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Research Article
Stochastic Effects of Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Monetary-Fiscal Simulation on Exports in Asia
expand article infoDavid Umoru‡, Rashidah Elamah§, Beauty Igbinovia‡
‡ Edo State University Uzairue, Iyamho, Nigeria
§ Auchi Polytechnic, Auchi, Nigeria
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The study explores the stochastic impacts of the exchange rate fluctuation and the synergistic effects of monetary-fiscal expansion simulations on export growth in Asia. It attempts to fill the gap between theoretical policy development and the practical uncertainty of policymakers in the emerging Asian markets.

The study is based on dual methodological approach. The study is based on a dual methodological approach. First, a Panel System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is used on a panel of Asian economies to identify structural determinants and interaction effects. Second, a Bayesian-estimated Medium-Scale version of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equation (DSGE) is employed to simulate the time-dependent reactions of exports to different policy and uncertainty shocks within twenty years span (the horizon taken to be twenty quarters). DSGE estimation was based on 26 years of historical data (January 1, 2000-December 31, 2025), and the impulse-response functions were simulated with horizon of twenty quarters (five years), which is compatible with canonical frequencies of business cycles taking into cognizance the transmission lags that accompany monetary and fiscal policy interventions required for the confirmation of the DSGE model convergence to the steady state. Besides, the homogeneity of monetary-fiscal policy regime that characterized the post-2000 era provides stability in the estimated deep parameters over the sample thus fulfilling the Lucas critique.

The GMM estimation shows that financial development and credit expansion are the most powerful structural forces of exports. Financial maturity only amplifies the advantages of competitive devaluations, according to the correlation between exchange rates and financial depth. The simulations in DSGE also show a coordinated expansion to be the most powerful stimulus as it will result in the greatest growth of exports of 0.934. A significant dampening in export growth is seen through policy uncertainty which is a big pull of exports in the economies of Asia. Conversely, the level of expansion of money supply, availability of domestic credit, financial development and consumption of energy has a positive impact on exports which in turn brings about the significance of liquidity, financial depth and production capacity in export expansion. The empirical evidence suggests that the competitiveness channel effect in the region of Asia is 0.867%. This gain is, nevertheless, dependent on financial maturity. In the case of the 16 poorest nations, the overall impact of monetary and fiscal expansion is expected to be positive if these economies are coupled with institutional reforms that reduce the cost of energy and debt. The simulated responses reveal stark structural asymmetries across the sample. While nominal exchange rate depreciation and co-ordinated monetary expansions represent extremely effective but necessarily short-lived export shocks - peaking invariably in Quarter four and reverting to the mean in Quarter twelve - the longer-run effects differ markedly. Bayesian inferences confirm that financial development is the only structural parameter that may lead to permanent (non-mean-reverting) export growth. By contrast, institutional weakness in forms of policy uncertainty, energy costs and black market labour exports inflicts significant negative asymmetries upon the fragile. The results show that the only way to avoid cyclical volatility is to prioritise holistic financial market development over short-term macroeconomic policymaking.

The study provides a contribution to the literature by developing a methodological interface between the reduced-form empirical research and structural general-equilibrium modelling in the emerging Asian markets. It separates the structural processes to determine the causal transmission processes of monetary-fiscal synergy and exchange-rate volatility on export growth in a Bayesian DSGE model with diffuse priors adapted to the high-volatility regime typical in developing Asia. The model explicitly measures the sensitivity of the effectiveness of conventional policies that promote exports to policy uncertainty, as well as the fear of floating, which can be unduly precarious in linear panel regressions by including a stochastic volatility factor. The research establishes that the Asian poorest economies are constrained by structural asymmetries. The credibility intervals around the 90% high-posterior-density (HPD) intervals with prior means robustly confirm that, while these countries are equipped with highly elastic short-term absorption capacities to monetary and currency shocks, these economies are by nature incapable of permanently shifting their long-term economic paradigms via cyclical policies. Weak economies disproportionately suffer from policy uncertainty and supply-side restrictions, and are thus more likely to cancel out the effects of positive exchange rates.

Keywords

Asian Exports, Stochastic Shocks, DSGE Simulation, Monetary-Fiscal Expansion, Exchange Rate Volatility, Financial Development, Policy Uncertainty.

JEL: C33, E52, E62, F14, F41.

1. Introduction

The stochastic model depicts the uncertainty associated with changes in economic variables as a dynamic condition that is influenced both by the general economic trend and by random economic phenomena. Monetary policy transmission and exchange rate responses are not constant but evolving with shifts in global financial conditions and uncertainty (Liu et al., 2026; Park & Shin, 2026). The interplay between exchange rates and monetary policy makes it essential to analyze the extent to which these two factors are interrelated. This analysis also indirectly examines the impact of these factors on export growth and performance. Another point that arises from this discussion is that the studies conducted so far have not provided sufficient information on the direction of causality between exchange rates, exports and respective countries’ monetary and fiscal policies. Traditional optimal policy design suggests that ideal solutions are often dictated by policymakers’ and economists’ understanding of the economic structure and the impact of policies under normal circumstances. However, decision-makers always have to act amidst heavy clouds of uncertainty about the efficacy of the policies they are applying. This gap in economic theory is particularly significant in terms of the hierarchy of policy responses to different economic environments and changing transmission channels. Is it more appropriate and economically sound to formulate policies that remain intact regardless of the circumstances, or to make them flexible and subject to change based on new information? This knowledge gap also encompasses the issue of how policies should be communicated and expectations managed when the effects of policies are uncertain. So, how should governments determine their policies when they cannot predict their effects with certainty? In what ways does this uncertainty influence the shaping of expectations and the success of communication regarding the policy?

Thirdly, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies and its influence on investment and export dynamics in different economic contexts has not yet been thoroughly researched (Demirtaş, 2024). According to economic theory, monetary policy, when considered in isolation from other policies, has a direct impact on investment and export in both developed and developing economies (Endut et al., 2017). However, the relationship is more complex in developing countries due to the limited effectiveness of interest rate tools and the need for better fiscal and monetary coordination (Ojeda‐Joya & Guzmán, 2018). Fourthly, the different impact of currency value fluctuations and central bank rate changes on various country groups and levels of economic development requires the use of more complex analytical models (Egilsson, 2020; Giovanni & Shambaugh, 2007). The size and flow of effects are likely to vary significantly between advanced and emerging economies (Baumann et al., 2019). Nevertheless, few studies have systematically compared these differences using a shared methodological approach (Demirtaş, 2024).

Fifth, while the influence of financial growth, energy use and policy uncertainty on the transmission of currency and monetary policy impacts to investment and exports has been studied, it remains a relatively under-explored area in the literature (Cascaldi-Garcia et al., 2023). These factors may considerably alter the transmission channels and magnitude of effects, but they are not yet incorporated into comprehensive analytical frameworks. Sixth, existing publications often lack inclusive methods for blending different viewpoints to provide a comprehensive analysis. While TVP-VAR-SV models excel at capturing temporal relationships, DSGE models provide theoretical grounding and Panel GMM methods address the endogeneity issue. However, there is significant potential for future research to integrate the complementary strengths of these approaches more effectively within a unified analytical framework. Seventh, existing empirical evidence is scattered across different regions and time periods, making it difficult to draw general conclusions about the stochastic influence of currency fluctuations and monetary policy shocks (Adams et al., 2020). Instead, what is needed is a thorough analysis that considers several regions and the most recent changes in the global economy, such as monetary policy normalization following the pandemic and geopolitical tensions. Furthermore, the policy implications stemming from existing research have often been unable to address uncertainty and the varying nature of economic relationships over time. Therefore, it is vital for policymakers to have comprehensive guidance that recognizes the stochastic nature of these relationships and provides recommendations that are equally effective in different economic conditions and time periods.

From the above, this study intends to tackle the following: (1) To assess the role played by the monetary-fiscal policy mix in influencing the stochastic effects of total export growth rate in the 16 least developed countries of Asia. (2) To simulate using the DSGE model, the total exports’ response to the stochastic impacts of the monetary-fiscal policy mix. (3) To derive policy implications for the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in various economic contexts from the empirical evidence and simulation results. Rifa’i (2023) highlights that developing countries face significant challenges in managing exchange rate fluctuations and monetary policy spillovers from developed economies. Given the impact of the global financial cycle on these economies, an examination of the policy mix consisting of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, and capital flow management measures is indispensable (Borio et al., 2023). This research makes a significant contribution to studies of the stochastic nature of exchange rates and monetary policy, as it facilitates a clearer and more accessible understanding of macroeconomic relations and policy choices. The research identifies the export industry and the stock market as the main beneficiaries of the study’s findings. The inherently random nature of such interactions provides dynamic guidance for risk management and strategic planning in unpredictable economic environments. The study’s exploration of the effects of energy consumption and financial development as mediating factors provides practitioners with insights and suggestions for creating sound financial and economic policies that align with a country’s sustainable development goals. This is particularly pertinent for less developed and developing nations seeking to build resilience to external shocks while fostering sustainable growth. By focusing on different regions, such as the poorest Asian countries, the study sheds light on regional development strategies tailored to specific areas’ needs. Comparing the various regimes sheds light on how varying degrees of economic development and the nature of governing institutions influence the transmission of global economic shocks, thus providing region-specific development policies and international cooperation frameworks.

The first section of our study outlines the research problem and highlights areas of the literature that require updating with sophisticated analytical frameworks. The research questions and objectives are also clearly defined to direct the empirical analysis, and the hypotheses put forward are testable propositions based on theoretical expectations. The sections on scope and limitations define the restrictions of the analysis and set realistic expectations for the study’s contributions. The next section is an empirical literature review focusing solely on studies from 2022 to 2024. This ensures that the review presents the most up-to-date findings and methodological advancements. This section summarizes previous research findings from various theoretical perspectives and provides a solid foundation for the empirical analysis. The third section deals with estimation techniques, providing a comprehensive description of the methodology of each approach, detailing their respective pros and cons, and outlining their appropriate usage. This section can be viewed as both a methodological handbook for applying the techniques and a guide to understanding the results. It covers data description and sources, discusses the data sources, and how the variables were constructed and the quality of the data. This information is important for the analysis and its limitations. Section 4 presents the estimated DSGE and system-GMM results, and section five provides a robust discussion of the resulting findings. Section six contains our concluding remarks.

2. Review of past findings

In recent years, the empirical literature on the relationship between exchange rates and export performance has advanced significantly, in terms of both the methods developed and the complexity of the international economic landscape. From 2022 to 2026, the focus of the study shifted towards the dynamic, non-linear and state-dependent nature of the relationship between exchange rates and exports. This change is driven by greater volatility in exchange rates, geopolitical tensions, uncertainty in financial markets and growing linkages with global value chains (Frikha, 2025; Wang, 2025). Recent research highlights that geopolitical tensions are a critical driver of exchange-rate volatility, creating market uncertainty that influences the strategies of export-oriented companies (Frikha, 2025). Furthermore, firms’ responses to exchange-rate volatility vary significantly based on size and diversification: smaller firms and those with fewer export destinations are more vulnerable to exchange-rate shocks than larger, more diversified firms (Cheung & Sengupta, 2013; Héricourt & Nedoncelle, 2017).

Studies using Bayesian time-varying parameter models indicate that the effects of exchange-rate movements on trade have become increasingly dynamic and sensitive to economic conditions (Alexius & Holmberg, 2023). This research demonstrates that pass-through behavior is not fixed, but rather changes over time in relation to exchange-rate volatility and broader macroeconomic variables (Alexius & Holmberg, 2023). Recent studies have further highlighted the nonlinear nature of the exchange rate-export nexus. Kim (2026) employs the Multiple-Threshold Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (MTNARDL) model to show how exchange-rate volatility affects exports in each of the volatility regimes (Kim, 2026). These results emphasize the relevance of threshold effects in the export reactions to exchange-rate changes (Kim, 2026). Financial frictions have also received a growing amount of attention in recent years as they play an important role in determining the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on export behavior. Research conducted over the past three years (2024–2026) shows that, in addition to relative prices, exchange-rate volatility affects exports via financial channels. Higher uncertainty in exchange rates leads to greater reductions in exports among firms with more limited financing options, as the uncertainty increases the cost of borrowing and reduces the incentive to invest in exports. Supporting this, research indicates that companies with robust supply-chain financing arrangements and better access to trade finance are more likely to absorb exchange rate shocks and maintain export activity (Nino, 2025). The literature has also shown that monetary policy can influence export performance through various transmission channels. Using a New Keynesian DSGE model, Shim (2023) investigates the optimal interest-rate policy in small open economies, finding that monetary policy should consider net-export externalities. According to the study, since interest rates affect both export competitiveness and economic activity, policymakers must balance domestic stabilization goals with the performance of the external sector. Therefore, export performance should be incorporated into the design of optimal policy rules alongside inflation stabilization by the monetary authorities.

