.0] | 3.6 [2.8, 4.4] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 5.8 [4.6, 7.0] (Q4) |
| Nepal | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] | -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] | 5.6 [4.7, 6.5] | 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] | 4.4 [3.6, 5.2] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] | 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] | 4.1 [3.4, 4.8] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] | -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] | 2.7 [2.1, 3.3] | 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] | 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] | 2.1 [1.6, 2.6] | 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] | 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] | -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] | -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] | 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] | 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] | 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] (Q4) |
| Pakistan | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] | -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] | 5.6 [4.7, 6.5] | 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] | 4.4 [3.6, 5.2] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] | 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] | 4.1 [3.4, 4.8] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] | -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] | 2.7 [2.1, 3.3] | 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] | 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] | 2.1 [1.6, 2.6] | 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] | 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] | -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] | -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] | 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] | 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] | 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] | 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] (Q4) |
| Papua New Guinea (Papua N. G. ) | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] | 3.3 [2.6, 4.0] | 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] | 2.3 [1.7, 2.9] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] | 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] | 2.1 [1.6, 2.6] | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] | 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] | -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] | -4.6 [-5.7, -3.5] | -2.9 [-3.7, -2.1] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | -4.6 [-5.7, -3.5] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] | 1.3 [0.9, 1.7] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -2.7 [-3.5, -1.9] | -3.9 [-4.9, -2.9] | -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.9 [-4.9, -2.9] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] | -3.1 [-4.0, -2.2] | -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] | -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.1 [-4.0, -2.2] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] | -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] (Q4) |
| Sri Lanka | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] | 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] | 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] | -2.0 [-2.5, -1.5] | -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 3.6 [3.0, 4.2] | 6.4 [5.5, 7.3] | 8.0 [6.9, 9.1] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] | 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 8.0 [6.9, 9.1] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 2.0 [1.6, 2.4] | 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] | 4.6 [3.9, 5.3] | 5.5 [4.7, 6.3] | 5.5 [4.7, 6.3] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] | -3.1 [-3.8, -2.4] | -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.1 [-3.8, -2.4] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] | 2.9 [2.3, 3.5] | 4.1 [3.3, 4.9] | 2.3 [1.7, 2.9] | 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.1 [3.3, 4.9] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] | 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] | 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.0 [-1.3, -0.7] | -1.9 [-2.4, -1.4] | -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] | 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] | 4.0 [3.3, 4.7] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 4.0 [3.3, 4.7] (Q4) |
| Syria | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] | 3.0 [2.2, 3.8] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.0 [2.2, 3.8] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 1.8 [1.2, 2.4] | 1.8 [1.2, 2.4] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] | -4.0 [-5.0, -3.0] | -5.5 [-6.8, -4.2] | -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] | -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -5.5 [-6.8, -4.2] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] | 1.5 [0.9, 2.1] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.5 [0.9, 2.1] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] | -3.2 [-4.2, -2.2] | -4.6 [-5.8, -3.4] | -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -4.6 [-5.8, -3.4] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] | -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] | -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] | -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.8 [0.6, 1.0] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] | -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] | -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] | 5.0 [4.0, 6.0] | 6.5 [5.2, 7.8] | 4.2 [3.2, 5.2] | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] | 1.1 [0.6, 1.6] | 6.5 [5.2, 7.8] (Q4) |
| Tajikistan | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.3 [-0.6, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] | 5.5 [4.6, 6.4] | 7.0 [5.9, 8.1] | 4.2 [3.4, 5.0] | 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 7.0 [5.9, 8.1] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] | 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] | 2.9 [2.3, 3.5] | 4.0 [3.3, 4.7] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] | 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] | -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] | 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] | 3.7 [2.9, 4.5] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.7 [2.9, 4.5] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] | 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] | -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] | -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] | -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] | 4.0 [3.1, 4.9] | 5.2 [4.1, 6.3] | 3.2 [2.4, 4.0] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 5.2 [4.1, 6.3] (Q4) |
| Timor-Leste | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] | -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] | 3.1 [2.4, 3.8] | 4.0 [3.1, 4.9] | 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.0 [3.1, 4.9] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] | 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] | 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] | -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] | -4.7 [-5.8, -3.6] | -2.9 [-3.7, -2.1] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -4.7 [-5.8, -3.6] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] | 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] | -3.8 [-4.8, -2.8] | -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.8 [-4.8, -2.8] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] | -3.0 [-3.9, -2.1] | -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.0 [-3.9, -2.1] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] | -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] | -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] | 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] | 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] (Q4) |
| Uzbekistan | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.8 [0.6, 1.0] | 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] | 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] | 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] | 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -1.1 [-1.4, -0.8] | -2.4 [-2.9, -1.9] | -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 4.3 [3.6, 5.0] | 7.6 [6.7, 8.5] | 9.3 [8.2, 10.4] | 5.1 [4.4, 5.8] | 1.7 [1.1, 2.3] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 9.3 [8.2, 10.4] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] | 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] | 2.5 [2.1, 2.9] | 3.9 [3.4, 4.4] | 5.1 [4.5, 5.7] | 6.4 [5.7, 7.1] | 6.4 [5.7, 7.1] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] | -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] | -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 2.1 [1.7, 2.5] | 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] | 4.6 [3.8, 5.4] | 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] | 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.6 [3.8, 5.4] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] | 2.7 [2.2, 3.2] | 4.1 [3.5, 4.7] | 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] | 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 4.1 [3.5, 4.7] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -0.6 [-0.8, -0.4] | -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] | -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] | -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] | -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.1 [-0.2, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] | 1.9 [1.5, 2.3] | 2.6 [2.1, 3.1] | 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] | 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 2.6 [2.1, 3.1] (Q4) |
| Yemen | |||||||
| Shock Type | Impact | Q2 | Q4 | Q8 | Q12 | Long Run | Peak Response |
| Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] (Q4) |
| Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) | -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] | -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] | -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] | -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] (Q4) |
| Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 2.9 [2.2, 3.6] | 3.7 [2.8, 4.6] | 1.9 [1.3, 2.5] | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 3.7 [2.8, 4.6] (Q4) |
| Financial Development (1σ↑) | 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] | 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] | 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] | 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] (LR) |
| Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) | -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] | -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] | -5.1 [-6.3, -3.9] | -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] | -5.1 [-6.3, -3.9] (Q4) |
| Coordinated Expansion | 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] | 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] | 1.9 [1.2, 2.6] | 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.9 [1.2, 2.6] (Q4) |
| Credit Expansion (1σ↑) | 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] | 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] | 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] | 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] | 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] (Q4) |
| Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) | -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] | -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] | -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] | -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] | -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] (Q4) |
| Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) | -1.3 [-1.7, -0.9] | -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] | -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] | -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] | -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] (Q4) |
| Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) | 0.7 [0.5, 0.9] | 1.3 [0.9, 1.7] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] | 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] | 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] (Q4) |
| Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) | -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] | -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] | -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] | -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] | -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] | -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] (Q4) |
| Remittances | 2.9 [2.2, 3.6] | 4.8 [3.8, 5.8] | 6.2 [4.9, 7.5] | 4.0 [3.0, 5.0] | 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] | 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] | 6.2 [4.9, 7.5] (Q4) |
Passing to structural parameters, the only shock that perpetually compounds is an increase in financial development of one standard deviation. Although cyclical shocks revert to 0.0% in the twelfth quarter, financial deepening has maximal quantitative effect in the long run. Countries that are aggressively developing their domestic credit markets are expected to experience significant export growth in the long term. Bangladesh, Uzbekistan and Cambodia are leading the way, with growth rates of 7.2%, 6.4% and 6.2%, respectively. Even in the most severely constrained markets such as Syria and Afghanistan this long-run financial development measure still imposes a positive steady-state deviation of 1.8% and 2.0, respectively. A one standard deviation expansion in domestic credit in the interim is a key quantitative intermediary. This credit shock spurs intermediate fourth-quarter export growth of an average of 1.0% in Syria and 4.8% in Bangladesh which ultimately decays. Another deep-seated structural pillar that has the capacity to lead to huge swings in the volume of trade is the exogenous capital inflow, which is modeled as remittance shocks. Remittances are statistically essential to highly fractured economies, as they produced fourth-quarter export boom of 6.5% in Syria, 6.2% in Yemen and 6.0% in Afghanistan. Such dependence on the diaspora capital brings out a numerical fact that foreign inflows are absolutely necessary to finance the import-intensive production lines of exports.
On the negative side of the ledger, the quantitative models are used in a very graphic manner in terms of the destructive asymmetric punishment of institutional fragility. One standard deviation jump in policy uncertainty is an apocalyptic shock that sends forward-looking export investments into a deep contraction. The data isolates explicitly fragile states, in which this uncertainty provokes fourth-quarter export crashes of -5.5% in Syria, -5.2% in Myanmar and -5.1% in Yemen. This chilling effect even hits structurally sound markets with Bangladesh and Uzbekistan losing 2.2% and 2.4% of their respective export volumes at the peak of the quarter four. These vulnerabilities are further complicated by a one standard deviation shock to the intensity of a shock to energy, which lowers performance in exports across the board by increasing the cost of core production. Since these economies are mainly dependent on energy intensive output, this shock triggers the fourth quarter export losses of between -1.8 in Bangladesh to a devastating -4.6 in Syria and Yemen. There is also a lot of mathematical complexity in the labor market, particularly when it comes to monitoring the informal sector. A 1 percent movement of formal labor to an informal economy is a way of effectively starving the sector that produces exports and this will cause a universal contraction. This dynamic most severely penalizes countries with weak institutional capacity, pushing fourth-quarter export shortages to -3.6% in Syria, -3.4% in Myanmar and -3.2% in Afghanistan. Underdeveloped markets have structural trade friction particular to them, including dependence on non-monetized trade preferences, which makes them even more alien to global supply chains. An increase in the non-monetized trade by one standard deviation moves the transactions out of quantifiable international markets and pulls down formal exports by up to -3.2% in Syria and -2.9% in Yemen. Surprisingly, there is a mathematical anomaly in the analysis of a one standard deviation rise in barter friction shocks. With increasing localized barter difficulty, actors must move into formal monetized markets, which in turn counter-intuitively prompt recorded fourth-quarter exports to increase 2.1% in Syria, and 1.9% in both Yemen and Myanmar.