Besides the more traditional exchange-rate and monetary-policy channels, recent work has focused on the policy options that can be used to dampen exchange-rate volatility. Using a Generalized Synthetic Control framework, Panggabean et al. (2025) have tested export-proceeds repatriation policies for a set of emerging economies and concluded that there is little evidence that such policies are effective in reducing exchange-rate volatility. The reports suggest that exchange-rate volatility is increasingly interacting with broader macroeconomic uncertainties, which makes it more difficult to predict export outcomes using traditional linear models. Alongside these developments, significant methodological advances have emerged in the estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (Ascari et al., 2019). While Bayesian estimation remains the dominant approach in the literature, researchers have explored alternative techniques that can capture nonlinearities, stochastic volatility, structural breaks and model uncertainty (Ascari et al., 2019).

Despite these significant contributions, there are still several important gaps in the literature. Firstly, existing DSGE studies often consider shocks one at a time in their impulse response functions, which limits the assessment of joint stochastic effects (Aizenman & Binici, 2015). Second, the analysis of high-frequency data is often overlooked in standard VAR models, despite its potential to improve prediction accuracy (Ghysels, 2016). Further research is therefore required that employs high-frequency data, stochastic simulations, FAVAR models, panel SVAR techniques and advanced DSGE estimation approaches, in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how exchange-rate fluctuations and monetary-fiscal policy interactions influence export growth in emerging Asian economies.

3. Methodology

To provide a thorough analysis of the dynamic transmission mechanism and the joint effects of monetary and fiscal policies on export growth, this study adopts a dual methodological framework. This framework integrates a Bayesian-estimated New Keynesian small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a dynamic panel System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. This combination effectively deals with endogeneity and captures the persistence of structures over quarterly data for 26 years, from 2000 to 2025.

3.1. Econometric strategy

The DSGE method provides a microeconomic foundation for the study of the impact of exchange rate changes and monetary policy shocks on domestic investment and exports (Scholl & Uhlig, 2008). The model’s specification considers rational expectations and inter-temporal optimisation, as well as market clearing conditions. However, it also allows for a range of nominal and real rigidities (Eichenbaum et al., 2020). The DSGE models represent various economic agents acting in a small open economy. Households maximise their utility within a budget constraint, firms maximize their profits subject to technology and adjustment costs, the central bank conducts monetary policy, the government conducts fiscal policy, and the foreign sector influences external conditions. The representative household’s objective is to maximize expected lifetime utility, given the discount factor:

E0∑t=0∞βtU(Ct,Ht,MtPt) (1)

Note that Ct is consumption, Ht is hours of labour worked, Mt /Pt is real money held, and t is the discount factor. The utility function is specified as:

Household Sector: The utility relation of the household is as given in equation (2).

U(Ct,Ht,MtPt)=Ct1−σC1−σC−Ht1+σH1+σH+χ(Mt/Pt)1−σM1−σM (2)

The household’s budget constraint is:

PtCt + Mt + Bt + EtBt* = WtHt + Mt–1 + Rt–1Bt–1 + EtRt*B*t–1 + Πt + Tt (3)

where Bt and Bt* are domestic and foreign bonds, Et is nominal exchange rate, Wt is the nominal wage, Rt and Rt* are domestic and foreign interest rates, Πt represents profits from firms, and Tt are transfers.

Domestic Firms: Domestic firms operate in monopolistically competitive markets and face price adjustment costs. The productions function for firm j is as specified in equation (4):

Yt(j) = AtHt(j)αKt–1(j)1–α (4)

where At is the effect of technology, Ht(j) is labor man-hour input, and Kt(j) is capital stock. Capital accumulation follows:

Kt+1(j)=(1−δ)Kt(j)+It(j)|1−ϕt2(It(j)It−1(j)−1)2| (5)

where It(j) is investment, δ is depreciation rate, and ϕI represents investment adjustment costs.

Price Setting: Firms’ price change or adjustment costs equation is given in (6):

∁(π)=ϑp2(πs−1)2Yf (6)

where ϑp account for price stickiness (price adjustment cost) parameter and πs is steady-state inflation or gross inflation rate that defines the change in current prices by firms relative to previous prices and Y is national output.

Export Sector: The export demand follows a detailed specification that incorporates the key variables of the study:

DEXPt = f [PEXP,t,St,FINDEVt,POLUNCt,Pt*,Yt*,ηEXP,ηFIN,ηY,ηPOL,ξEXP,t} (7)

where DEXPt is total exports, PEXP,t is the domestic export price, St is the nominal exchange rate, Pt* is the foreign price level, Yt* is foreign output/demand, FINDEVt is the financial development index, POLUNCt is the policy uncertainty index, ηEXP is the price elasticity of export demand, ηY is the income elasticity of export demand, ηFIN captures financial development effects on export capacity, ηPOL captures policy uncertainty effects on export performance, ξEXP,t is an export-specific shock. The export price is determined by:

P(EXP,t)=μEXPMCt(1+τEXP,t)(FINDEVtFINDEV)−γFIN(1+γPOLPOLUNCt) (8)

where μEXP is the export markup, MCt is marginal cost, τEXP,t represents export-related costs including financing costs affected by monetary policy, γFIN captures how financial development reduces export costs, and γPOL captures how policy uncertainty increases export costs. The export firms face working capital requirements that depend on monetary policy:

WCEXP,t=θEXPPEXP,tEXPt(RtR)θWC (9)

where θEXP is the working capital coefficient and ϕWC captures the sensitivity to interest rates.

Monetary policy specification: The central bank follows an enhanced Taylor-type rule that incorporates money supply considerations and responds to both domestic and external conditions interest rate smoothing. The enhanced Taylor-Type rule is as specified:

RtR=(Rt−1R)ρR[(πtπ∗)ϕπ(YtY)ϕY(StSt−1π∗)ϕS]1−ρRe[R,tRtR==(Rt−1R)pR[(πtπ∗)ϕR(YtY)ϕY(St/St−1π∗)ϕs]1−ρReJRtRRt==(RRt−1)ρR[(π∗πt)ϕπ(YYt)ϕY(π∗St/St1)ϕS]1−ρRe∫R,t (10)

Money supply follows an enhanced specification:

MtM=(Mt−1M)ρM(RtR)−ϕMR(YtY)ϕMYeϵM,t (11)

where ρR and ρM are persistence parameters, ϕπ, ϕγ, ϕS, ϕMR, and ϕMY are policy response coefficients, and ϵR,T and ϵM,t are monetary policy shocks.

Credit supply is determined by the specification of equation (12):

CREDIT t=CREDIT―(FINDEVtFINDEV)γCRED (RfR)−ϕCRED eeCRED ,t (12)

where γCRED captures financial development effects on credit supply and ϕCRED captures interest rate effects.

Fiscal policy: With regard to government expenditure, ĝt is fraction of the deviation of government spending from its steady state, γg is persistence parameter that measure how long the fiscal programs would last or persists and is a fiscal policy shock. The relationship is represented in equation (13).

g^1=γsg^t−1+εt8 (13)

Foreign Sector and Exchange Rate: The exchange rate is based on interest parity that incorporates risk premiums, financial development, and policy uncertainty. The foreign sector equations are given as:

Et[St+1St]=Rt∗RteψRPt (14)

where the risk premium follows an enhanced specification:

ψRP,t=ψ0+ψ1(FINDEVtFINDEV)−ψ2+ψ3POLUNCt++ψ4(CREDITtCREDIT)+ψ5(Bt′GDPtb′gdp)+ϵRP,t (15)

This specification shows that financial development reduces the risk premium (higher FINDEV lowers the risk premium through ψ1 > 0, ψ2 > 0), policy uncertainty increases the risk premium (through ψ3 > 0; credit conditions affect the risk premium (through ψ4); and external debt levels affect the risk premium (through ψ5 > 0). The model includes several stochastic processes that drive the key variables of the study:

Technology shock (in deviation from steady state):

a^t=γaa^t−1+ea,t (16)

Export demand shock:

ξEXP,t=ρEXPξEXP,t−1+σEXPϵEXP,t (17)

Policy uncertainty shock:

POLUNC t=(1−ρPOL)POLUNC―+ρPOLPOLUNCt−1+σPOLϵPOL,t (18)

Financial development evolution:

log⁡FINDEVt=(1−ρFIN)log⁡FINDEV―+ρFINlog⁡FINDEVt−1+σFINϵFIN,t (19)

Foreign demand shock:

yt∗=ρy′⋅yt−1∗+ey′,t (20А)

Risk premium shock:

ϵRP,t=ρRPϵRP,t−1+σRPvRP,t (20)

Monetary policy rate shock:

ϵR,t=ρR, slock ϵR,t−1+σRvR,t (21)

Money supply shock:

ϵM,t=ρM, slock ϵM,t−1+σMvM,t (22)

Credit shock:

ϵCRED ,t=ρCRED ϵCRED ,t−1+σCRED vCRED ,t (23)

where all ϵ and ν terms represent white noise innovations with zero mean and unit variance, ât is percentage deviation of technology from its steady state, γa is persistence parameter that measure how long the technology upgrading persists and ea,t is shock innovation. A logarithmic linearization of in its steady state yields a system of linear rational expectations equations that can be solved using standard techniques. The key equations for the study variables are: The log-linearized investment, exports, exchange rates, monetary policy rule, money supply and credit equations are given by equations (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), and (29) respectively.

I^t=StI^t+1−σl(R^t−Stπ^t+1)+γES^t+γcCREDIT⏜t++γFFINDEV⏜t−γPPOLUNC⏜t+γMSMS⏜t+ϵI,t (24)

EXPt^=−ηp(P^EXP,t−S^t−P^t′)+ηYY^t+ηFINFINDEV^t−−ηPOLPOLUNC^t−γEER(R^t−π^t)+γMSMSt^+γCCREDIT^t+ξ^EXP^t (25)

S^t=EtS^t+1−(R^t−R^t∗)+ψ1+ψ1MSt^+ψ2 FINDEV ^t++ψ3 POLUNC ^t+ψ4 CREDIT ^t+ϵ^RP (26)

R^t=ρRR^t−1+(1−ρR)[ϕππ^t+ϕYY^t+ϕS(S^t−S^t−1)]+ϵ^R,t (27)

MS^t=ρMMS^t−1−ϕMRR^t+ϕMYY^t+ϵ^M,t (28)

CREDIT^t=γCREDFINDEV^t−ϕCREDR^t+ϵ^CRED,t (29)

where: I^t,EXP^t, etc. denote log-deviations from steady state; σI is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for investment; γE,γC, γF, γp, γMS are coefficients capturing exchange; rate, credit, financial development, policy uncertainty, and money supply effects on investment; ηP, ηY, ηFIN, ηPOL are elasticities of export demand with respect to prices, foreign income, financial development, and policy uncertainty; γER,γEMS, γEC are coefficients capturing real interest rate, money supply, and credit effects on exports. The equations demonstrate the manner in which exports are affected by interest rates, exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables, thereby establishing the foundation for the examination of policy transmission mechanisms. In some countries such as Nepal, Tajikistan and the Philippines remittances tend to compete or even surpass export earnings (Azam et al., 2016; Qurbonova & Zaidi, 2012). Remittances serve as an important source of foreign exchange and an important shock absorber to households in those countries (Yang & Choi, 2007). Therefore we expand the DSGE model to include the informal sector, barter (non-monetized transactions) as follows:

3.1.1. Integrating money transfers (remittances)

A. Modified Household Budget Constraint: In this case, we need to add remittances (REMt), which are often received in foreign currency and converted at the nominal exchange rate (St), to equation (3) to have equation (30).