A rigorous cross-sectional analysis of the time data verifies that, except finance development, the effects of all the shocks modeled fade quickly. The large majority of cyclical perturbations by the twelfth quarter are measuring in a fraction of a percent, which is a strong indication of mean-reverting gravity. As an illustration, the huge 10.5% increase in exchange rate in Bangladesh drops to a mere 2.2% in the quarter twelve and finally, the exchange rate adjusts to 0.0% in the long run. This speedy numeral obliteration strictly restrains the capacities of such transitional economies to alter their export foundation irreversibly by short-run monetary or currency intercessions. This quantitative reality compels policy makers to maneuver through a unique mathematical duality of short-term survival and long-term growth. A 10% currency depreciation is the most statistically sound short-term bailout, creating spikes in yield of double or high single digits in the short term. Nevertheless, to break free from cyclical volatility, uncompromising long-term financial deepening is required — the only modelled measure that can ensure major developing countries achieve steady-state growth of more than 5.0% in the long term. These disaggregated numbers eventually demonstrate that the only way out of such transient and highly volatile export cycles is to broaden formal access to credit and keep the uncertainty down to below a baseline standard deviation.
The remarkable 10.5% peak export growth in Bangladesh is highly plausible and has structural justification, which follows a 10% exchange rate depreciation shock at Quarter 4, thanks to the country’s distinctive macroeconomic features and export composition. The performance is a lot better than that of its regional peers Cambodia, Pakistan and Afghanistan whose domestic economies are vastly different - 9.2%, 7.2% and 3.5% respectively. Bangladesh is taking the lead mainly because of the high elasticity of demand for its exports, which are dominated by ready-made garments that account for 80–85% of total export earnings. Unlike specialised technology or capital goods, mass-market apparel is a highly substitutable consumer good, making global demand for Bangladeshi textiles highly price-elastic. Thus, a 10% depreciation of the Bangladeshi taka immediately causes the foreign currency price of apparel to fall on the global market, making it easy for large retail chains in the US and Europe to shift orders and causing a huge, disproportionate increase in purchases.
Bangladesh’s structural openness and large-scale, cluster efficiencies further enhance this price benefit. Despite having a much larger economy than countries such as Bhutan and Kyrgyzstan, Bangladesh’s modern industrial sector is highly outward-facing. It has large industrial garment clusters with significant underused capacity and labor liquidity, enabling it to rapidly increase output. In stark contrast to Afghanistan or Nepal, whose export is hampered by binding supply-side constraints, landlocked geography or low-elasticity primary commodities such as minerals and selected agricultural goods, India is expected to capture maximum global market in case of shifts in dollar, yen or rupee.
Moreover, Bangladesh’s well-developed backward linkages in spinning, weaving, dyeing and finishing mills mitigate the classic imported inflation traps encountered in traditional Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models. Although depreciation in exchange rate penalizes an economy due to expensive imported raw materials and slows down the export expansion, Bangladesh does most of the value-addition of textile at home. This advantage of the structure means the net competitiveness gain from a weaker currency is much bigger than the inflationary impact of costlier imported raw cotton or machinery. It can thus be concluded that the export surge initially has a positive effect, but that this effect is progressively diminished over time as a result of the long-term price convergence.
Eventually, the gradual staggered shock of first 5.0% to 8.5% in Quarter 2 and 10.5% in Quarter 4 fits well with the micro realities of trade contracts and the J curve effect. Because orders in the global garment industry are generally booked three to six months in advance, the immediate impact shows only limited volume adjustment. By Quarter 4, roughly one year on, supply chains will have fully adjusted and old contracts will have been re-priced. What may take place during Q4 is that international buyers will not limit their supply portfolios to competitor nations such as Vietnam or India and so will make full use of Bangladesh’s competitiveness. For this reason, Bangladesh peaks higher than a highly dollarized Cambodia which diminishes pure exchange rate pass-through or Pakistan who suffers from extreme domestic energy constraints and supply chain frictions.
Whereas frequentist models (e.g., OLS, VAR) are normally used to provide a single point estimate of each model parameter, the Bayesian DSGE models provide an entire posterior distribution, thus capturing ambiguity over the actual values of the parameters (
| Parameter | Posterior Mean | Standard Deviation | 95% Credible Interval | 90% Credible Interval | 68% Credible Interval | Acceptance Rate (%) |
| Monetary Policy Reaction (ϕ₁) | 1.502 | 0.105 | [1.296, 1.708] | [1.329, 1.675] | [1.397, 1.607] | 31.2 |
| Exchange Rate Sensitivity (α₁) | 0.425 | 0.082 | [0.264, 0.586] | [0.290, 0.560] | [0.343, 0.507] | 28.4 |
| Export Elasticity to EXR (β₁) | 1.185 | 0.150 | [0.891, 1.479] | [0.938, 1.432] | [1.035, 1.335] | 29.5 |
| Monetary Policy Shock (σ₁) | 0.015 | 0.003 | [0.009, 0.021] | [0.010, 0.020] | [0.012, 0.018] | 32.1 |
| Fiscal Policy Shock (σ₂) | 0.028 | 0.005 | [0.018, 0.038] | [0.020, 0.036] | [0.023, 0.033] | 30.8 |
| Inflation Targeting Parameter (π₁) | 1.654 | 0.120 | [1.419, 1.889] | [1.457, 1.851] | [1.534, 1.774] | 33.5 |
| Risk Aversion Parameter (γ) | 2.450 | 0.300 | [1.862, 3.038] | [1.956, 2.944] | [2.150, 2.750] | 27.6 |
| Export Demand Sensitivity (η₁) | 0.852 | 0.115 | [0.627, 1.077] | [0.663, 1.041] | [0.737, 0.967] | 29.9 |
| Price Stickiness (φ₁) | 0.520 | 0.065 | [0.393, 0.647] | [0.413, 0.627] | [0.455, 0.585] | 31.0 |
| Output Shock (σ₃) | 0.022 | 0.004 | [0.014, 0.030] | [0.015, 0.029] | [0.018, 0.026] | 34.2 |
| Informal Sector Expansion Shock (σinf) | 0.045 | 0.008 | [0.029, 0.061] | [0.032, 0.058] | [0.037, 0.053] | 26.8 |
| Barter Friction Shock (σbar) | 0.038 | 0.007 | [0.024, 0.052] | [0.026, 0.050] | [0.031, 0.045] | 27.1 |
| Non-Monetized Trade Shock (σnmt) | 0.032 | 0.006 | [0.020, 0.044] | [0.022, 0.042] | [0.026, 0.038] | 28.5 |
The small confidence interval indicates the extent to which the effectiveness of monetary policy is certain, making it a key tool for controlling economic fluctuations. With an exchange rate posterior mean estimate of 0.425, policymakers can conclude that it has a significant impact on the economy’s openness and competitiveness in international markets. The credible interval indicates that there is some uncertainty, but the overall effect is significant. The exchange rate management, whether by interventions into the foreign exchange markets or by modifying capital controls, can influence export performance and trade balances (Sekkat & Varoudakis, 2000). The estimated posterior of 0.23 indicates a medium sensitivity of exports to exchange-rate changes, which gives important information to the policy makers who may want to stabilize export growth in the presence of changes in exchange rates. The narrow credible interval also adds confidence in this relationship.
The credible intervals of the pertinent parameters are observed in order to assess the temporal propagation of various economic shocks, including monetary policy shocks or fiscal policy shocks, throughout the economy. In reference to the monetary policy shock (σ₁) it is evident that a posterior mean (1.5) coupled with a fairly narrow credible interval indicates that monetary policy shocks (say, changes in interest rates) can bring about quantifiable differences in the economy, for example, an interest rate cut should promote consumption and investment (Juhro et al., 2023). The high acceptance rate indicates strong confidence in this outcome, meaning that policy interventions could be more reliable. Regarding the fiscal policy shock (σ₂), the posterior mean of 0.028 with a narrow 95% credible interval suggests that fiscal policy, government expenditure and tax cuts have a significant impact on the economy. This parameter is particularly useful for determining the effects of expansionary fiscal policy, especially during periods of economic contraction.
In terms of risk management and policy uncertainty, the model can absorb uncertainty, enabling policymakers to tolerate the constant risks associated with any economic intervention. Taking into account the risk-aversion parameter (γ), the posterior mean of 2.45 and the wide credible interval (2.1, 2.7) indicate that there is significant uncertainty surrounding the level of risk aversion in the economy. Central banks use signaling mechanisms to inform markets of policy actions and shape investors’ expectations (
In order to design long-term structural policies, the posterior mean of export demand sensitivity (η₁) of 0.65, with a narrow confidence interval, indicates that exports are susceptible to external demand shocks, such as changes in global economic conditions or trade policy. Policymakers can use this information to design trade policies that stabilise exports, particularly when global demand fluctuates. Furthermore, the posterior mean of price stickiness (φ₁) of 0.50 indicates a high degree of price rigidity, meaning that prices do not change immediately in response to a shock. This result has significant implications for monetary policy and inflation targeting. In a setting where prices are difficult to change, the response to changes in monetary policy due to inflation may not be instantaneous (
The fiscal policy shock has a mean of 0.028. This reflects the fiscal constraints faced by frontier economies (
Table
Disaggregated Bayesian posterior estimates for 16 frontier Asian economies and 90% HPD credible intervals
| Country | ϕ1 (Monetary Rxn) | α1 (EXR Sens.) | β1 (Export Elast.) | σ1 (Monetary Shock) | σ2 (Fiscal Shock) | π1 (Inflation Target) | γ (Risk Aversion) |
| Afghanistan | 1.10 [0.98, 1.22] | 0.25 [0.18, 0.32] | 0.85 [0.71, 0.99] | 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] | 0.045 [0.035, 0.055] | 1.15 [1.02, 1.28] | 2.95 [2.65, 3.25] |
| Bangladesh | 1.65 [1.48, 1.82] | 0.45 [0.38, 0.52] | 1.45 [1.25, 1.65] | 0.015 [0.011, 0.019] | 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] | 1.75 [1.58, 1.92] | 2.10 [1.85, 2.35] |
| Bhutan | 1.55 [1.41, 1.69] | 0.35 [0.29, 0.41] | 1.10 [0.95, 1.25] | 0.012 [0.008, 0.016] | 0.022 [0.016, 0.028] | 1.85 [1.65, 2.05] | 2.25 [1.98, 2.52] |
| Cambodia | 1.45 [1.32, 1.58] | 0.55 [0.46, 0.64] | 1.35 [1.18, 1.52] | 0.014 [0.010, 0.018] | 0.020 [0.015, 0.025] | 1.65 [1.49, 1.81] | 2.15 [1.92, 2.38] |
| Kyrgyzstan | 1.50 [1.36, 1.64] | 0.42 [0.35, 0.49] | 1.15 [1.02, 1.28] | 0.015 [0.011, 0.019] | 0.028 [0.021, 0.035] | 1.60 [1.45, 1.75] | 2.45 [2.21, 2.69] |
| Laos | 1.42 [1.29, 1.55] | 0.40 [0.33, 0.47] | 1.05 [0.92, 1.18] | 0.016 [0.011, 0.021] | 0.030 [0.024, 0.036] | 1.55 [1.40, 1.70] | 2.50 [2.25, 2.75] |
| Myanmar | 1.25 [1.12, 1.38] | 0.38 [0.31, 0.45] | 0.95 [0.82, 1.08] | 0.020 [0.014, 0.026] | 0.035 [0.027, 0.043] | 1.35 [1.21, 1.49] | 2.75 [2.48, 3.02] |
| Nepal | 1.48 [1.34, 1.62] | 0.35 [0.28, 0.42] | 1.08 [0.94, 1.22] | 0.014 [0.010, 0.018] | 0.026 [0.020, 0.032] | 1.62 [1.46, 1.78] | 2.35 [2.12, 2.58] |
| Pakistan | 1.58 [1.43, 1.73] | 0.48 [0.40, 0.56] | 1.25 [1.10, 1.40] | 0.018 [0.013, 0.023] | 0.032 [0.025, 0.039] | 1.70 [1.54, 1.86] | 2.40 [2.16, 2.64] |
| Papua N. G. | 1.35 [1.21, 1.49] | 0.32 [0.26, 0.38] | 1.12 [0.98, 1.26] | 0.015 [0.011, 0.019] | 0.034 [0.027, 0.041] | 1.50 [1.35, 1.65] | 2.75 [2.48, 3.02] |
| Sri Lanka | 1.62 [1.47, 1.77] | 0.50 [0.42, 0.58] | 1.30 [1.15, 1.45] | 0.019 [0.014, 0.024] | 0.031 [0.024, 0.038] | 1.80 [1.64, 1.96] | 2.30 [2.07, 2.53] |
| Syria | 1.05 [0.93, 1.17] | 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] | 0.75 [0.61, 0.89] | 0.028 [0.021, 0.035] | 0.050 [0.039, 0.061] | 1.10 [0.98, 1.22] | 3.00 [2.70, 3.30] |
| Tajikistan | 1.40 [1.26, 1.54] | 0.38 [0.31, 0.45] | 1.02 [0.89, 1.15] | 0.016 [0.011, 0.021] | 0.029 [0.022, 0.036] | 1.52 [1.38, 1.66] | 2.60 [2.35, 2.85] |
| Timor-Leste | 1.38 [1.25, 1.51] | 0.30 [0.24, 0.36] | 0.98 [0.85, 1.11] | 0.015 [0.010, 0.020] | 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] | 1.48 [1.33, 1.63] | 2.80 [2.53, 3.07] |
| Uzbekistan | 1.52 [1.38, 1.66] | 0.45 [0.38, 0.52] | 1.22 [1.08, 1.36] | 0.014 [0.010, 0.018] | 0.025 [0.019, 0.031] | 1.68 [1.52, 1.84] | 2.20 [1.98, 2.42] |
| Yemen | 1.15 [1.03, 1.27] | 0.22 [0.16, 0.28] | 0.80 [0.66, 0.94] | 0.026 [0.019, 0.033] | 0.048 [0.038, 0.058] | 1.20 [1.08, 1.32] | 2.90 [2.62, 3.18] |
| Country | η1 (Demand Sens.) | φ1 (Price Stickiness) | σ3 (Output Shock) | σinf (Informal Shock) | σbar (Barter Shock) | σnmt (Non-Monetized) | σrem (Remittance Shock) |
| Afghanistan | 0.65 [0.55, 0.75] | 0.21 [0.15, 0.27] | 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] | 0.068 [0.055, 0.081] | 0.085 [0.072, 0.098] | 0.092 [0.081, 0.103] | 0.055 [0.045, 0.065] |
| Bangladesh | 0.95 [0.85, 1.05] | 0.52 [0.44, 0.60] | 0.020 [0.015, 0.025] | 0.058 [0.048, 0.068] | 0.018 [0.012, 0.024] | 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] | 0.042 [0.035, 0.049] |
| Bhutan | 0.82 [0.72, 0.92] | 0.72 [0.65, 0.79] | 0.018 [0.012, 0.024] | 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] | 0.045 [0.036, 0.054] | 0.031 [0.024, 0.038] | 0.015 [0.010, 0.020] |
| Cambodia | 0.92 [0.82, 1.02] | 0.65 [0.57, 0.73] | 0.019 [0.014, 0.024] | 0.048 [0.039, 0.057] | 0.021 [0.015, 0.027] | 0.015 [0.010, 0.020] | 0.022 [0.016, 0.028] |
| Kyrgyzstan | 0.85 [0.75, 0.95] | 0.55 [0.47, 0.63] | 0.022 [0.016, 0.028] | 0.045 [0.036, 0.054] | 0.038 [0.030, 0.046] | 0.030 [0.023, 0.037] | 0.062 [0.052, 0.072] |
| Laos | 0.80 [0.71, 0.89] | 0.58 [0.50, 0.66] | 0.024 [0.018, 0.030] | 0.044 [0.035, 0.053] | 0.052 [0.043, 0.061] | 0.040 [0.032, 0.048] | 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] |
| Myanmar | 0.75 [0.65, 0.85] | 0.35 [0.28, 0.42] | 0.030 [0.023, 0.037] | 0.055 [0.045, 0.065] | 0.060 [0.049, 0.071] | 0.078 [0.066, 0.090] | 0.035 [0.027, 0.043] |
| Nepal | 0.84 [0.74, 0.94] | 0.51 [0.43, 0.59] | 0.021 [0.015, 0.027] | 0.050 [0.041, 0.059] | 0.045 [0.037, 0.053] | 0.038 [0.031, 0.045] | 0.085 [0.075, 0.095] |
| Pakistan | 0.88 [0.78, 0.98] | 0.49 [0.41, 0.57] | 0.025 [0.019, 0.031] | 0.049 [0.040, 0.058] | 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] | 0.062 [0.052, 0.072] | 0.052 [0.044, 0.060] |
| Papua N. G. | 0.81 [0.72, 0.90] | 0.50 [0.42, 0.58] | 0.026 [0.020, 0.032] | 0.038 [0.030, 0.046] | 0.072 [0.061, 0.083] | 0.065 [0.055, 0.075] | 0.018 [0.012, 0.024] |
| Sri Lanka | 0.90 [0.80, 1.00] | 0.41 [0.34, 0.48] | 0.028 [0.022, 0.034] | 0.042 [0.034, 0.050] | 0.020 [0.014, 0.026] | 0.048 [0.039, 0.057] | 0.045 [0.037, 0.053] |
| Syria | 0.60 [0.50, 0.70] | 0.25 [0.19, 0.31] | 0.040 [0.032, 0.048] | 0.065 [0.053, 0.077] | 0.070 [0.058, 0.082] | 0.088 [0.076, 0.100] | 0.065 [0.054, 0.076] |
| Tajikistan | 0.78 [0.68, 0.88] | 0.48 [0.40, 0.56] | 0.023 [0.017, 0.029] | 0.052 [0.042, 0.062] | 0.041 [0.033, 0.049] | 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] | 0.088 [0.078, 0.098] |
| Timor-Leste | 0.72 [0.63, 0.81] | 0.45 [0.37, 0.53] | 0.025 [0.019, 0.031] | 0.041 [0.033, 0.049] | 0.065 [0.055, 0.075] | 0.055 [0.046, 0.064] | 0.028 [0.021, 0.035] |
| Uzbekistan | 0.86 [0.77, 0.95] | 0.61 [0.53, 0.69] | 0.020 [0.015, 0.025] | 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] | 0.028 [0.022, 0.034] | 0.022 [0.016, 0.028] | 0.040 [0.032, 0.048] |
| Yemen | 0.62 [0.52, 0.72] | 0.28 [0.22, 0.34] | 0.038 [0.030, 0.046] | 0.062 [0.050, 0.074] | 0.075 [0.063, 0.087] | 0.081 [0.069, 0.093] | 0.058 [0.047, 0.069] |
Disaggregated Posterior Estimates: The disaggregated posterior estimates irrefutably show that a one-size-fits-all macroeconomic policy is structurally unsustainable for the diverse institutional landscapes of the sixteen frontier Asian economies. Working with the traditional posts in this dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, remarkable structural differences immediately arise. The inflation targeting coefficient (π1) shows a clear distinction between economies whose central banks have imploded and those with functional central banks. Countries such as Bangladesh with a posterior mean of 1.75, HPD [1.58, 1.92] and Bhutan with 1.85, HPD [1.65, 2.05] exhibit a strong commitment to the Taylor principle, with parameters far exceeding the crucial threshold of 1.0 to aggressively tackle price fluctuations. By contrast, countries in the midst of civil war, such as Afghanistan (1.15, HPD [1.02, 1.28]) and Syria (1.10, HPD [0.98, 1.22]) reveal inflation targeting parameters close to one, suggesting that their central banks are scientifically impotent to anchor inflation expectations. This monetary impotence is compounded by the wide range of price stickiness (φ1) observed in the regional panel. For well-behaved transitioning economies such as Bhutan (0.72) with relative stiffness in prices, there is sufficient time for the traditional monetary policies to boost real economic activity before local prices respond. But in highly fragmented markets such as Afghanistan (0.21, HPD [0.15, 0.27]); the price adjustment is hyper-flexible. As a result, any monetary stimulus (σ1) in these at-risk economies is quickly sterilized by local inflation without benefiting the productive capacity of the economy.