PtCt+It+Bt+StBt∗=WtLt+R t−1Bt−1+StRt−1∗Bt−1∗+Πt+Tt+StREMt (30)

B. Remittance Shock Process: Remittances are largely exogenous to domestic monetary policy, driven by foreign income and external shocks (Mandelman, 2012). Consequently, we model such remittances as a stochastic first-order autoregressive AR(1) process:

REMt=(1−ρrem )REM―+ρrem REMt−1+εrem, t (31)

C. Balance of Payments (External Sector) with Remittances: This inflow of remittances essentially changes the exchange rate dynamics by offering a substitute to export-related foreign reserves (Khurshid et al., 2017); as a result, the foreign debt/asset evolution becomes:

StBt∗=StRt−1∗Bt−1∗+PX,tXt−StPF,tMt+StREMt (32)

3.1.2. Integrating the informal sector

The informal sector does not pay taxes or comply with proper financial rules, and relies on cash rather than formal credit (Gordon & Li, 2005).

A. Dual labor market: The representative household divides labor into formal (LF,t) and informal (LI,t) so that the disutility of labor on the utility functional becomes:

U(Ct,Lt)=Ct1−σ1−σ−(LF,t+LI,t)1+φ1+φ (33)

B. Informal production function: Informal firms are very labor-intensive and with little or no formal capital or technology modernizing, unlike formal firms that use capital (Kt) and workforce (Derbile et al., 2012). The informal production function is:

YI,t=AI,tLI,tαt (34)

where αI is the informal sector labor share, and AI,t, is the informal level of technology/efficiency.

C. National output aggregation: The total national output (Yt) follows a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) of formal (YF,t)and informal (YI,t) goods:

Yt=(λ1θYF,tθ−1θ+(1−λ)1θYl,tθ−1θ)θθ−1 (35)

where λ is the structural size/weight of the formal economy, and θ is the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods.

3.1.3. Integrating barter (non-monetized transactions)

In truly rural regions of the chosen countries the exchange of agricultural products does not always go through fiat money. This affects the way in which monetary policy is transmitted, since the interest rate set by central banks (MPR) only affects the monetized part of the economy (Durevall et al., 2013).

A. Splitting consumption: Total consumption (Ct) is broken down into monetized consumption (CM,t, which needs fiat money) and barter consumption (CB,t, which needs direct goods exchange and time/search costs).

Ct=CM,t+CB,t (36)

B. Money demand (Cash-in-advance constraint): We add a liquidity constraint, which is only applied to the monetized sector. When γ denotes the proportion of purchases to be made using fiat money, the real money balances should satisfy

MtPt≥γCM,t (37)

C. The Barter search cost: Barter is not without cost; it involves the cost of searching for transactions (Dolud & Olena, 2004), which consumes household time or resources. The price depends on the extent to which a household relies on bartering compared to its total consumption:

Γt=κ2[CB,tCt]2Yt (38)

where κ is the coefficient of friction of barter trade. As monetary policy tightens (i.e. interest rates increase), households will replace monetized consumption (CMt) with barter (CBt), but they will suffer from the increased search costs Γt. The IMF’s creation of medium-scale DSGE models for combined policy analysis demonstrates that these models are increasingly recognised as useful for jointly considering monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macro-policy stability and capital flow management (Vitek et al., 2022). Their rich macro-financial linkages, which incorporate risk endogeneity and have multiple spillover transmission routes, make these models well-suited to analysing the complex interactions between exchange rates, monetary policy and real economy variables (Vitek et al., 2022). The PGMM specification is a robust analytical framework that enables the measurement of the impact of exchange rate volatility and shifts in monetary policy on investment and exports, while simultaneously addressing the issue of endogeneity and controlling for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity (Li et al., 2021). The PGMM method is excellent for the current research since it is capable of managing dynamic panel data models that have possibly endogenous regressors (Li et al., 2021). The dynamic panel model for export growth can be specified as:

DEXPi,t = α1DEXPi,t–1 + β1REERi,t + β2MPRi,t + β3MSi,t + β4CREDITi,t + + β5POLUNCi,t + β6FINDEVi,t + β7ENCONSi,t + μi + λt + ui,t (39)

Where DEXPi,t is export growth in country i at time t, REERi,t is the real effective exchange rate change; MPRi,t is the monetary policy rate; MSi,t is money supply growth; CREDITi,t is credit/GDP growth rate; POLUNCi,t is policy uncertainty index; FINDEVi,t is financial development indicator; ENCONSi,t is energy consumption growth; μi represents unobserved country-specific effects; λt is time-specific effects; and ui,t is the idiosyncratic error term. The export growth model is specified as:

DEXPi,t=αDEXPi,t−1+β1REERi,t+β2MPRi,t+β3MSi,t++β4CREDITi,t+γ′Xi,t+μi+λt+εi,t (40)

To capture the effects of monetary-fiscal policy mix, the extended model with policy interactions is thus specified as in equation (41):

DEXPi,t = α1DEXPi,t–1 + β1REERi,t + β2MPRi,t + β3MSi,t + β4CREDITi,t + β5POLUNCi,t + + β6FINDEVi,t + β7ENCONSi,t + β8(MPRi,t × MSi,t) + β9(REERi,t × FINDEVi,t) + + β10(POLUNCi,t × CREDITi,t) + β11(MPRi,t × REERi,t) + μi + λt + ui,t (41)

This extended specification takes into account the monetary policy coordination effects through MPRi,t × MSi,t; financial development enhancement of exchange rate effects through REERi,t × FINDEVi,t; policy uncertainty moderation of credit effects through POLUNCi,t × CREDITi,t and exchange rate-monetary policy interactions through MPRi,t × REERi,t. GOVEXPi,t is government expenditure growth and TAXREVi,t is tax revenue growth. To operationalize all proxy variables for the informal sector, barter and non-monetized trade in the panel System GMM framework, the extended new specification for the dynamic panel export growth equation model (Equation 41) becomes:

DEXPi,t=αEXPi,t−1+β1REERi,t+β2MPRi,t+γ1(MPRi,t×INV−MONi,t)++γ2(MPRi,t×SHADOWi,t)+δ∑Xi,t+μi+τt+εi,t (42)

The true marginal effect of monetary policy on exports is no longer just . It is calculated by taking the partial derivative of exports with respect to the monetary policy rate:

∂EXPi,t∂MPRi,t=β2MPRi,t+γ1(INV−MONi,t)+γ1( SHADOW i,t) (43)

The PGMM model for exports was estimated in order to deal with endogeneity and identification problems across the panel. The PGMM approach combines the first-differenced equation with the levels equation (Girod & Whittington, 2016):

ΔDEXPi,t=α1ΔDEXPi,t−1+β1ΔREERi,t+β2ΔMPRi,t+β3ΔMSi,t++β4ΔCi,tPi,tDITi,t+β5ΔPOLUNCi,t+β6ΔFINDEVi,t+Δui,t (44)

Alternatively, the levels equation can be specified as in (34):

DEXPi,t=α1DEXPi,t−1+β1 REER i,t+β2 MPR i,t+β3 MS i,t++β4 CREDIT i,t+β5 POLUNC i,t+β6 FINDEV i,t+μi+εi,t (45)

The additional moment conditions for the levels equation are:

E[ΔDEXPi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 fors ≥ 1 (46)

E[ΔREERi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (47)

E[ΔMPRi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (48)

E[ΔMSi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (49)

E[ΔCREDITi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (50)

E[ΔPOLUNCi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (51)

E[ΔFINDEVi,t–s · (ui,t + μi)] = 0 for s ≥ 1 (52)

These moment conditions require the assumption that the correlation between individual effects and lagged first differences is constant over time, enabling identification of the levels equation parameters (Blundell & Bond, 2000). The additional moment conditions for the levels equation are:

E[Δyi,t−d⋅(μi+εi,t)]=0 for d=1 (53)

The instrument matrix for the system GMM estimator is such that, for the first-differenced equation, we used lagged levels, and for the levels equation, we used lagged first differences of endogenous variables, while strictly operationalizing the exogenous condition for all available lags and leads. Accordingly, the instrument matrix grows with the time dimension but can be collapsed to reduce instrument proliferation (Abrate et al., 2008; Ding & Knight, 2010). The SGMM approach provides solution to the following sources of endogeneity: dynamic endogeneity which has to do with the presence of lagged dependent variables creating correlation between regressors and error terms; endogeneity which occurs as a result of exchange rates, monetary policy variables, and credit being determined simultaneously with exports; and unobserved heterogeneity whereby country-specific characteristics may be correlated with both dependent and independent variables (Ajayi, 2023; Ning & Wang, 2017). Accordingly, the SGMM further improves efficiency and reduce finite sample bias associated with the panel of countries (Hayakawa, 2005). The identification strategy uses lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments (Blundell & Bond, 2000). The GMM estimator minimizes the quadratic form (Ghonghadze & Lux, 2016) as follows:

θ^GMM=arg⁡minθ[1n∑i=1nZi′ε~i(θ)]′W[1n∑i=1nZi′ε~i(θ)] (54)

where ε~i(θ) is the residual vector, Zi is the instrument matrix, and W is a weighting matrix. The following optimal weighting matrix was utilized:

Woptimal =[1n∑i=1nZi′ΩiZi]−1 (55)

where Ωi=E[ε~iε~i′] is the variance-covariance matrix of the error vector. Consequently, we executed a two-step process where the first step involved the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the regression model with the identity matrix as weighting matrix, leading to consistent estimates; and the second step included the application of the residuals from the first step in order to construct the optimal weighting matrix. For the PGMM estimation, we performed also the following tests of specification: the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation to examine for AR(2) in the first-differenced residuals; the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions to settle the validity of instruments; the difference-in-Hansen test to evaluate subsets of instruments; and the instrument rank condition to test model identification. We applied the Windmeijer factor to adjust standard errors for the two-step GMM; the forward orthogonal deviations of the sample size; and the bias correction factor that modifies the coefficient estimates for finite sample bias. The Panel generalized method of moments (PGMM) approach is a commonly used estimation method to address endogeneity concerns in dynamic models with panel data (Omri & Kahouli, 2013). Dynamic panel GMM estimation has been used to examine factors influencing economic growth and investment (Farzana et al., 2024). In terms of measurement error, the contemporaneous measurement error, like that of a certain news cycle increasing economic policy uncertainty (EPU), is correlated with the current error term. Conversely, the two-period ago level of uncertainty (t-2) is not related to the current measurement error. The GMM-based estimator is a methodology that isolates the persistent structural uncertainty from the transitory variability in-the data. The System-GMM model, therefore, reduces bias in the estimated parameters (Bardhan et al., 2013). The estimator distinguishes between the true structural signal and noisy measurement artefacts and macro-feedback loops by instrumenting the heterogeneous policy-uncertainty variable and its lag values. This results in stronger inference (Nasreen et al., 2020).

Variables and Data Sources

For this study, the dependent variable to be analyzed is total export growth (DEXP). DEXP growth was calculated as the yearly percentage change in the value of goods and services exported at constant prices. The export data has been computed by combining merchandise export trade statistics with balance of payments data for services. These were acquired from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, 2025), and the UN Comtrade database (2025). Export data was adjusted for re-exports whenever feasible in order to concentrate on the local production. For the countries where there is a substantial amount of entrepôt trade, the process of distinguishing between domestic exports and foreign goods re-exports was very meticulous. The services include both the traditional and the new forms of digital services trades, depending on the availability of data. The focus on total exports rather than specific export categories allows for a comprehensive analysis of how macroeconomic variables affect overall export performance. The measurement of export performance considers both volume and value effects, recognizing that exchange rate fluctuations can affect export competitiveness through the price effect, while a monetary policy shock may influence the sector’s capacity through its impact on domestic economic conditions and financing availability. The set of control variables is likely to include policy and population uncertainty, financial development, energy consumption and the output gap, as well as the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy tools.

Where applicable, the policy uncertainty index (POLUNC) was calculated using the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) indices developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (Baker et al., 2016). For countries without EPU indices, alternative measures were drafted from the following sources: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk indices; World Bank Governance Indicators government stability indicators; election timing variables and political transition indicators; and text-based measures derived from news coverage and policy documents. The policy uncertainty measures were standardized to have zero mean and unit variance to ensure comparability across countries and time periods. High policy uncertainty can depress corporate investment by raising the option value of waiting and lowering firms’ readiness to make irreversible investment commitments (Gulen & Ion, 2015). The study also examines financial development from several angles, such as financial depth (the size of financial institutions and markets relative to the economy), financial access (the extent to which individuals and firms can obtain financial services) and financial efficiency (the ability to provide services at a low cost while generating sustainable revenue) (Čihák et al., 2013). More precisely, the financial development index (FINDEV) was assessed using the IMF Financial Development Index, which considers the following financial measures in terms of institutions and markets: depth, accessibility and efficiency (Kus & Bölükoğlu, 2022). For countries and periods not included in the IMF index, the following alternative measures were used:

  • Banking sector indicators, including credit-to-GDP ratios, total bank assets and deposits in the financial system.
  • Capital market indicators, including stock market capitalization, bond market development and insurance penetration.
  • Access indicators, including the number of bank branches per capita and bank account ownership.
  • Measures of financial inclusion.

Financial development measures were standardized and combined through the technique of principal component analysis to derive composite indices representing the overall development of the financial sector.

The monetary policy rate variable used by each country’s central bank to enforce monetary policy was utilised. During periods of unconventional monetary policy, shadow rates estimated by financial institutions were employed to model monetary policy shocks when interest rates were constrained by the zero lower bound. These shadow rates factor in the effects of unconventional policy actions, such as quantitative easing and forward guidance (Takáts & Temesváry, 2020). Central bank websites and databases from the IMF IFS and OECD were the sources of data used for this research. All data series went through thorough quality checks including the detection of outliers which involved the use of statistical tests for extreme values and comparison with regional averages. Interpolation was used very sparingly and only for short gaps in the data of high frequency where monthly or quarterly observations could reasonably be estimated from annual data. The final dataset was formed as an unbalanced panel with different time coverage across countries and variables. The database was set up in various formats to facilitate the different estimation techniques: panels for PGMM estimation; and calibration datasets for the DSGE model parameterization. The database holds extensive metadata that describes the variable definitions, source changes and the country-specific factors that impact the interpretation of the results.

Definition of the Sample

The research spans 1st January 2000 to 31st December 2025 and uses quarterly observations on 11 variables (explanatory, interacted and control variables) in 16 economies of Asia. A total of 1,664 represent the sample observations that have been acquired by multiplying 26 years by 4 quarters and then further dividing it by 104 time periods. With 16 countries, N = 16 × T = 104. To address the apparent discrepancy between the years and quarters, the analysis uses year on year (YoY) growth at quarterly frequencies. Hence, we do not switch to annual frequency (N=26). We used quarterly frequency (N=104) because we needed to convert our variables into annual changes but measured at each quarterly point. This method reconciles any observed data measurement inconsistency and consequently removes seasonality effects (a comparison between Q1 to Q1), and makes the variables stationary (I(0)). It also provides the high-frequency data needed to bring Bayesian convergence in the DSGE model, and places the observed variables on the growth path of the model using a particular observation equation specified in (5), which provides the annual variation of the variables in relation to the quarterly dynamics.

Yobs,t=∑j=0K−1Δzt−j (56)

Largely, the DSGE model uses the measurement equation to translate annual data changes against the quarterly structural dynamics of the model (Croushore & Sill, 2014). Accordingly, the empirical study is based on a balanced panel of 1664 quarterly observations. The growth variables are also converted to quarterly percentage changes of YoY to ensure a stationary point in the panel estimation and to remove seasonality. The research design validity within the DSGE framework was supported through the use of a measurement equation that links the theoretical constructs to the empirical observations of the quarterly data between the years 2000 and 2025 in 16 countries in Asia. Since the variables of the DSGE model are typically presented in terms of percentage changes relative to a steady state (Fernández‐Villaverde et al., 2016), the measurement equation was designed specifically to project the observed series onto the model’s structural variables and add growth across four quarters, thereby maintaining data-theory consistency.

DEXPtobs=γ¯exp+(x^t−x^t−1)+ex,tme (57)

Where: γ¯exp is the steady-state trend growth rate (estimated or fixed), x^t is the model’s export variable (deviation from steady state) and ex,tme is a measurement error (optional, to prevent stochastic singularity). For interest rates (MPR) and uncertainty,

MPRtobs=r¯+R^t (58)

POLUNC tobs =p¯+σ^tp (59)

To interpret the simulations properly, it was necessary to have a clear difference between the estimation sample and the simulation environment. The estimation sample is the historical observations through which the prior distributions of the model may be transformed into posterior distributions, in order to represent the most plausible parameter values in consideration of the data. This sample was randomized with 1664 observations for the 16 Asian countries making the inference on the model on the Asian export development to different macro-economic shocks throughout the 26 years. By comparison, the simulation sample is an experimental design that examines the effect of shocks in a 20-quarter (five-year) horizon, with an initial hypothetical disturbance. These simulations are not predictions to the year 2026; instead, these are controlled experiments, designed to observe the effects of specific shocks, such as a 1% monetary expansion, on the export-led economy under the assumption that the parameters estimated using the sample remain constant.

Sample of Countries

The selection of the study countries was based on the poorest 16 Asian countries, emerging and developing economies in Asia with differing institutional frameworks, financial development and policy transmission mechanisms. The Asian countries in the sample were classified as low-middle and low-income according to the World Bank (Piras, 2023). The explicit list of the sixteen countries was selected to create a Developing and emerging Asia-Pacific sample, and also it was justified that the findings could be scientifically generalized to the wider Asian continent. The World Bank’s income classifications of low and lower-middle income are used to construct a valid sample representing the poorest and least developed countries in the Asia-Pacific region. These countries are not advanced economies like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand).

Table 1.

The Sample of the 16 Poorest/Developing Asian Economies

Region Countries Selected Economic Characteristics (Justification)
Region Countries Selected Economic Characteristics (Justification)
South Asia (6) 1. Afghanistan, 2. Bangladesh, 3. Bhutan, 4. Nepal, 5. Pakistan, 6. Sri Lanka The economy is characterized by high surplus labor and heavily relies on remittances, thus being susceptible to changes in energy prices (World Bank, 2022; Islam, 2021)
Southeast Asia (CLMV + 2) 7. Cambodia, 8. Lao PDR, 9. Myanmar, 10. Timor-Leste, 11. Vietnam, 12. Philippines The Factory Asia hub is an illustration of the integration into global supply chains, which are a shift in agricultural to manufacturing industries (Mohamed & Abdulle, 2024; Tampubolon & Nababan, 2022)
Central Asia & Pacific (4) 13. Kyrgyzstan, 14. Tajikistan, 15. Mongolia, 16. Papua New Guinea It has a resource-dependent economy, with an emphasis on both mining and energy industries; resource-locked in Central Asia or closed off by the Pacific Ocean creates unique costs in trade (Mori & Dong, 2018; Vakulchuk & Øverland, 2021)
Data Sources by Variable
Variable Abbreviation Specific Database Source
Export Growth EXP IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) provides highly accurate monthly/quarterly bilateral trade data for capturing the rapid textile export shifts in South Asia and global supply chain integrations in Southeast Asia.
Real Effective Exchange Rate REER Bruegel REER Database / Bank for International Settlements (BIS) calculate REER for 170+ countries for capturing the currency volatility of the resource-dependent Central Asian group facing commodity shocks.
Monetary Policy Rate MPR IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) cross-reference with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators portal, used the Central Bank Discount Rate for tracking Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Philippines, while for dollarized or tightly managed economies like Timor-Leste or Cambodia, proxy rates via the ADB were utilized
Broad Money Supply MS IMF IFS (Monetary & Financial Statistics) tracks M2 or Broad Money aggregates.
Credit to Private Sector CRED World Bank Global Financial Development / ADB Key Indicators reports trade finance statistics for the Southeast Asian manufacturing group World Bank Global Financial Development Database, tracks Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
Financial Development FINDEV (M2 to GDP Ratio) IMF Financial Development Index (FDI)
Investment / GDP Ratio DINV World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI): Gross fixed capital formation for Tracking factory and infrastructure scaling in CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam)
Gov. Expenditure & Tax Revenue GOVEXP / TAX IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) augmented with the CEIC Data which provides excellent, localized high-frequency fiscal data for South and Southeast Asian emerging markets as well as the ADB Key Indicators is an excellent backup for Asian-specific fiscal metrics.
Energy Consumption ENCONS U. S. EIA / International Energy Agency (IEA) for Tracking energy vulnerability in South Asia and energy-intensive mining output in Mongolia and PNG
Policy Uncertainty POLUNC Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index: (bakerbloomdavis.com). For countries without a dedicated EPU index (like Bhutan or Tajikistan), we used the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Political Stability/Regulatory Quality) or the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Proxy Variables for the Informal Sector, Barter, and Non-Monetized Trade
Informal Sector (Currency Demand Proxy) CURR_RATIO IMF IFS (Monetary Data) calculates the ratio of Currency Outside Banks (COB) to Broad Money (M2) to capture the expansion of untaxed, cash-based shadow economy activities escaping formal banking.
Informal Sector (Physical Input Proxy) ELEC_GAP World Bank WDI / U. S. EIA calculated as the difference between total electricity consumption growth and official real GDP growth to proxy energy consumed by unregistered manufacturing and shadow firms.
Shadow Economy Index SHADOW Medina & Schneider Shadow Economy Database estimates the structural percentage of the shadow economy relative to GDP (interpolated from annual to quarterly data).
Non-Monetized Economy (Inverse Monetization) INV_MON Calculated directly from IMF IFS / World Bank WDI as 1 - (M2 / GDP). Captures the structural percentage of the domestic economy that relies on non-fiat transactions and is thus insulated from monetary policy transmission.
Barter Trade (Agricultural Weight) AGRIC_VA World Bank WDI tracks agricultural value-added as a % of GDP to measure rural reliance on subsistence farming and direct goods exchange that bypasses central bank interest rates.
Barter Frictions (Rural Population) RURAL_POP World Bank WDI / UN Population Division. Tracks rural population as a % of total population, serving as a structural proxy for low banking penetration and high non-monetized transaction volumes.

4. Results

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for sixteen Asian countries. Examining the comparative descriptive statistics of the 16 poorest Asian countries reveals that, on average, export growth in these countries has been 9.34% over the years. However, it has also reached 18.45%, which is the standard deviation. This portrays even higher volatility than investment growth and is significantly different from the export growth rates of both Europe (3.81%) and Africa (8.92%). The extreme change from -52.33% to 78.45% illustrates the great susceptibility of Asian exports to global economy, price of commodities, exchange rates and demand shocks. The 0.89 positive skewness indicates that there are more periods of excellent export growth than the periods of very low export growth; this is probably due to the export-oriented development strategies adopted by most Asian countries and their ability to exploit the global growth opportunities when the timing is good. In terms of the real effective exchange rate, a slight depreciation trend (mean of -0.012) was observed together with a considerable volatility (standard deviation of 0.156). This suggests that exchange rates were subject to frequent and significant adjustments in response to external pressures, capital flow volatility and attempts by policymakers to maintain their economies’ competitiveness.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics for 16 Asian Countries (2000-2025)

Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
DINV (%) 8.67 15.23 -45.67 67.89 0.78 6.23
DEXP (%) 9.34 18.45 -52.33 78.45 0.89 7.12
REER (log diff) -0.012 0.156 -0.678 0.567 -0.23 5.67
MPR (%) 7.89 4.67 2.25 25.5 2.34 9.45
MS (%) 15.67 12.34 -8.45 67.23 1.89 8.23
CREDIT (%) 12.45 19.67 -35.67 89.23 1.45 7.89
POLUNC (index) 0.67 1.34 -2.89 4.56 0.78 4.12
FINDEV (index) 0.34 0.18 0.12 0.72 0.67 3.45
ENCONS (%) 6.78 8.94 -15.67 45.23 1.23 6.45

The wide range of -0.678 to 0.567 shows how much the currencies of Asia are exposed to external shocks and how little stabilization capacity there is in these economies that are often caught in the trap of balance of payments problems, political instability and varying levels of foreign exchange reserves. Asian countries have been setting their monetary policy rates at an average of 7.89%, which is considerably higher than in Europe (2.15%) but lower than the African level (12.67%). This situation reflects an inflationary environment that is not excessively high, the macroeconomic volatility that is remarkably greater than that of the advanced economies, and the necessity for the high real interest rates that are needed not only to secure economic stability and attract capital inflows but also to offset the effects of inflation in the long term. Additionally, the standard deviation of 4.67% and the extreme range of 2.25% to 25.5% suggest significant variations in monetary policy across countries and over time. This has often reflected crisis response measures, different levels of institutional capacity for monetary policy implementation, and varying approaches to inflation targeting and exchange rate management. Countries in Asia experience a wide range of volatility, reflecting external shocks, policy changes and global economic conditions. This is indicative of the export-oriented nature of many Asian economies and their integration into the volatile global value chain. With an average growth rate of 15.67% and a high standard deviation of 12.34%, money supply growth reflects the challenges of maintaining monetary stability in contexts with limited institutional capacity for sophisticated monetary policy implementation, as well as the accommodation of rapid economic growth characteristic of developing economies. The high positive skewness of 1.89 indicates frequent episodes of rapid monetary expansion, potentially reflecting crisis response measures, accommodative policies to support growth during economic downturns, or difficulties in controlling monetary aggregates due to financial system development limitations. Credit growth averages 12.45% with exceptionally high volatility (standard deviation of 19.67%), indicating dynamic but unstable financial intermediation characterized by rapid expansion periods followed by sharp contractions. The extreme range from -35.67% to 89.23% reflects the boom-bust cycles typical of developing financial systems with limited regulatory capacity, procyclical lending behavior, and high sensitivity to external financing conditions and policy changes. The financial development index averages 0.34, substantially lower than European levels (0.78) but higher than African levels (0.19), indicating intermediate financial system sophistication with significant room for improvement in access to financial services, capital market development and regulatory framework enhancement. The relatively narrow range of 0.12 to 0.72 indicates that there are ongoing financial development constraints across the region. Even the most advanced Asian countries in this group have relatively limited financial system capabilities compared to those in advanced economies.