Risk aversion and Exchange Rate Dynamics: The conventional fiscal policy shocks (σ2) also show tremendous variance from Bangladesh’s 0.025 to Syria’s 0.050 reflecting the widely different taxation and public expenditure policies of each country. The risk aversion (γ) coefficient highlights the ingrained risk averse attitudes of local households in an ever changing game of chance that reaches a dangerous level in the case of Syria (3.00) and Afghanistan (2.95). Large risk aversion affects mathematical domestic consumption and investment, and leaves the export sector to bear the burden of economic growth. This proves the importance of the parameters relating to the sensitivity to the exchange rate (α1) and the elasticity of exports (β1). Countries with fledgling manufacturing sectors (e.g. Bangladesh), have a very elastic export response to exchange rate depreciations (1.45, HPD [1.25, 1.65]) - clearly demonstrating that their industrialization can take advantage of low currency valuations in the long term. However, the initial cost of depreciations is still devastating in terms of increasing the cost of imports of raw materials (Dornbusch et al., 1976).
Size of structural frictions: As the policy focus shifts from conventional levers to frictions, the expansion of the informal sector (σinf) stands out as a universal virus. This informal economy feeds voraciously upon both labour and capital resources, imposing a hard mathematical constraint on the formal export expansion. Countries with large informal workforces, like Afghanistan and Bangladesh, utilize low-cost informal labor as a key comparative advantage for participation in manufacturing value chains (
Remittance Paradox and Policy Inferences: Amidst such substantial domestic distortions, the inclusion of foreign remittance inflows (σrem) introduces a policy paradox. Remittance shocks provide a much-needed financial buffer, reaching their peak in highly dependent economies such as Tajikistan (0.088, HPD [0.078, 0.098]) and Nepal (0.085, HPD [0.075, 0.095]). This is achieved by directly injecting foreign exchange income into the hands of the poor, thereby lifting domestic consumption. These regular financial transfers temporarily paper over the dysfunctionalities of the national labour market by artificially driving aggregate demand. But the model shows that excessive dependence on these remittances creates extensive moral hazard that erodes local industry. With these sustained transfers of unearned income, households’ reservation wage rises. This effect directly undermines labor supply in the labor-intensive and hardworking low-wage formal manufacturing sector, compounding the brain drain in the informal sector. While remittances ease short-term poverty, they are a structural hindrance to the long-term industrialisation required for export-led growth. The complex dynamics of high risk aversion, pervasive informality and remittance inflows form an economic conundrum that conventional interest rate adjustments cannot cure.
Policies to stimulate these economies through traditional output shocks (σ3) or price sensitivities (η1) are lost causes when the transmission mechanisms are cut off by non-monetized transactions. Economic revival in this region requires a radical departure from status quo monetary tweaking. The only area that should receive policy attention is that of deep institutional shocks, which eliminate barter frictions through the information and financial sectors. Shadow economy formalization and diversion of remittance into domestic productive investment are the only quantifiable ways to return policy effectiveness. This structural diagnosis informs us that frontier Asian economies cannot be treated as macroeconomic entities, and require highly disaggregated, quantitative and frictional interventions.
We provide posterior estimates and conversion to convergence diagnostics (Table
| Parameter | Description | Prior Dist. | Prior Mean | Prior S. D. | Post. Mean | 90% HPD Interval | R-stat | |
| Panel A: Structural Parameters | ||||||||
| σc | Inv. Inter-temporal Elast. | Gamma | 1.50 | 0.37 | 1.82 | [1.65, 2.01] | 1.002 | |
| h | Habit Formation | Beta | 0.70 | 0.10 | 0.81 | [0.76, 0.85] | 1.001 | |
| θp | Calvo Price Stickiness | Beta | 0.50 | 0.10 | 0.67 | [0.59, 0.74] | 1.004 | |
| φπ | Taylor Rule: Inflation | Normal | 1.50 | 0.25 | 1.94 | [1.78, 2.12] | 1.003 | |
| φy | Taylor Rule: Output | Normal | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.18 | [0.14, 0.23] | 1.001 | |
| φer | Taylor Rule: Exch. Rate | Gamma | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.22 | [0.16, 0.28] | 1.005 | |
| α | Openness (Import Share) | Beta | 0.30 | 0.05 | 0.34 | [0.31, 0.37] | 1.000 | |
| Parameter | Description | Prior Dist. | Prior Mean | Prior S. D. | Post. Mean | 90% HPD Interval | R-stat | |
| Panel B: Shock Processes | ||||||||
| ρexp | AR(1) Export Demand | Beta | 0.50 | 0.20 | 0.76 | [0.68, 0.82] | 1.008 | |
| ρmpr | AR(1) Monetary Policy | Beta | 0.50 | 0.20 | 0.62 | [0.55, 0.69] | 1.002 | |
| ρPOLUNC | AR(1) Policy Uncertainty | Beta | 0.50 | 0.20 | 0.89 | [0.84, 0.93] | 1.011 | |
| ρinf | AR(1) Informal Sector | Beta | 0.50 | 0.20 | 0.85 | [0.78, 0.91] | 1.004 | |
| ρbar | AR(1) Barter Friction | Beta | 0.50 | 0.20 | 0.72 | [0.65, 0.79] | 1.002 | |
| ρnmt | AR(1) Non-Monetized Trade | Beta | 0.50 | 0.20 | 0.81 | [0.74, 0.88] | 1.005 | |
| σexp | Volatility: Export | InvG | 0.10 | 2.00 | 0.45 | [0.38, 0.52] | 1.003 | |
| σer | Volatility: Exch. Rate | InvG | 0.10 | 2.00 | 0.87 | [0.76, 0.99] | 1.006 | |
| εinf | Volatility: Informal Sector | InvG | 0.10 | 2.00 | 0.45 | [0.39, 0.51] | 1.003 | |
| εbar | Volatility: Barter Friction | InvG | 0.10 | 2.00 | 0.38 | [0.32, 0.45] | 1.001 | |
| εnmt | Volatility: Non-Monetized | InvG | 0.10 | 2.00 | 0.32 | [0.26, 0.38] | 1.004 | |
| Panel C: Model Fit Statistics | ||||||||
| Statistic | Description | Value | Target / Threshold | |||||
| Log Data Density | (Modified Harmonic Mean) | -2456.8 | N/A | |||||
| Acceptance Rate | (Metropolis-Hastings) | 28.4% | (Target: 20-40%) | |||||
| Brooks-Gelman-Rubin | (Overall Convergence) | Converged | (< 1.05) | |||||
The measure of acceptance rate is a proxy for efficiency and is defined as the ratio of accepted parameter draws to the number of proposed parameter draws in Monte Carlo simulations. Table
The inclusion of the informal economy, barter and non-monetized trade in the DSGE offers a pragmatic view of institutional frictions constraining frontier Asia. These three elements differ from the usual cyclical macroeconomic shocks that reflect institutional frictions able to undermine conventional monetary and fiscal policy. The effects of these shocks, their sizes and persistence limits expose structural problems beyond the scope of traditional economic policy. The informal sector stands out as the largest sink of resources in the model, eclipsing the impact of traditional policy shocks. A 1% migration of workers into the informal economy leads to a sharp decline in exports, reaching -0.52% in the second quarter. This implies that the informal economy does not merely serve as a safety net but competes with the formal economy, diverting labor, resources and capital from export-oriented manufacturing. Moreover, the persistence of the shock (with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.85) reveals persistence of informality. Once employed workers and capital move to the informal sector to evade taxes or regulations, it is difficult to reintegrate these workers and firms into the formal sector, which ultimately undermines export capacity.
In contrast, frictions in barter highlight the impact of a hard medium of exchange on village supply chains. The barter shock in terms of search cost leads to a sharp fall in formal exports, with a maximum of -0.22%. This suggests the isolationist nature of barter systems, with local and subsistence forms of trade, and the failure to integrate agricultural or mineral surpluses into national supply chains limits global exports. The shock’s variance of 0.38 highlights the sensitivity of these informal markets to slight variations in their operation. Lack of monetization, where a cultural or structural preference exists to avoid currency, results in a delayed but often more intense liquidity shock. This shock, as opposed to the immediate impacts of barter or informality, has a delayed effect, with a magnitude of -0.35% in the fourth quarter. This lagged pattern casts the steady loss of domestic currency. As more domestic agents shift away from the formal financial system, the banking sector suffers from a lack of capital and is unable to issue letters of credit, trade finance and loans for formal exporters. The persistence of this shock with an AR(1) parameter of 0.81 implies that this form of behavioral risk aversion to the formal currency is deeply rooted, and that institutional change can only be long-term. The cumulative effects of these three factors imply that a central bank can set interest rates or print money, but it will be ineffective if significant proportion of the population is involved in informal trade, barter or non-monetized transactions. The scale of these institutional frictions suggests that solving export stagnation requires more than just monetary policy adjustments. A holistic strategy is required, incorporating financial inclusion, the modernization of rural payment systems and the elimination of regulatory restraints that could stimulate the underground economy.
According to Table
Dynamic system GMM estimation of Asian export growth including informal and non-monetized economy frictions
| Variables | Coefficient | Standard Error | p-value | Significance |
| Baseline Dynamics & Macro Variables | ||||
| Lagged Export Growth (EXPi,t-1) | 0.384 | 0.082 | 0.000 | *** |
| Real Effective Exchange Rate (REERi,t) | -0.142 | 0.045 | 0.002 | *** |
| Monetary Policy Rate (MPRi,t) | -0.215 | 0.061 | 0.001 | *** |
| Broad Money Supply (MSi,t) | 0.088 | 0.039 | 0.024 | ** |
| Credit to Private Sector (CREDi,t) | 0.176 | 0.052 | 0.001 | *** |
| Financial Development (FINDEVi,t) | 0.112 | 0.047 | 0.017 | ** |
| Policy Uncertainty (POLUNCi,t) | -0.095 | 0.033 | 0.004 | *** |
| Government Expenditure (GOVEXPi,t) | 0.064 | 0.028 | 0.022 | ** |
| Tax Revenue (TAXi,t) | -0.051 | 0.024 | 0.034 | ** |
| Energy Consumption (ENCONSi,t) | 0.135 | 0.041 | 0.012 | ** |
| Strictly Exogenous Structural Controls | ||||
| Rural Population Ratio (RURAL_POPi,t) | -0.108 | 0.041 | 0.008 | *** |
| Agricultural Value-Added (AGRIC_VAi,t) | -0.134 | 0.046 | 0.004 | *** |
| Electricity-to-GDP Gap (ELEC_GAPi,t) | -0.077 | 0.031 | 0.013 | ** |
| Friction Modifiers & Policy Interaction Terms | ||||
| MPRi,t×INV_MONi,t | 0.182 | 0.055 | 0.001 | *** |
| MPRi,t ×CURR_RATIOi,t | 0.145 | 0.049 | 0.003 | *** |
| MPRi,t×SHADOWi,t | 0.168 | 0.058 | 0.004 | *** |
| MPR×MS | 0.084 | 0.036 | 0.035 | ** |
| REER×FINDEV | 0.105 | 0.042 | 0.021 | ** |
| POLUNC×CREDIT | -0.092 | 0.037 | 0.018 | ** |
| Constant | 2.451 | 0.612 | 0.000 | *** |
| Diagnostic Tests | Statistic | p-value | Result | |
| Difference-in-Hansen test | χ² = 12.55 | 0.577 | Subset valid | |
The baseline dynamic specification is confirmed by the positive, statistically significant coefficient on lagged exports, which indicates export persistence in these economies. The friction modifiers radically change the dynamics in ways that reveal the weakened transmission of central bank policy (
Policy uncertainty is a key disincentive, generally lowering trade volumes by preventing producers from undertaking long-term investment as governance remains in flux (
While simple foreign exchange appreciation would normally devastate export competitiveness, the presence of more developed domestic financial markets enables firms to use more sophisticated hedging and trade finance products to offset these negative exchange rate shocks (
Overall, the DSGE results in Table
Table
| Test | Statistic | Reference Value | Result |
| Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic | 24.85 | > 16.38 (Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV relative bias) | Reject null of weak instruments |
| Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic | 28.12 | > 19.93 (Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size) | Strong identification |
The most significant outcome of Table
| Diagnostic Metric | p-Value | Reference Threshold / Rule | Result |
| Number of Groups (Countries) | 16 | N/A | Panel Size Confirmed |
| Number of Instruments | 11 | ≤ Number of Groups (16) | Pass (No Proliferation) |
| Instrument-to-Group Ratio | 0.875 | < 1.00 | Robust Specification |
| Hansen J-Test (p-value) | 0.413 | > 0.10 | Instruments Valid |
| Arellano-Bond AR(2) (p-value) | 0.157 | > 0.05 | No Serial Correlation |
Table
| Variable / Shock | Coefficient/Impact | Significance | Interpretation |
| Monetary Contraction (MPR↑) | -0.545% (Peak Trough) | *** | The negative outcomes of tightening monetary conditions are devastating, as a stronger exchange rate reduces export supply and higher credit costs make borrowing more expensive |
| Exchange Rate (Depreciation) | +0.867% (Peak) | *** | There is a strong competitiveness channel, in which an undervalued currency dramatically raises the quantity of exports |
| Energy Intensity Shock | -0.123% (Impact) | * | The cost drag arises due to a decrease in competitiveness by high energy prices, which is consistent with a cost-push mechanism |
| Fin. Development (FINDEV) | +0.445 (GMM Coefficient) | *** | There is evidence of structural support with deeper financial markets strongly correlated with export growth |
In order to reconcile the +0.867% depreciation effect in Table
(1) elasticity pessimism – these countries mainly export primary goods with low price elasticity, so a weaker currency does not necessarily lead to a significant increase in volume (
(2) limited development opportunities. The Asian financial development coefficient (+0.445) is smaller than the regional average, implying a lack of shock absorbers to deal with devaluation volatility.
The limitations of the structures in these economies tend to convert a devaluation policy into a debilitating solution. The risks of devaluation, specifically, the inability to consider inflationary pass-through, foreign-currency debt and financial stability effectively impair the +0.867% coefficient found in the broader sample. This outcome is summarized in Table
| Variable / Risk Factor | Benchmark Impact (Table |
Reconciled Impact for Poorest 16 | Transmission Mechanism & Constraint | Reality for Poorest 16 (Structural Drag) | Net Effect on Export Growth |
| Inflationary Pass-Through | +0.867% (Volume gain) | Significant Drag (-0.45%) | The cost of imported inputs is high in these countries due to the lack of national supply chain; a weak currency increases the prices of imported machineries and fuel, resulting in cost-push inflation that impact on price benefits | These countries are characterized by high import dependency; they import key capital goods and fuel; a spike in depreciation will instantly raise the price of these imports | Negative/Neutral: Gains in export pricing are washed out by rising production costs. |
| Foreign Currency Debt | +0.445 (FINDEV support) | Severe Risk (-0.60%) | The balance effect is weakened, where most debts in these 16 countries are in USD, devaluation has the effect of increasing the cost of servicing debt in local currency, creating a financial weakness and reducing funds they can use to access export growth | Original sin is widespread (Eichengreen et al., 2003), and many nations are borrowing in USD; devaluation also increases the cost of debt servicing in local currency, which can trigger insolvency | Severe Negative: Financial distress reduces the firm’s ability to fund export operations. |
| Financial Stability | High Significance (***) | Volatility Penalty (-0.30%) | The poorest 16 countries are typified by thin capital markets, lacking hedging instruments and thus sharp depreciation results in capital flight and increases the risk premium, thereby, raising the cost of trade credit | In the poorest countries, thin markets exist (Henry, 2007), and, due to the lack of hedging ability, volatility can lead to capital flight (as opposed to investment) (Tornell & Velasco, 1992) | Moderate Negative: Uncertainty discourages long-term export-oriented FDI |
| Reaction of Partners | Strong Competitiveness | Zero-Sum Effect (Neutral) | Competitive devaluation is evident because these 16 countries manufacture similar low-value products including textiles, devaluation by a country will often provoke a competition at the bottom between the neighbors, thus creating neutral effects | In regional value chains, relative advantage is undermined by parallel devaluation by other regional competitors, and the effect is a competitive devaluation effect | Neutral: No net gain in market share if the Asian Block moves together |