Policy uncertainty averages 0.67 with a standard deviation of 1.34, indicating moderate but variable policy predictability that significantly exceeds European levels (0.12) while remaining below African levels (1.23). This pattern reflects the intermediate institutional development characteristic of many Asian developing economies, which have achieved greater policy stability than the poorest African countries but continue to face significant policy uncertainty due to political transitions, external pressures and institutional capacity limitations. Energy consumption growth averages 6.78% with a standard deviation of 8.94%, reflecting the energy-intensive development strategies characteristic of industrializing Asian economies and their focus on manufacturing and infrastructure development. The positive skewness indicates periods of rapid energy consumption growth associated with economic expansion, industrial development and urbanization processes that characterize developing Asian economies. The descriptive statistics reveal that Asian countries occupy an intermediate position between European and African economies across most indicators, suggesting that they represent economies in transition from low-income to middle-income status with corresponding institutional and structural characteristics.

The pronounced fluctuations seen in most variables as compared to the European countries reveal the situation of the higher vulnerability to the external shocks and the limited institutional capability for the economic stabilization, while the generally more moderate levels compared to the African countries point to the existence of somewhat greater institutional development and economic stability. This intermediate position significantly affects the design of policies and economic management. Asian countries must tackle the dual challenge of controlling the volatility associated with developing economies and building the institutional capacity necessary for economic advancement. The combination of high growth rates and high volatility indicates that the Asian economies carry a lot of potential for development, but they will require carefully designed policy frameworks to both manage the risks involved and keep the growth trajectories at the sustainable levels.

Bayesian priori distributions

The results of the prior distributions reported in Table 3 below are highly sensitive. Using standard priors based on developed economies (e.g. the United States or the Eurozone) would most probably result in model misspecification and incorrect inference when applied to the 16 emerging and developing Asian markets, due to their fundamental structural differences. Consequently, the Bayesian prior distributions fundamentally restructure traditional macroeconomic assumptions to accurately reflect the subsistence-driven realities of the poorest Asian economies. By significantly increasing the inverse inter-temporal elasticity parameter, the model mathematically captures the acute hand-to-mouth behavior of populations that lack formal savings vehicles and cannot easily smooth their consumption over time. This structural vulnerability is further reinforced by a downward adjustment in the habit formation prior, acknowledging that subsistence households must consume based on immediate daily availability rather than maintaining stable, persistent consumption patterns. The formal sector weight and the monetization ratio formally quantify the massive scale of the shadow economy, revealing that nearly half of national output and a vast portion of trade bypass fiat currency entirely. As these informal and barter markets operate with daily unregulated transactions, the aggregate Calvo price stickiness parameter is notably lowered to blend rigid formal pricing with extreme informal price flexibility. Despite this pervasive underlying volatility, the priors for the Taylor rule parameters remain rigidly anchored, reflecting the reality that central banks in these regions continue to aggressively target formal-sector inflation while treating long-term output growth as a secondary mandate (Klau & Mohanty, 2004; Ybrayev, 2021). To account for the vital external financial lifelines sustaining these households, the model assigns a remarkably high persistence prior to the newly introduced remittance parameter. This elevated persistence mathematically dictates that worker transfers act as a deeply ingrained, structural shock absorber that continuously influences the real effective exchange rate independently of domestic monetary policy interventions.

Table 3.

Bayesian Priori Distributions

Parameter Description Parameter Symbol Microeconomic Definition Distribution Prior Mean Prior Std. Dev Hyper-parameters (Shape / Scale) Rationale for Asian Model
Inverse Inter-temporal Elasticity σc Hand-to-mouth behavior Normal 2.50 0.50 N/A Increased. Reflects severe lack of consumption smoothing due to subsistence living and lack of formal savings.
Habit Formation h Consumption persistence Beta 0.50 0.15 a = 5.056 b = 5.056 Decreased. Subsistence households consume based on immediate availability, lowering habit persistence.
Taylor Rule Inflation φπ Central Bank inflation response Normal 1.70 0.15 N/A Maintained. Central banks still aggressively target formal sector inflation to anchor expectations.
Taylor Rule Output φy Central Bank output response Normal 0.12 0.05 N/A Maintained. Growth mandates remain secondary to exchange rate and price stability.
Calvo Price Stickiness θp Price adjustment rigidity Beta 0.55 0.10 a = 13.063 b = 10.688 Decreased. Blends rigid formal prices with the highly flexible, daily-adjusted prices of the informal/barter markets.
Formal Sector Weight ω CES weight of formal goods Beta 0.45 0.10 a = 10.688 b = 13.063 New. Acknowledges that the informal sector generates a massive portion of aggregate national output.
Monetization Ratio γm Fiat currency reliance Beta $0.60$ 0.10 a = 13.800 b = 9.200 New. Captures the cash-in-advance constraint; reflects the percentage of trade that cannot be bartered.
Remittance Persistence ρrem Stickiness of FX transfers Beta 0.85 0.05 a = 42.500 b = 7.500 New. Remittances are highly persistent and structurally ingrained over long horizons, heavily dictating the REER.
General Shock Persistence ρx External/Tech shock duration Beta 0.50 0.20 a = 2.625 b = 2.625 Maintained. Captures standard medium-term persistence of external macroeconomic shocks.
Informal Productivity Shock σinf Informal sector volatility Inv. Gamma 1.00 α = 2.000 β = 1.000 New Friction Shock. Captures high-frequency unobserved supply-side shocks shifting the shadow economy.
Barter Friction Shock σbar Non-monetized trade volatility Inv. Gamma 1.00 α = 2.000 β = 1.000 New Friction Shock. Captures exogenous shifts in rural liquidity constraints and non-monetized trade access.
Monetary Transmission Shock σnmt Credit leakage volatility Inv. Gamma 1.00 α = 2.000 β = 1.000 New Friction Shock. Accounts for structural leakage in interest rate pass-through due to shallow financial markets.
General Shock Volatility σz Exogenous shock magnitude Inv. Gamma 1.00 α = 2.000 β = 1.000 Maintained. Accounts for the inherently higher macroeconomic volatility in emerging frontier markets.

Concurrently, the persistence and magnitude of broader external macroeconomic shocks remain firmly elevated within the inverse gamma and beta distributions, a necessary configuration to accommodate the inherent vulnerability of frontier markets to sudden global commodity shifts. This all-inclusive recalibration ensures that the subsequent empirical estimations do not artificially force advanced-economy dynamics onto deeply fragmented, cash-reliant and remittance-dependent nations. The open-economy, small-economy argument suggests that the Asian economies are vulnerable to external shocks due to their integration into the international financial cycle, given the increased macroeconomic volatility it implies (Deb et al., 2021). Financial markets in developing Asian economies are shallower and more fragmented than those in the West (Didier & Schmukler, 2014). Household balance sheets also exhibit distinct patterns compared to those in advanced economies (Badarinza et al., 2019). As a result, we use smaller prior means of the parameter of habit-formation (h) and larger prior standard deviations of the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (σc) in opposition to the benchmark of Smets and Wouters (2007). In addition, the central banks of Asian countries do not typically adhere to a pure Taylor rule based on inflation and the output gap; rather, they employ aggressive managed-float exchange-rate regimes (Kubo, 2022). In light of this, we introduce a non-zero exchange rate coefficient into the monetary policy rule to reflect widespread panic surrounding floating, and we revise the parameters of consumption and investment friction to simulate the liquidity constraints that Asian households and firms face. This strategic divergence from standard priors creates diffusive priors for shock processes, incorporating the increased volatility and abrupt stop risks typical of the Asian region.

Identification Checks

The analysis of identification, which is summarized in Table 4, confirms that the key parameters of the DSGE model, including: the monetary policy reaction coefficient (ϕ₁) and the exchange-rate sensitivity (α₁), are identified because of the direct observational relations to the data of inflation and exchange-rates. These parameters are well supported by the empirical estimates, and this is a positive indicator of their estimation. Conversely, the risk aversion coefficient (γ) and output shock coefficient (σ₃) are less well-defined, due to the latency of risk preferences and the confounding effect of other macroeconomic variables. Precisely estimated parameters of inflation targeting (π₁) and export demand sensitivity (η₁) provide a robust empirical basis for informing policy decisions. The model ensures that the best estimates of the various parameters are uniquely determined by the data and economic theory, thus proving the accuracy of the findings obtained.

Table 4.

Identification table for DSGE model parameters

Parameter Description Identification Status Analysis
Parameter Description Identification Status Analysis
Monetary Policy Reaction (ϕ₁) Response of interest rate to inflation Identified There is strong identification because changes in interest rates directly affect inflation, which is strongly supported by macroeconomic theory
Exchange Rate Sensitivity (α₁) Sensitivity of exports to exchange rates Identified The high identification is obtained by explicit connections to trade data, i.e. exports and exchange rates; informative prior-distribution also reduces uncertainty
Export Elasticity to Exchange Rate (β₁) Sensitivity of exports to exchange rate movements Identified The model can be easily identified due to the considerable changes in the interest rates and inflation, which makes it possible to establish a direct nexus between the shock and the empirical data
Monetary Policy Shock (σ₁) Variance of monetary policy shock Identified The nominal interest rate’s volatility is the driving force behind parameter identification. By filtering out systematic policy reaction (Taylor-type rule) from the data, we were able to identify σ₁ as the remaining variance of unexplained noise. The evidence of steep curvature supports the view that inflation and/or output would not capture the shock by an endogenous deterministic variable.
Fiscal Policy Shock (σ₂) Variance of fiscal policy shock Identified Fiscal policy shocks, such as government spending, have observable impacts on output and prices, providing good identification from macroeconomic data.
Risk Aversion Parameter (γ) Degree of risk aversion in the economy Weakly Identified Risk aversion is poorly estimated because it is indirectly related to the observed data. Uncertainty arises due to the data being weakly identified.
Inflation Targeting Parameter (π₁) Responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation deviations Identified Strong identification is obtained by the historical behavior of central banks towards inflation, especially in the economies that follow the active inflation-targeting policy
Export Demand Sensitivity (η₁) Sensitivity of exports to external demand Identified There is a clear link between the variables and the world trade volumes and external demand for exports, based on historical trade statistics and the current world economic conditions
Price Stickiness (φ₁) Degree of price rigidity Identified Price stickiness may be determined through inflation data especially when consideration is given to nominal rigidity or slow price response
Output Shock (σ₃) Variance of output shock Weakly Identified In some economies, output shocks are less pronounced and therefore weakly identified. Consequently, estimation uncertainty arises due to low data variability

Figure 1 shows how export growth responds to different monetary and fiscal scenarios. The model was calibrated using Asian data from 2000 to 2025, with a simulation horizon of 20 quarters. During the coordinated expansion, the peak impact was observed in the fifth quarter at 78%, indicating a very strong positive export response to the coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus. Conversely, the trough impact is -30%, indicating negative export effects resulting from contractionary monetary policy.