| Net Effect | +0.867% (Gross) | -0.483% (Estimated Net) | A structural trap exists where the overall debt cost, inflation, and financial shallowness subsume devaluation to a net loss situation for the poorest Asian countries. | Contractionary Devaluation hypothesis is made dominant (Kamin & Rogers, 2000). The supply-side losses (the increase in the costs of inputs and insolvency of the balance sheet) conceal mathematically the demand side benefits (reduced prices). | Net Contractionary: devaluation negatively impact export capacity not as stimulus to demand. |
As seen in Table
| Factor from Statement | Impact on Table |
Reconciled Result |
| Inflationary Pass-Through | Offsets the Exchange Rate (+) gain | Real effective exchange rate stays flat. |
| Foreign Currency Debt | Erodes the FINDEV (+) structural support | Financial distress limits production capacity |
| Energy/Input Costs | Amplifies the Energy Intensity (-) shock | Cost-push inflation reduces profit margins |
| Partner Reaction | Neutralizes the Exchange Rate (+) coefficient. | Global demand for the country’s exports plateaus |
But this nominal expansion does not take place in isolation. Inflationary pass-through is a significant headwind for the positive movement in this channel as described in Table
The third level of structural resistance is an energy and input cost shock, which can be destructive to domestic production frameworks. Indeed, most manufacturing centers in Asia are closely connected to the global value chain, depending on imports of raw materials, specialized intermediate products and energy, including petroleum and LNG, from outside the country (
Finally, external friction in the transmission process arises from partner reactions and retaliatory trade policies. Fierce currency devaluation by a major Asian exporter is rarely accepted passively by its trading partners or other Asian competitors in the global marketplace. Neighboring countries that are exporting the same basket of goods, that is, products that compete with each other, can neutralize the first country’s advantage in exchange rates by engaging in competitive devaluations (
Table
| Variable | Full Sample (Asia) | Subsample A: Emerging Markets(e.g., India, Vietnam, Indonesia) | Subsample B: Low-Income/Fragile(e.g., Nepal, Afghanistan, Myanmar) |
| DEXP(-1) (Persistence) | 0.192*** | 0.268** | 0.064 (Insignificant) |
| REER (Exchange Rate) | -0.215*** | -0.174** | -0.298* |
| MPR (Interest Rate) | -0.164** | -0.195** | -0.042 (Weak/Insignificant) |
| FINDEV (Fin. Depth) | 0.412*** | 0.485*** | 0.105 (Weak) |
| POLUNC (Uncertainty) | -0.181*** | -0.123* | -0.362** |
The empirical findings of the subsample comparison of heterogeneity estimation show deep and structurally-driven differences between emerging Asian economies and low-income and fragile economies, which provide a valuable understanding of the effects of structural vulnerabilities on the macroeconomic transmission mechanism. The common-size negative coefficients obtained in all three samples confirm the general validity of the standard open-economy economic theory, which predicts that the domestic currency’s real appreciation will reduce international competitiveness and slow export expansion all over the continent (
Local export firms have access to better financing options, such as credit facilities, hedging tools and trade financing. These options are better able to mitigate currency shocks and ensure supply chain continuity. This is due to the deep financial systems in emerging markets, which have a high and statistically significant financial development coefficient of 0.485. In comparison, the fragile countries in Subsample B have very shallow domestic credit channels, with a very low and statistically insignificant financial depth coefficient of 0.105. These low-income economies do not have a robust financial ecosystem to provide a buffer for real appreciation or to support them when they face tight monetary conditions. Consequently, the baseline monetary policy rate transmission in these economies is negligible at -0.042. Finally, the status of fragile states without a financial buffer makes them fully vulnerable to the unabated impact of currency fluctuations and additional institutional risks, as is reflected in their extremely high policy uncertainty coefficient of -0.362. This establishes a vicious circle: if there are no developed financial markets and robust supply chains, the economy’s macroeconomic instability negatively affects trade growth.
To ensure structural consistency across the empirical frameworks, the baseline REER results in Table
The subsample analysis in Table
| Shock Type | Emerging Markets (Group A) | Low-Income / Fragile (Group B) | Economic Interpretation |
| Monetary contraction | -0.612% | -0.234% | Credit channel strength. Rate hikes bite harder in formalized economies. |
| Energy intensity shock | -0.098% | -0.345% | Efficiency gap. Poorer countries use older technology; energy shocks are devastating to their marginal costs. |
| Coordinated expansion | +0.987% | +0.456% | Policy space. Poorer nations lack the fiscal/monetary space to fully benefit from stimulus. |
To determine the strength of our results and rule out outliers such as Vietnam’s abnormal growth path or Afghanistan’s excessive volatility, we performed further subsample stability tests. The results are reported in Table
| Transmission Channel | Full Sample (16) | Subsample A: Landlocked/Resource Rich (e.g., Mongolia, Nepal) | Subsample B: Coastal/Manufacturing (e.g., Vietnam, Bangladesh) | Sustainability Conclusion |
| Exchange rate depreciation | Positive (+) | Weak positive (+) | Strong positive (++) | The mechanism is sustainable worldwide, but its effectiveness is higher in the manufacturing countries where the supply is elastic compared to the resource countries where it is inelastic |
| Monetary contraction | Negative (-) | Negative (-) | Negative (-) | The net effect of high interest rates is that they reduce access to credit by exporters regardless of the composition of exports within a given country |
| Policy uncertainty | Negative (-) | Severe negative (--) | Moderate negative (-) | Sustainability of the mechanism is because fragile or landlocked countries pay higher risks premiums; however, the same directional impact of the shock is observed across the Asian region |
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Central Banks’ Taylor Principle Adherence
Null Hypothesis (H01): The inflation targeting parameter is less than or equal to 1.0, implying a passive and/or accommodative monetary policy that does not anchor inflation.
Testable Condition: The posterior mean of the Inflation Targeting Parameter is greater than 1.0, and statistically so.
Alternative Hypothesis (H11): Central banks in these countries strictly follow the Taylor principle, responding to price stability with aggressive monetary policy by moving nominal interest rates more than one-for-one with inflationary deviations.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Long-Run Exchange Rate Elasticity (The J-Curve)
Null Hypothesis (H02): Export elasticity to the exchange rate is perfectly inelastic or weakly elastic (less than or equal to 1.0), implying currency depreciation does not result in substantial increases in long-term exports.
Testable Constraint: The posterior mean for Export Elasticity to the Exchange Rate (Export Elasticity) must be much greater than 1.0, showing relatively high elasticity.
Alternative Hypothesis (H12): Even with initial import cost shocks, real exchange rate adjustments have a highly elastic, positive expenditure-switching impact on long-term exports.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The Price Flexibility Transmission Constraint
Null Hypothesis (H03): Monetary policy cannot affect real economic output in a strong way, because the economy has a high frequency of price changes.
Testable Constraint: The Calvo Price Stickiness constraint has to be significantly below the benchmark value for advanced economies (0.75-0.85), reflecting prompt and reactive price adjustments by domestic firms.
Alternative Hypothesis (H13): Price stickiness in the economy is high (above 0.75) so that the impact of the interest rate on the economy’s real output is significantly scaled up.
Test of Hypothesis 1 (Taylor Principle): Using the Bayesian estimates, the inflation targeting parameter is quite stable, with a posterior mean of 1.654 and a 90% credible interval of 1.457 to 1.851. The entire credible interval is safely above the threshold of 1.0, meaning that the Taylor principle is satisfied. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis (H01) and accept H1.
Test of Hypothesis 2 (Exchange Rate Elasticity): The empirical findings determine the export elasticity parameter to be 1.185. Operating within a 68% credible interval of 1.035 to 1.335, this parameter indicates an elastic threshold. Consequently, the null hypothesis (H02) must be rejected in favour of H2.
Test of Hypothesis 3 (Price Stickiness): The Calvo price stickiness parameter is astonishingly low, with a posterior mean value of 0.520. The credible interval (95%) of 0.393 to 0.647 is far below the usual price stickiness level in highly formalized economies (Justiniano & Primiceri, 2008; Davig & Leeper, 2007; and Calza et al., 2013). Thus, given the high frequency motion of prices, we reject the null hypothesis (H03) and accept H3.
These traditional macroeconomic variables are significant in that they offer a clear diagnosis of the reasons why policy transmission is as it is in frontier Asian economies. The testing of hypothesis H1 demonstrates that central banks here are not behaving erratically. By obediently following the Taylor principle (a reaction coefficient of 1.654), central banks are strongly protecting their inflation-targeting objectives. Most of these central banks in Asia are doing what macroeconomics recommends to stabilize prices against global shocks. Yet, the tragedy of this situation is revealed by H3, which uncovers a stark macroeconomic truth: even if the central bank carries out an optimal monetary expansion to stimulate exports, its effect is completely annihilated by the absurd flexibility of domestic prices. The parameter of price stickiness is very low (0.520), which implies that domestic firms and suppliers adjust to monetary policy shocks by immediately raising prices instead of increasing their real manufacturing capacity. Liquidity that is added to the system merely flees the scene as a local inflationary phenomenon. This successfully explains why the aforementioned monetary policy shock resulted in a meager 0.11% peak export response. The confirmation of H2 explains the currency conundrum. With an export elasticity of 1.185, the formal manufacturing sector is shown to be very sensitive to a positive exchange rate in the long term. If the country is willing to accept the J-curve effect in the short term, whereby imported capital goods and raw materials suddenly become extremely expensive, depreciation will inevitably force an expansion of export competitiveness in the long term (
The simulation results of the DSGE model for the Asia-Pacific region reveal the more subtle dynamics of policy interaction and provide essential support for recent theoretical and empirical advances in the literature on the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. The coordinated policy expansion has a peak response of 0.934% which is far greater than the sum of the effects of the individual components, thereby providing a strong empirical basis for the New Keynesian approach to policy interaction as described by
This quick ability to adjust is a feature of many Asian economies, which have built flexible manufacturing sectors aimed at the global market. These sectors have well-established supply chains and production networks that can respond quickly to market signals. The duration of these effects, which remain elevated for 8-10 quarters, suggests that the appreciation of the exchange rate creates lasting benefits through the gaining of market share and relationship building that are not dependent on the initial shock of competitiveness. This persistence confirms the importance of market relationships and established trading patterns in international trade, where initial competitiveness gains can lead to lasting market presence and customer relationships. These effects propagate via several transmission channels:
The policy uncertainty simulation, yielding trough effects of -0.534% in Quarter 4, captures the high costs of policy instability in developing economies, where export activities incur significant irreversible investments in market development and relationship building. It also points to an empirical evidence of policy conflict results, revealing delayed negative responses in the same quarter. Consequently, it provides strong empirical support for the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic framework initially proposed by Sargent and Wallace (
The results of the coordinated expansion especially support the growing body of research that regards the timing and sequencing of policy as key to getting the desired outcomes (
The peak response of monetary policy at quarter 5, at 0.367%, aligns with New Keynesian DSGE model scenarios involving credit channels and risk factors. The progressive build-up and persistence of effects endorses the theoretical prediction of the interaction between adjustment costs, the formation of expectations and forward-looking behavior in investment decisions. Monetary contraction simulations shed light on financial accelerator mechanisms, which have recently been emphasized in literature regarding credit channel transmission and balance sheet effects. The findings strongly encourage further discussion in the context of the framework developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, as set out in the new literature. This literature suggests that monetary tightening affects investment rates through both direct interest rate effects and amplified balance sheet channels, which worsen firms’ financial constraints and thus enhance external financial premiums. The asymmetric response pattern where contractions appear to have a stronger effect than expansions has shown support for recent research on non-linear policy transmission mechanisms and the significance of the financial constraints in magnifying contractionary policies. Moreover, research suggests that coordination has an important, positive empirical effect on the theory of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities (
Cross-regional comparative analysis demonstrates that the policy transmission mechanisms operate differentially, consistent with present-day theoretical and empirical waves in development economics, international macroeconomic literature and institutional economics. Asian countries appear to exhibit stronger responses across all three policy indicator groups: MPR (50.3%), REER (29.7%) and credit (44.2%), providing robust empirical support for theories of financial development, institutional economic frameworks, and recent research on the endogenous division of economic and financial variables in developing countries. This is similar to recent arguments by
Panel SGMM estimation results on the growth of Asian exports provide a substantial empirical support for major theories in international trade by shedding light on the sophisticated transmission mechanism specific to the Asian developing economies. The positive REER coefficient at 0.234 confirms classical expenditure-switching effects, in which the competitiveness of exports through reducing the real exchange rate works through price competitiveness in international markets. The more important finding related to Asia is that Asian economies are normally driven by the unchecked forces of price competitiveness, juxtaposed against the traditionally more competitive nature of advanced economies, due to a lack of price competitiveness. The lagged dependent variable coefficient of 0.178 indicates moderate export persistence, suggesting that export performance has natural momentum effects. This means that export responses are relatively robust in the face of internal and external economic pressures, and that they can quickly adapt to economic changes, reflecting the flexibility and responsiveness of these production structures.
An increase in interest rates depresses export activity in four main ways: an increase in working capital and export finance costs, pressure on the domestic currency (which decreases competitiveness), weak domestic economic activity and reduced export capacity, and trade finance conditions that affect small and medium-sized enterprises. Monetary authorities should be mindful of the consequences for export-oriented economies on a smaller scale than developing countries, given their easier access to alternative sources of finance, better-performing financial intermediaries, and far more developed capital markets with a wide range of financial products. Their findings support the work of previous scholars who have attested to the rather remarkable effects of the abnormal transmission of monetary policy in leading economies with advanced and vibrant financial sectors. This pattern is consistent with the literature on how interest rate transmission depends on economic circumstances and financial development (
The strongest positive effect is now seen in the financial development coefficient, which is at 0.445, providing robust empirical support for the idea that financial sector development is vital for supporting export activities in developing economies (
Empirical evidence strongly supports the use of real options theory to resolve issues in foreign trade. This relates to how uncertainty influences firm decisions to enter and remain in export markets. The compass of export market entry involves strapping irreversible investments in market research along with marketing networks, product adaptation and relationship building amidst uncertain situation. The negative coefficient shows that uncertainty about policy delays the entry to export markets resulting in reduced exports, and its most serious consequences pertain to an institutional setup where policy certainty is limited. The interaction terms embody an intricate weave of policy complementarities and substitution effects that provide significant insights for policy design. The positive interaction term (MPR × MS) is 0.089, suggesting that negative interest rate effects on exports can be controlled through appropriate money supply management, enabling central banks to counteract the adverse effects of their raised policy interest rates. Similarly, the positive intercept of the REER×FINDEV interaction indicates a situation in which financial development enhances the export-friendly effects of exchange rate depreciation by promoting elevated access to trade finance and superior risk management for scaling up. The negative interaction between POLUNC and CREDIT (-0.076) shows that policy uncertainty cancels out the positive effects of credit expansion on exports. It shows that an uncertain policy environment curtails a firm’s desire to use the available credit. This could be explained by increased perceived risks or a hesitant attitude to make trade more profitable by employing wise export credit moves.
The empirical evidence for five key Asia-Pacific countries indicates a long-term relationship between GDP and export growth, while finding that exchange rate volatility negatively impacts economic performance (
Unlike financial depth, which has a positive impact, policy uncertainty has a strong negative impact on export performance, as reported by
The interaction effects also offer more insight into the complexity of the policy transmission channels: an expansionary liquidity policy can mitigate the impact of a higher interest rate, while financial depth can boost the competitiveness channel but at the same time weaken it by a high degree of policy uncertainty. The DSGE simulations also reveal significant disparities among Asian economies. Emerging market economies tend to respond more robustly to monetary policy shocks than fragile and low-income economies due to their superior financial systems and credit transmission channels. Conversely, low-income economies are more sensitive to exchange rate movements because their exports are price-sensitive primary commodities with high price elasticity (
The greater negative effect of policy uncertainty among fragile economies underscores the crucial role of institutional quality in influencing export performance: fragile economies with lower governance scores and higher political risk register bigger export declines with rising uncertainty (
According to extensive empirical evidence, export growth in all Asian economies depends on several factors: exchange-rate competitiveness, monetary policy settings, financial development, energy prices, and policy uncertainty. GMM estimation yielded a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the real effective exchange rate (REER). Meanwhile, the simulated peak export response in the DSGE model following currency depreciation was found to be 0.867%. A strong competitive force is emerging in the region. Improvements in international price competitiveness increase demand for foreign goods and exports. This is consistent with the Bayesian DSGE study of India by Banerjee and Basu (2024), which demonstrates that export gains are significant due to expenditure switching effects. The net-effect analysis shows that the benefits of initial competitiveness gains are ultimately offset by negative effects, which include roll-over pass-through, foreign-currency debt obligations, energy-price rises and trading-partner responses. In most cases, the positives are far outweighed by the negatives.
Alongside the short-term fluctuations in the macroeconomic landscape, the positive coefficient on export persistence indicates that past success is linked to future success. This inertia stems from pre-existing trade linkages, manufacturing networks and market knowledge. Alternatively, the coefficient of monetary policy rate with a negative and significant value shows that tightening of monetary policy has a negative impact on export performance due to the impact of higher interest rates on cost of borrowing, level of investment, flow of working capital and appreciation of domestic currency. This finding is supported by the DSGE simulation result of a 0.545% decline in exports following the reduction in the interest rate.
The growth in the money supply, which has the power to offset the above forces, highlights the importance of monetary accommodation, or increased liquidity, to enhance access to finance and promote investment in exports. This finding is consistent with the work of
Interaction effects shed light on the complexities of policy transmission channels. For instance, an expansionary liquidity policy can mitigate the impedance effect of a higher interest rate. Also, financial depth can strengthen the competitiveness channel but can also weaken it by a high degree of policy uncertainty. The DSGE model simulations reveal large disparities between Asian economies, with emerging market economies responding more strongly to monetary-policy shocks than fragile and low-income economies due to their better financial systems and credit-transmission channels. According to Anand and Prasad (2024), this structural gap indicates that the monetary policy transmission is considerably weaker in less developing Asian countries than in institutionalized economies like India, Indonesia and Malaysia. In contrast, poor economies are more responsive to exchange-rate movements because their exports are primarily price-sensitive commodities, which are highly price-elastic.
Robustness analysis verifies the endurance of the identified transmission mechanisms across diverse economic frameworks. Additionally, although the size of the exchange-rate effects may be greater in a resource-rich economy than in a manufacturing economy, the relationship remains positive across all subsamples. While depreciation of the exchange rate may be sustainable on a global scale, it may be more effective in a structural sense for coastal, trade-based manufacturing economies such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, where supply is elastic, than for landlocked, resource-rich countries such as Mongolia and Nepal, where supply curves are inherently inelastic.
The Bayesian posterior diagnostics of the DSGE model strongly confirm the reliability of these simulated dynamics. The narrow highest-posterior-density intervals of the model parameters, as well as Brooks-Gelman-Rubin statistics close to unity, indicate strong convergence and stability of parameters. The significant changes from prior means to updated posterior means, especially for the Calvo price-stickiness parameter and the policy uncertainty parameter, show that the empirical quarterly data series for 2000-2025 produced deep updated insights about Asian structural realities. Moreover, the ideal Metropolis-Hastings acceptance rate of 28.4% indicates the efficiency of the simulation method. The diagnostics are similar to those of recent Asian DSGE studies of Banerjee and Basu (2024). Ultimately, GMM panel estimations and DSGE simulations yield a joint toolbox for regional policymakers, showing that a uniform monetary framework cannot deal with the deep-seated structural heterogeneity characterizing modern Asian trade.
To ensure short-term export survival and prevent unemployment, policymakers should aim for a competitive (potentially undervalued) real exchange rate, using the documented fourth-quarter elasticity to cushion demand shocks from the rest of the world. There should be a focus on financial deepening. Monetary and fiscal policy must shift focus from cyclical interest rate setting to the rapid deepening of domestic credit markets. Reducing financial frictions emerges as the last-mile solution to sustainable export growth. There is a need to mitigate institutional uncertainty. Governments ought to establish stringent, predictable policies; policy certainty is essential for maintaining export competitiveness. Policy should be put in place and implemented to check the use of localized barter and non-monetized transactions. By actively raising the frictional cost of the informal economy, employment and capital are encouraged to formalize and integrate in the measurable global supply chain and thus boost the officially recorded export level.