Figure 1. 

Impulse response functions – export growth response to monetary policy shocks in Asia. Source: Authors’ DSGE model simulations. Impulse responses to 1% shocks normalized to baseline.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the coordinated policy expansion versus policy conflict scenarios comparison displays +78% growth in exports by the fifth quarter when monetary and fiscal policies are synchronized. The negative reaction of -0.112% arriving at quarter 8 shows how inconsistent policies can erode the trust of investors. The main takeaway is that the regulating policies demonstrate immediate positive effects with early peak impact whereas the policy conflicts result in the delayed negative responses accompanied by the persistent volatility in the investors’ behavior.

Figure 2. 

Comparison of coordinated policy expansion vs. policy conflict scenarios. Source: Authors’ DSGE model simulations. Impulse responses to 1% shocks normalized to baseline.

As shown in Figure 3, the effect of exchange rate depreciation was most beneficial in the fifth quarter, with a positive value of +0.656%. This indicates that currency depreciation has a long-lasting competitive effect on trade. Uncertainty over policies had the least influence on exports, at -0.378%, at the end of the fourth quarter. This suggests that the decline in business confidence is negatively impacting the export sector due to policy uncertainty. The broad trade policy insight is that the 10% currency devaluation (exchange rate depreciation) is a key factor to be relied upon for export growth that is both significant and long-lasting, while the policy uncertainty brings in negative impacts that are instantaneous but last for several quarters during which a slow recovery takes place.

Figure 3. 

Impact of exchange rate changes vs. policy uncertainty on export performance. Source: Authors’ DSGE model simulations. Impulse responses to 10% shocks normalized to baseline.

Figure 4 illustrates the situation where exchange rate depreciation of 10% caused the peak positive impact of +0.867% at the end of the year, indicating the very strong and quick gain in export competitiveness due to currency depreciation in Asia. The coordinated expansion similarly highlights the peak impact of +0.934% in the fifth quarter, which can be interpreted as the exceptional stimulus effect on export growth coming from the monetary and fiscal measures. Conversely, the monetary contraction scenario involving a 1% increase in the MPR resulted in a trough impact of -0.545% in the sixth quarter, indicating that contractionary monetary policy had a very negative and extensive impact on export performance. The suggested export policy for Asia is that changes in the exchange rate have a significant impact on exports from Asia. For example, a 10% depreciation in the currency can lead to sustained export growth of over 0.8% for several quarters.

Figure 4. 

Asian export response to monetary policy and exchange rate shocks. Source: Authors’ DSGE model simulations. Impulse responses to 10% shocks normalized to baseline.

On the other hand, contractionary monetary policy brings about huge and lasting adverse effects, while the adoption of expansionary monetary policy can lead to the most powerful positive response in exports. These effects are indeed much more significant than those experienced in Europe, as they directly reflect the higher price elasticity and external dependency typical of Asian developing economies (Senhadji & Montenegro, 1999).

The chart presented in Figure 5 indicates the maximum positive effect of +0.434% in the 5th quarter, accompanied by the continuous effect of 8-10 quarters; this shows that the financial sector’s development is crucial for the export competitiveness. The impact of policy uncertainty was manifested through a negative effect of -0.534% in the 4th quarter, which resulted in immediate and severe disruptions of the export activities with a slow recovery in the 6-8th quarters. Credit Expansion is reported to have the highest effect of +0.467% in the 4th quarter, indicating that access to credit has a direct and major impact on export performance. The Asian Development Economics perspective is that the financial development transition results in substantial and lasting benefits for Asian export performance, with the latter’s sustainability being much longer than that of the former’s impact of monetary policy. Immediate and severe disruptions resulting from policy uncertainty are very hard to recover from, while credit expansion brings about strong positive effects on financial development. Such developments in the financial sector should be considered the primary option, while stability in government policies is needed to support export competitiveness in developing Asian countries.

Figure 5. 

Asian export response to financial development and policy uncertainty shocks. Source: Authors’ DSGE model simulations. Impulse responses to 1% shocks normalized to baseline.

As illustrated in Figure 6 below, the export sensitivity comparison to the main variables indicates that the REER at +0.867% in Asia was the most responsive to a 10% depreciation, while the financial development effects at +0.434% were the second most responsive to a 1σ improvement. The policy de-ranking effects were at -0.534% trough response to 1σ increase. It can be concluded that Asian economies are the most sensitive to changes in exchange rates with regard to exports. Therefore, it can be inferred that they are more integrated into global value chains, and that their export demand is more elastic. The same can be said of the negative response to policy uncertainty, which was the most sensitive issue and hence more susceptible to institutional instability. At the same time, the response to financial development was robust, confirming the assumption that financial sector development policies have great potential to attract benefits.

Figure 6. 

Asian export response to financial development and policy uncertainty shocks. Source: Authors’ DSGE model simulations. Impulse responses to 10% shocks normalized to baseline.

The results of the DSGE export response simulations for the Asian countries included in the study are presented in Table 5. The Bayesian DSGE simulations show that policy coordination and exchange rate movements emerge as the main factors influencing Asia’s export growth. Indeed, 10% depreciation of the exchange rate is the most dominant and persistent positive independent shock, with a quick rise to 0.88% in the 4th quarter, with a credible interval above zero. The evidence also highlights the prudence of a massive asymmetry in the effectiveness of monetary policy, with a 1% contraction having a far greater negative impact on exports than a 1% expansion has a positive impact. But, when monetary and fiscal expansions are simultaneously applied, this twin shock has the largest overall magnitude in the model, with a spectacular peak.

Table 5.

DSGE export response simulations - Asian countries (posterior means and 90% HPD intervals)

Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.04% [-0.01%, 0.08%] 0.11% [-0.02%, 0.24%] 0.08% [-0.01%, 0.18%] 0.03% [-0.01%, 0.07%] 0.01% [-0.01%, 0.03%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] 0.11% [-0.02%, 0.24%]
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.05% [-0.10%, 0.01%] -0.12% [-0.21%, -0.03%] -0.09% [-0.16%, -0.01%] -0.04% [-0.09%, 0.01%] -0.01% [-0.03%, 0.01%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] -0.12% [-0.21%, -0.03%]
Exchange Rate Depreciation (10%) -0.45% [-0.65%, -0.25%] 0.85% [0.55%, 1.15%] 1.42% [0.95%, 1.88%] 0.75% [0.40%, 1.10%] 0.25% [0.05%, 0.45%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] 1.42% [0.95%, 1.88%]
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.08% [0.02%, 0.14%] 0.22% [0.10%, 0.35%] 0.45% [0.25%, 0.65%] 0.68% [0.40%, 0.95%] 0.72% [0.45%, 0.98%] 0.55% [0.30%, 0.80%] 0.72% [0.45%, 0.98%]
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -0.35% [-0.50%, -0.20%] -0.68% [-0.85%, -0.42%] -0.52% [-0.70%, -0.30%] -0.20% [-0.35%, -0.05%] -0.08% [-0.18%, 0.02%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] -0.68% [-0.85%, -0.42%]
Coordinated Expansion 0.18% [0.05%, 0.30%] 0.52% [0.35%, 0.70%] 0.88% [0.60%, 1.15%] 0.45% [0.25%, 0.65%] 0.18% [0.05%, 0.32%] 0.10% [0.01%, 0.20%] 0.88% [0.60%, 1.15%]
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.12% [0.04%, 0.20%] 0.38% [0.18%, 0.55%] 0.35% [0.15%, 0.50%] 0.15% [0.02%, 0.28%] 0.05% [-0.02%, 0.12%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] 0.38% [0.18%, 0.55%]
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.28% [-0.40%, -0.15%] -0.56% [-0.75%, -0.32%] -0.42% [-0.60%, -0.25%] -0.18% [-0.30%, -0.05%] -0.05% [-0.12%, 0.02%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] -0.56% [-0.75%, -0.32%]
Informal Sector Expansion (1% Labor Shift) -0.15% [-0.25%, -0.05%] -0.52% [-0.70%, -0.38%] -0.45% [-0.62%, -0.28%] -0.20% [-0.35%, -0.05%] -0.05% [-0.15%, 0.05%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] -0.52% [-0.70%, -0.38%]
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑ in Search Costs) -0.08% [-0.15%, -0.02%] -0.22% [-0.34%, -0.11%] -0.18% [-0.28%, -0.08%] -0.05% [-0.12%, 0.02%] -0.01% [-0.04%, 0.02%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] -0.22% [-0.34%, -0.11%]
Non-Monetized Trade Preference (1σ↑) -0.10% [-0.18%, -0.03%] -0.28% [-0.42%, -0.15%] -0.35% [-0.50%, -0.20%] -0.15% [-0.25%, -0.05%] -0.02% [-0.08%, 0.04%] 0.00% [0.00%, 0.00%] -0.35% [-0.50%, -0.20%]

During the impact phase, export growth shrinks by -0.45 percent, capturing the initial cost shock for export intermediate imports. Although this cost shock is short-lived, a powerful expenditure-switching effect ultimately catapults the export curve to a massive peak expansion of 1.42 percent in the fourth quarter. Despite the audacity of this growth, the confidence interval of 0.95 per cent to 1.88 per cent indicates significant variation across countries in the effectiveness of firms’ responses to a weak currency. To maintain global competitiveness without the whims of currency manipulation, the quantitative findings heavily favour institutional financial development. A one standard deviation positive shock to financial development yields a cumulative increase in the peak effect of 0.72 percent in the 12th quarter. Notably, it is the only shock which leaves a permanent, positive structural boost of 0.55 percent. Although raw domestic credit boom also delivers a quantitative benefit of 0.38 percent peak in the second quarter, the quantitative effects completely evaporate in the long run. On the downside, the simulation shows the devastating impact of domestic volatility and infrastructural gaps. A one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty immediately erodes manufacturers’ trust, triggering a rapid quantitative collapse of -0.68 percent in the second quarter. Physical bottlenecks mirror this psychological damage as a one standard deviation shock to energy intensity requires a -0.56 percent decline in exports. This metric provides the absolute binding constraints imposed by the weak electric grid on industrial production. The multifaceted nature of these constraints results in the need to employ a combined approach to counter these effects, as is the case in the coordinated expansion scenario. Through the simultaneous implementation of monetary, credit and structural interventions, the coordinated shock generates a very robust peak export growth of 0.88 percent in the fourth quarter. This coordinated approach is theoretically demonstrated to be more effective than monetary fiddling, and yields a persistent 0.10 percent impact in equilibrium. But the full extent of the region’s vulnerabilities is laid bare by defining the new structural frictions. A mere one percent shift of labor towards the informal economy unleashes an aggressive factor misallocation, which depresses formal exports by -0.52 percent at its peak. This coefficient exposes the vicious zero-sum competition, where informal markets systematically drain precious human and physical capital from internationally competitive manufacturing industries. Agriculture records its own rural paralysis, captured via the barter friction shock. A one standard deviation increase in search costs for barter induces -0.22 percent peak decline, amounting to the effective isolation of rural surpluses from global monetization opportunities. The effect of this rural isolation is reinforced by a one standard deviation shock to non-monetized trade preferences, which induces a lagging peak negative export shock of -0.35 percent in the fourth quarter. This particular period proves that when domestic agents positively eschew fiat currency for domestic payments, the formal export sector is systematically denied the domestic liquidity needed to fund supply chains. These point estimates demonstrate that unless policymakers decisively break down the pervasive structures of informality and barter, macroeconomic policies will continue to be unable to support sustainable exports.