The central banks of Asia actually need dual mandate exchange rate policies prima facie subject to the dual objectives of export competitiveness and domestic macroeconomic stability. For Asian central banks, the acknowledged fact of conflicting policies (
In order to allow for timely policy responses when relative export competitiveness falls precipitously, governments need to install competitiveness monitoring frameworks to observe movements in real effective exchange rates, currently with reference to their major trading partners and competitor countries. These frameworks should provide visual warnings in the event of exchange rate rises that could threaten export performance, requiring responsive policies to address this situation and restore the competitive position. Mechanisms for coordinating exchange rate policies should also entail integrating central banks and trade promotion agencies, whereby exchange rate management should actively contribute to all export strategies. In practice, this would mean regular consultation between the two parties, sharing of analytical capabilities, and an agreement on coordinated action, ensuring that the aims of exchange-rate policies are aligned with those of export promotion. The strong positive relationship between exchange rate depreciation and export growth (
In this study, we conducted empirical research to evaluate the stochastic effects of exchange rate fluctuations and fiscal and monetary expansions on exports in selected Asian countries. The estimation was based on striking a balance between structural stability and statistical power. A sample period from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2025 was used to capture sufficient volatility (e.g. the Global Financial Crisis and the Coronavirus pandemic) to enable robust parameter identification. The impulse-response functions were modeled within 20 quarters (five year) horizon, which is compatible with canonical frequencies of business cycles. This time period is required to adequately include the hump shaped transmission lags that accompany monetary and fiscal policy interventions and to confirm that the model converges to the steady state. A five-year horizon therefore allows researchers to capture the long-run mark of a transient shock on the economy, an aspect that is important in the study of synergistic impacts. This is why it was crucial to evaluate whether the positive effects of fiscal-monetary expansion are short-term (one to two years) or long-term (four to five years). By projecting the data to 2025, the model also includes the new normal of supply-side limitations and the interplay between fiscal dominance and monetary tightening, which are the descriptive features of the modern economic environment. It is inherent in monetary and fiscal policy shocks that there is an implementation and impact lag. The maximum impact of a monetary contraction on inflation generally reaches its highest point between 8 and 12 quarters (two to three years). A truncated horizon (e.g. 8-10 quarters) would cut the graph at exactly the point of maximum influence, thus not giving a picture of the overall trajectory. A 20 ‑quarter window records the shock rise, peak and dissipation. The study found that short-term risk management and long-term economic development are the two sides of the same macroeconomic coin. Temporary monetary policy merely delays the day of reckoning, while permanent poverty alleviation and export market share dominance can only be achieved via arduous financial institution building.
Consequently, this research provides qualitative underpinnings for the expenditure-switching mechanisms and also substantiates the role of foreign exchange rate competitiveness and export performance against the backdrop of a developing economy where price competitiveness usually overrides other competitive factors. The speed of the reaction, within a single year, trimmed by a high level of depreciation in the exchange rate and significant real effects within the same time suggests a high price elasticity of export from all responsive Asian regions with relatively easily adaptable production structures in the face of relative competitiveness alterations. In spite of the fact that this study focused on the 16 emerging economies of the Asia-Pacific region, its results can be transferred to the wider geographic area. The greater the role of these countries as the anchor of the Factory Asia value chain, the more their responsiveness to monetary-fiscal shocks serves as a leading indicator of trade stability in the region. The fact that the transmission mechanisms in both resource-dependent and manufacturing-intensive subsamples are robust shows that the coordinated expansion multiplier is a key characteristic of the Asian export-led model of growth, not just along the low-income frontier. Although these sixteen countries are among the poorest, they form the upstream basis of the whole Asian industrial complex. An event such as a shock in Vietnam or Bangladesh, which are key suppliers of components and assembly, has a direct impact on developed economies such as Japan and South Korea, which depend on them as suppliers of intermediate goods. Based on that, the stability in these sixteen countries is used as a proxy to the stability of the Asian supply chain. Advanced Asian economies such as Japan and Singapore have already achieved steady-state growth. The dynamic margin of Asian export growth, its variability and future path are literally dictated by these developing economies. Their volatility is well captured by precise modeling and this indicates the risk that the larger Asian continent is facing. The structural frictions arising in this sample — namely, credit constraints and exchange rate sensitivity — are widespread across the continent, albeit at varying levels. We determine the maximum limit of policy sensitivity by considering the worst-case scenario for an Asian economy. A policy that works in these rigidly structured economies (e.g. coordinated expansion) would lead to even greater efficiency in superior Asian economies.
According to the reconciliation of estimated findings, the policy suggestion is that the sixteen poorest Asian countries should transition from monetary devaluation to structural upgrading, focusing on financial deepening by increasing small and medium enterprises’ access to credit and reducing the cost of trade financing. Stable financial system is a more robust long-term driver of exports compared to a fluctuating currency. To counteract the impact of rising prices, these countries must reduce their energy intensity by diversifying their energy sources. This will make the export price less sensitive to changes in the global oil and gas market. They may also invest in energy-efficient production to offset the negative effects of energy-intensive shocks. To ensure that firms with foreign-currency liabilities are not adversely affected by devaluation, reduce the inflationary pass-through to the poor, retain the confidence of their trading partners and block retaliation in the form of tariffs, these Asian countries must adopt exchange-rate stability as a policy.
The research contributes to the existing body of academic knowledge by establishing a methodological connection between reduced-form empirical studies and structural general-equilibrium modeling of the context of emerging Asian economies within the 2000-2025 horizon. Unlike previous studies, which have mostly been limited to the use of historical correlations, our contribution is carried out in a trilateral way: (i) it isolates the structural mechanisms using a Bayesian DSGE model with diffuse priors that are reflective of the high-volatility nature of developing Asian markets, thus going beyond simple correlation to causal identification of the monetary-fiscal synergy and exchange-rate volatility that drive export expansion; (ii) it captures non-linear dynamics by, indeed, the inclusion of a stochastic volatility component. Taken together, (iii) the results offer empirical evidence on the impact of disparate economic policies and exogenous variables in determining the growth of trade, thus expanding the knowledge base of macroeconomic stability and providing practical advice to the regional policymakers.
Asian countries should establish robust macroeconomic policy frameworks to be able to guide the transmission of strong policy effects with economic stability. The framework, which calls for in-depth policy tools and capable institutional formulation, is firmly rooted in the suggested practicalities. As stringent measures are implemented by banking regulators to rectify incongruous banking practices, enhance collective banking industry performance and address financial stability concerns, the development of the financial sector has to become a major priority across all regions. This requires a simultaneous consideration of banking and non-banking markets, as well as the delivery of specialised services that are of great importance and need to be provided promptly. Financial sectors in Asia should then, in this period, be strengthened, in order to help with economic financing. In conclusion, the ultimate implication of policies should lead towards institutionalizing regional and interregional cooperation amongst economies. The evidence presented in the study underscores the importance of trade finance, export credit facilities, and other such financial instruments that can provide firms with access to international markets, help manage currency and political risk, and finance large working capital requirements associated with export activities.
Enhanced financial sector development and improved policy transmission mechanisms are required across the European economic space. Fiscal policy also should be able to respond explicitly to the monetary policy stance and transmission mechanics in light of the evidence discovered; thus, during periods of monetary tightening, fiscal policy should be extensively applied to provide the necessary offset to compensate for the shortfall in investment during subsequent periods. And conversely, during subsequent periods of monetary easing, fiscal policy should strive to maintain structural equilibrium and enhance long-term competitiveness, as opposed to ad hoc demand management measures. So, a community-wide crisis management framework must account for the development of transmission mechanisms during stressful periods. Regional cooperation mechanisms should also be established to mitigate the impact of global monetary policy changes and exchange rate fluctuations. The integration of Asian economies into global value chains creates opportunities, but also vulnerabilities, necessitating coordinated regional action to mitigate the impact of shocks and policy changes from major economies. International policy coordination channels should also be upgraded to manage spillovers between different regional groupings. Evidence of differential transmission mechanisms in different regions suggests that changes in policies by major economies affect disparities within respective country groups differently. Therefore, they must work together to reduce any negative spillovers. Policy uncertainty is represented by various input measures based on different data from various countries, at different times and from different sources, presenting challenges. Consequently, the empirical study acknowledges the impossibility of a single, global measure of policy uncertainty and instead uses generally available proxies that may not fully characterize the multidimensionality of policy uncertainties within each context. Therefore, there is a need for further studies to use the TVP-VAR-SV method for similar analyses.
The uncertainty surrounding the policy is reflected by a wide range of input measures, each making use of a variety of data and from a diversity of sources of policy uncertainty. The findings confirm that no global measurement of policy uncertainty is currently available, meaning that broadly available proxy measurements are used instead. However, these measurements may not capture the multidimensionality of policy uncertainty in each context. Future lines of research must address the data and parameter frictions specific to frontier markets that affect estimations, which poses empirical challenges. The presence of substantial unrecorded informal transactions and measurement errors in samples from war-torn and deeply fragile states, such as Afghanistan, obscures structural noise behind the aggregates. Another important aspect of the simulations for the period 2000–2025 is that the shallow and deep structural parameters of the Bayesian DSGE model can be time-varying. The emerging Asian economies underwent rigorous financial deregulation, shifts in trade access regimes and institutional overhauls during this period (