It is evident that structural financial factors engender significant externalities. It is demonstrated that both financial deepening and direct credit expansion function as potent stimuli for trade capacity, with a short-to-medium-term effect. This aligns with the finding of Manova (2012) and Paravisini et al. (2011). While isolated monetary shocks can have long-run effects, the structural policy benefits of well-developed financial markets are permanent as earlier found by Bekaert et al. (2010), and Jordà et al. (2020). Conversely, policy uncertainty has been identified as a significant macro-friction, exerting a negative influence on export growth (Kristina, 2026; Fan et al., 2025). The export vulnerability of the region’s manufacturing sector is also nicely measured by the long-term negative impact of an energy intensity shock. This finding aligns with the results reported by Dussaux & Monjon (2023) and Festić (2026). It is imperative that policymakers recognize the inherent practical uncertainty of frontier Asian markets, and in response, implement integrated macro-financial policy commitments as opposed to monetary policy responses. Ultimately, the most effective ways to promote export resilience are to maintain a competitive exchange rate, develop financial markets and stabilise policies. This aligns with Aizenman et al. (2016), Chaney (2016), Aftab & Phylaktis (2022) and O’Donnell et al. (2024).

Table 6 indicates the country-specific disaggregated responses of the DSGE exports. The numerical asymmetries in the absorption of macroeconomic shock by the transitional economies are shown by the disaggregated quantitative information of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In all the countries studied, 10 percent exchange rate depreciation is the most universally powerful short-term driver of export acceleration. Such depreciation always boosts export volumes to their maximum in the fourth quarter, albeit with considerable country-to-country variation in the numerical elasticity of such depreciation. The fastest fourth-quarter growth is in highly integrated manufacturing centers, where Bangladesh had an astounding 10.5% peak deviation and Uzbekistan had 9.3%. In sharp contrast, weak states are severely supply-side constrained so as to dampen this benefit, with peak export growth of a mere 3.0% in Syria and 3.5% in Afghanistan in the fourth quarter. The conventional monetary policies show a far more limited and temporary quantitative effect on export competitiveness. If the money supply increases by 1 percent, the maximum increase in exports is 0.4 percent in Syria and 2.4 percent in Bangladesh, both of which eventually fade away to zero in the long term. On the other hand, a one percent tightening of the monetary policy rate is sure to squash any export activity, bottoming in the fourth quarter with losses as high as -4.2% in Bangladesh and -3.6% in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, in cases where monetary expansion is organized at a regional level, the cumulative positive spillovers of the effect approximately increase the export deviations of domestic actions. An integrated growth in the export of Bangladesh is an example whereby a coordinated expansion has a 5.2% export growth in the fourth quarter, which is more than 2.4% produced by an uncoordinated 1% rise in the money supply.

Table 6.

Disaggregated country-specific DSGE export responses

Afghanistan
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 2.8 [2.1, 3.5] 3.5 [2.6, 4.4] 1.8 [1.2, 2.4] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.5 [2.6, 4.4] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] -3.5 [-4.5, -2.5] -5.0 [-6.2, -3.8] -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] -1.5 [-2.1, -0.9] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -5.0 [-6.2, -3.8] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] 1.8 [1.1, 2.5] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.8 [1.1, 2.5] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] 0.6 [0.2, 1.0] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] -4.1 [-5.2, -3.0] -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -4.1 [-5.2, -3.0] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] -2.0 [-2.7, -1.3] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -2.0 [-2.7, -1.3] -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] (Q4)
Remittances 2.8 [2.1, 3.5] 4.5 [3.6, 5.4] 6.0 [4.8, 7.2] 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] 6.0 [4.8, 7.2] (Q4)
Bangladesh
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.9 [0.7, 1.1] 1.6 [1.3, 1.9] 2.4 [2.0, 2.8] 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.4 [2.0, 2.8] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -1.4 [-1.7, -1.1] -2.8 [-3.4, -2.2] -4.2 [-5.0, -3.4] -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -4.2 [-5.0, -3.4] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 5.0 [4.2, 5.8] 8.5 [7.5, 9.5] 10.5 [9.3, 11.7] 6.0 [5.2, 6.8] 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 10.5 [9.3, 11.7] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] 2.8 [2.4, 3.2] 4.5 [3.9, 5.1] 5.8 [5.1, 6.5] 7.2 [6.4, 8.0] 7.2 [6.4, 8.0] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 2.5 [2.1, 2.9] 3.8 [3.2, 4.4] 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.5 [-0.7, -0.3] -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.0 [0.0, 0.1] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.1 [-0.2, 0.0] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] (Q4)
Remittances 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] (Q4)
Bhutan
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] -0.3 [-0.6, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] 5.2 [4.3, 6.1] 6.8 [5.7, 7.9] 4.0 [3.2, 4.8] 1.2 [0.7, 1.7] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 6.8 [5.7, 7.9] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] 3.8 [3.1, 4.5] 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.3 [-0.6, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] 0.6 [0.2, 1.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.0 [-1.3, -0.7] -2.0 [-2.5, -1.5] -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] -0.6 [-1.0, -0.2] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] (Q4)
Remittances 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.3 [0.0, 0.6] 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] (Q4)
Cambodia
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.7 [0.5, 0.9] 1.3 [1.0, 1.6] 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -1.1 [-1.4, -0.8] -2.4 [-2.9, -1.9] -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 4.2 [3.5, 4.9] 7.5 [6.6, 8.4] 9.2 [8.1, 10.3] 5.0 [4.3, 5.7] 1.6 [1.0, 2.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 9.2 [8.1, 10.3] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] 2.4 [2.0, 2.8] 3.8 [3.3, 4.3] 5.0 [4.4, 5.6] 6.2 [5.5, 6.9] 6.2 [5.5, 6.9] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.0 [-1.3, -0.7] -1.9 [-2.4, -1.4] -2.6 [-3.2, -2.0] -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.6 [-3.2, -2.0] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 2.0 [1.6, 2.4] 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.5 [3.7, 5.3] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] 2.6 [2.1, 3.1] 4.0 [3.4, 4.6] 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.0 [3.4, 4.6] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.7 [-0.9, -0.5] -1.6 [-2.0, -1.2] -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.5 [-0.7, -0.3] -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.1 [-0.2, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] (Q4)
Remittances 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] 2.5 [2.0, 3.0] 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 2.5 [2.0, 3.0] (Q4)
Kyrgyzstan
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] -1.9 [-2.4, -1.4] -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] 6.0 [5.1, 6.9] 7.6 [6.5, 8.7] 4.6 [3.8, 5.4] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 7.6 [6.5, 8.7] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 1.9 [1.5, 2.3] 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] 4.4 [3.7, 5.1] 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] 5.2 [4.4, 6.0] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.3 [-1.7, -0.9] -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] -3.3 [-4.0, -2.6] -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.3 [-4.0, -2.6] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] 2.9 [2.3, 3.5] 4.0 [3.2, 4.8] 2.3 [1.7, 2.9] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.0 [3.2, 4.8] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] 2.3 [1.8, 2.8] 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] -2.6 [-3.3, -1.9] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.6 [-3.3, -1.9] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] (Q4)
Remittances 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] 4.2 [3.5, 4.9] 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 4.2 [3.5, 4.9] (Q4)
Laos
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.3 [0.2, 0.4] 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.5 [-0.7, -0.3] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] 4.5 [3.6, 5.4] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.5 [3.6, 5.4] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] 3.2 [2.6, 3.8] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] -4.8 [-5.9, -3.7] -3.0 [-3.8, -2.2] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -4.8 [-5.9, -3.7] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] -2.0 [-2.7, -1.3] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -1.9 [-2.6, -1.2] -2.8 [-3.7, -1.9] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.8 [-3.7, -1.9] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -2.2 [-3.0, -1.4] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.2 [-3.0, -1.4] (Q4)
Remittances 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] 5.0 [3.9, 6.1] 3.2 [2.4, 4.0] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 5.0 [3.9, 6.1] (Q4)
Myanmar
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.8 [2.9, 4.7] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] -3.8 [-4.8, -2.8] -5.2 [-6.5, -3.9] -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] -5.2 [-6.5, -3.9] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] 1.9 [1.3, 2.5] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.9 [1.3, 2.5] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] -2.4 [-3.2, -1.6] -1.0 [-1.5, -0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -1.3 [-1.7, -0.9] -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.4 [-4.3, -2.5] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.7 [0.5, 0.9] 1.3 [0.9, 1.7] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] -1.7 [-2.3, -1.1] -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] (Q4)
Remittances 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] 4.4 [3.5, 5.3] 5.8 [4.6, 7.0] 3.6 [2.8, 4.4] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 5.8 [4.6, 7.0] (Q4)
Nepal
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] 5.6 [4.7, 6.5] 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] 4.4 [3.6, 5.2] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] 4.1 [3.4, 4.8] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] 2.7 [2.1, 3.3] 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] 2.1 [1.6, 2.6] 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] (Q4)
Remittances 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] (Q4)
Pakistan
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.5 [-3.2, -1.8] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] 5.6 [4.7, 6.5] 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] 4.4 [3.6, 5.2] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 7.2 [6.1, 8.3] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] 4.1 [3.4, 4.8] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.0 [-3.7, -2.3] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] 2.7 [2.1, 3.3] 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.8 [3.0, 4.6] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] 2.1 [1.6, 2.6] 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.1 [2.5, 3.7] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] (Q4)
Remittances 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] 3.5 [2.8, 4.2] 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] 1.4 [0.9, 1.9] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] (Q4)
Papua New Guinea (Papua N. G. )
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] 3.3 [2.6, 4.0] 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] 2.3 [1.7, 2.9] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] 2.1 [1.6, 2.6] 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] 2.8 [2.2, 3.4] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] -4.6 [-5.7, -3.5] -2.9 [-3.7, -2.1] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] -4.6 [-5.7, -3.5] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] 1.3 [0.9, 1.7] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -2.7 [-3.5, -1.9] -3.9 [-4.9, -2.9] -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.9 [-4.9, -2.9] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] -3.1 [-4.0, -2.2] -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.1 [-4.0, -2.2] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] (Q4)
Remittances 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 3.5 [2.7, 4.3] (Q4)
Sri Lanka
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.6 [0.4, 0.8] 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.8 [1.4, 2.2] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] -2.0 [-2.5, -1.5] -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.8 [-3.5, -2.1] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 3.6 [3.0, 4.2] 6.4 [5.5, 7.3] 8.0 [6.9, 9.1] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 8.0 [6.9, 9.1] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 2.0 [1.6, 2.4] 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] 4.6 [3.9, 5.3] 5.5 [4.7, 6.3] 5.5 [4.7, 6.3] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] -3.1 [-3.8, -2.4] -1.5 [-2.0, -1.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.1 [-3.8, -2.4] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] 2.9 [2.3, 3.5] 4.1 [3.3, 4.9] 2.3 [1.7, 2.9] 0.9 [0.5, 1.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.1 [3.3, 4.9] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.0 [-1.3, -0.7] -1.9 [-2.4, -1.4] -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] (Q4)
Remittances 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] 4.0 [3.3, 4.7] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 4.0 [3.3, 4.7] (Q4)
Syria
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] 3.0 [2.2, 3.8] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.0 [2.2, 3.8] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 1.8 [1.2, 2.4] 1.8 [1.2, 2.4] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] -4.0 [-5.0, -3.0] -5.5 [-6.8, -4.2] -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -5.5 [-6.8, -4.2] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] 1.5 [0.9, 2.1] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.5 [0.9, 2.1] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] -3.2 [-4.2, -2.2] -4.6 [-5.8, -3.4] -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -4.6 [-5.8, -3.4] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.8 [0.6, 1.0] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -2.3 [-3.0, -1.6] -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.2 [-4.1, -2.3] (Q4)
Remittances 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] 5.0 [4.0, 6.0] 6.5 [5.2, 7.8] 4.2 [3.2, 5.2] 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] 1.1 [0.6, 1.6] 6.5 [5.2, 7.8] (Q4)
Tajikistan
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.5 [1.1, 1.9] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.3 [-0.6, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] 5.5 [4.6, 6.4] 7.0 [5.9, 8.1] 4.2 [3.4, 5.0] 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 7.0 [5.9, 8.1] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] 1.6 [1.2, 2.0] 2.9 [2.3, 3.5] 4.0 [3.3, 4.7] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] 4.8 [4.0, 5.6] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -2.0 [-2.6, -1.4] -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.9 [-3.6, -2.2] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 1.4 [1.0, 1.8] 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] 3.7 [2.9, 4.5] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.7 [2.9, 4.5] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 2.0 [1.5, 2.5] 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.0 [2.4, 3.6] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] -1.8 [-2.3, -1.3] -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.7 [-3.4, -2.0] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] -0.7 [-1.1, -0.3] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.2 [-1.7, -0.7] (Q4)
Remittances 2.4 [1.8, 3.0] 4.0 [3.1, 4.9] 5.2 [4.1, 6.3] 3.2 [2.4, 4.0] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 5.2 [4.1, 6.3] (Q4)
Timor-Leste
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.7 [0.4, 1.0] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.8 [-1.2, -0.4] -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 1.7 [1.2, 2.2] 3.1 [2.4, 3.8] 4.0 [3.1, 4.9] 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.0 [3.1, 4.9] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] 2.6 [2.0, 3.2] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -1.9 [-2.5, -1.3] -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] -4.7 [-5.8, -3.6] -2.9 [-3.7, -2.1] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -4.7 [-5.8, -3.6] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.0 [1.4, 2.6] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -2.6 [-3.4, -1.8] -3.8 [-4.8, -2.8] -2.2 [-2.9, -1.5] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.8 [-4.8, -2.8] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] -3.0 [-3.9, -2.1] -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.0 [-3.9, -2.1] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.5 [1.0, 2.0] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] -1.8 [-2.4, -1.2] -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] -1.4 [-1.9, -0.9] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] (Q4)
Remittances 1.8 [1.3, 2.3] 3.0 [2.3, 3.7] 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 1.2 [0.8, 1.6] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 4.2 [3.3, 5.1] (Q4)
Uzbekistan
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.8 [0.6, 1.0] 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] 1.1 [0.8, 1.4] 0.4 [0.2, 0.6] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 2.0 [1.7, 2.3] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -1.1 [-1.4, -0.8] -2.4 [-2.9, -1.9] -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.6 [-4.3, -2.9] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 4.3 [3.6, 5.0] 7.6 [6.7, 8.5] 9.3 [8.2, 10.4] 5.1 [4.4, 5.8] 1.7 [1.1, 2.3] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 9.3 [8.2, 10.4] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.5 [0.3, 0.7] 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] 2.5 [2.1, 2.9] 3.9 [3.4, 4.4] 5.1 [4.5, 5.7] 6.4 [5.7, 7.1] 6.4 [5.7, 7.1] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -0.9 [-1.2, -0.6] -1.7 [-2.2, -1.2] -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.4 [-3.0, -1.8] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 2.1 [1.7, 2.5] 3.4 [2.8, 4.0] 4.6 [3.8, 5.4] 2.5 [1.9, 3.1] 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.6 [3.8, 5.4] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 1.4 [1.1, 1.7] 2.7 [2.2, 3.2] 4.1 [3.5, 4.7] 2.4 [1.9, 2.9] 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 4.1 [3.5, 4.7] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -0.6 [-0.8, -0.4] -1.4 [-1.8, -1.0] -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] -1.3 [-1.8, -0.8] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.2 [-2.8, -1.6] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.8 [-1.1, -0.5] -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.2 [-1.6, -0.8] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -0.2 [-0.4, 0.0] -0.5 [-0.8, -0.2] -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.1 [-0.2, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] (Q4)
Remittances 1.0 [0.7, 1.3] 1.9 [1.5, 2.3] 2.6 [2.1, 3.1] 1.7 [1.3, 2.1] 0.8 [0.5, 1.1] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 2.6 [2.1, 3.1] (Q4)
Yemen
Shock Type Impact Q2 Q4 Q8 Q12 Long Run Peak Response
Monetary Expansion (1% MS↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] (Q4)
Monetary Contraction (1% MPR↑) -0.3 [-0.5, -0.1] -0.6 [-0.9, -0.3] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] -0.4 [-0.6, -0.2] -0.1 [0.0, -0.2] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -1.0 [-1.4, -0.6] (Q4)
Exchange Rate Depr. (10%) 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 2.9 [2.2, 3.6] 3.7 [2.8, 4.6] 1.9 [1.3, 2.5] 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 3.7 [2.8, 4.6] (Q4)
Financial Development (1σ↑) 0.1 [0.0, 0.2] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.5 [0.2, 0.8] 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] 1.6 [1.1, 2.1] 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] 2.2 [1.6, 2.8] (LR)
Policy Uncertainty (1σ↑) -2.1 [-2.7, -1.5] -3.6 [-4.6, -2.6] -5.1 [-6.3, -3.9] -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -0.4 [-0.7, -0.1] -5.1 [-6.3, -3.9] (Q4)
Coordinated Expansion 0.6 [0.3, 0.9] 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] 1.9 [1.2, 2.6] 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.9 [1.2, 2.6] (Q4)
Credit Expansion (1σ↑) 0.3 [0.1, 0.5] 0.8 [0.4, 1.2] 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] 0.7 [0.3, 1.1] 0.2 [0.0, 0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.3 [0.8, 1.8] (Q4)
Energy Intensity Shock (1σ↑) -1.6 [-2.1, -1.1] -2.8 [-3.6, -2.0] -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] -2.5 [-3.3, -1.7] -1.1 [-1.6, -0.6] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -4.2 [-5.3, -3.1] (Q4)
Informal Sector Exp. (1% Labor) -1.3 [-1.7, -0.9] -2.4 [-3.1, -1.7] -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] -0.9 [-1.3, -0.5] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -3.3 [-4.2, -2.4] (Q4)
Barter Friction Shock (1σ↑) 0.7 [0.5, 0.9] 1.3 [0.9, 1.7] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] 1.1 [0.7, 1.5] 0.4 [0.1, 0.7] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 1.9 [1.4, 2.4] (Q4)
Non-Monetized Trade Pref. (1σ↑) -1.1 [-1.5, -0.7] -2.1 [-2.8, -1.4] -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] -1.6 [-2.2, -1.0] -0.7 [-1.0, -0.4] 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] -2.9 [-3.8, -2.0] (Q4)
Remittances 2.9 [2.2, 3.6] 4.8 [3.8, 5.8] 6.2 [4.9, 7.5] 4.0 [3.0, 5.0] 2.1 [1.5, 2.7] 1.0 [0.5, 1.5] 6.2 [4.9, 7.5] (Q4)

Passing to structural parameters, the only shock that perpetually compounds is an increase in financial development of one standard deviation. Although cyclical shocks revert to 0.0% in the twelfth quarter, financial deepening has maximal quantitative effect in the long run. Countries that are aggressively developing their domestic credit markets are expected to experience significant export growth in the long term. Bangladesh, Uzbekistan and Cambodia are leading the way, with growth rates of 7.2%, 6.4% and 6.2%, respectively. Even in the most severely constrained markets such as Syria and Afghanistan this long-run financial development measure still imposes a positive steady-state deviation of 1.8% and 2.0, respectively. A one standard deviation expansion in domestic credit in the interim is a key quantitative intermediary. This credit shock spurs intermediate fourth-quarter export growth of an average of 1.0% in Syria and 4.8% in Bangladesh which ultimately decays. Another deep-seated structural pillar that has the capacity to lead to huge swings in the volume of trade is the exogenous capital inflow, which is modeled as remittance shocks. Remittances are statistically essential to highly fractured economies, as they produced fourth-quarter export boom of 6.5% in Syria, 6.2% in Yemen and 6.0% in Afghanistan. Such dependence on the diaspora capital brings out a numerical fact that foreign inflows are absolutely necessary to finance the import-intensive production lines of exports.

On the negative side of the ledger, the quantitative models are used in a very graphic manner in terms of the destructive asymmetric punishment of institutional fragility. One standard deviation jump in policy uncertainty is an apocalyptic shock that sends forward-looking export investments into a deep contraction. The data isolates explicitly fragile states, in which this uncertainty provokes fourth-quarter export crashes of -5.5% in Syria, -5.2% in Myanmar and -5.1% in Yemen. This chilling effect even hits structurally sound markets with Bangladesh and Uzbekistan losing 2.2% and 2.4% of their respective export volumes at the peak of the quarter four. These vulnerabilities are further complicated by a one standard deviation shock to the intensity of a shock to energy, which lowers performance in exports across the board by increasing the cost of core production. Since these economies are mainly dependent on energy intensive output, this shock triggers the fourth quarter export losses of between -1.8 in Bangladesh to a devastating -4.6 in Syria and Yemen. There is also a lot of mathematical complexity in the labor market, particularly when it comes to monitoring the informal sector. A 1 percent movement of formal labor to an informal economy is a way of effectively starving the sector that produces exports and this will cause a universal contraction. This dynamic most severely penalizes countries with weak institutional capacity, pushing fourth-quarter export shortages to -3.6% in Syria, -3.4% in Myanmar and -3.2% in Afghanistan. Underdeveloped markets have structural trade friction particular to them, including dependence on non-monetized trade preferences, which makes them even more alien to global supply chains. An increase in the non-monetized trade by one standard deviation moves the transactions out of quantifiable international markets and pulls down formal exports by up to -3.2% in Syria and -2.9% in Yemen. Surprisingly, there is a mathematical anomaly in the analysis of a one standard deviation rise in barter friction shocks. With increasing localized barter difficulty, actors must move into formal monetized markets, which in turn counter-intuitively prompt recorded fourth-quarter exports to increase 2.1% in Syria, and 1.9% in both Yemen and Myanmar.

A rigorous cross-sectional analysis of the time data verifies that, except finance development, the effects of all the shocks modeled fade quickly. The large majority of cyclical perturbations by the twelfth quarter are measuring in a fraction of a percent, which is a strong indication of mean-reverting gravity. As an illustration, the huge 10.5% increase in exchange rate in Bangladesh drops to a mere 2.2% in the quarter twelve and finally, the exchange rate adjusts to 0.0% in the long run. This speedy numeral obliteration strictly restrains the capacities of such transitional economies to alter their export foundation irreversibly by short-run monetary or currency intercessions. This quantitative reality compels policy makers to maneuver through a unique mathematical duality of short-term survival and long-term growth. A 10% currency depreciation is the most statistically sound short-term bailout, creating spikes in yield of double or high single digits in the short term. Nevertheless, to break free from cyclical volatility, uncompromising long-term financial deepening is required — the only modelled measure that can ensure major developing countries achieve steady-state growth of more than 5.0% in the long term. These disaggregated numbers eventually demonstrate that the only way out of such transient and highly volatile export cycles is to broaden formal access to credit and keep the uncertainty down to below a baseline standard deviation.

The remarkable 10.5% peak export growth in Bangladesh is highly plausible and has structural justification, which follows a 10% exchange rate depreciation shock at Quarter 4, thanks to the country’s distinctive macroeconomic features and export composition. The performance is a lot better than that of its regional peers Cambodia, Pakistan and Afghanistan whose domestic economies are vastly different - 9.2%, 7.2% and 3.5% respectively. Bangladesh is taking the lead mainly because of the high elasticity of demand for its exports, which are dominated by ready-made garments that account for 80–85% of total export earnings. Unlike specialised technology or capital goods, mass-market apparel is a highly substitutable consumer good, making global demand for Bangladeshi textiles highly price-elastic. Thus, a 10% depreciation of the Bangladeshi taka immediately causes the foreign currency price of apparel to fall on the global market, making it easy for large retail chains in the US and Europe to shift orders and causing a huge, disproportionate increase in purchases.

Bangladesh’s structural openness and large-scale, cluster efficiencies further enhance this price benefit. Despite having a much larger economy than countries such as Bhutan and Kyrgyzstan, Bangladesh’s modern industrial sector is highly outward-facing. It has large industrial garment clusters with significant underused capacity and labor liquidity, enabling it to rapidly increase output. In stark contrast to Afghanistan or Nepal, whose export is hampered by binding supply-side constraints, landlocked geography or low-elasticity primary commodities such as minerals and selected agricultural goods, India is expected to capture maximum global market in case of shifts in dollar, yen or rupee.

Moreover, Bangladesh’s well-developed backward linkages in spinning, weaving, dyeing and finishing mills mitigate the classic imported inflation traps encountered in traditional Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models. Although depreciation in exchange rate penalizes an economy due to expensive imported raw materials and slows down the export expansion, Bangladesh does most of the value-addition of textile at home. This advantage of the structure means the net competitiveness gain from a weaker currency is much bigger than the inflationary impact of costlier imported raw cotton or machinery. It can thus be concluded that the export surge initially has a positive effect, but that this effect is progressively diminished over time as a result of the long-term price convergence.

Eventually, the gradual staggered shock of first 5.0% to 8.5% in Quarter 2 and 10.5% in Quarter 4 fits well with the micro realities of trade contracts and the J curve effect. Because orders in the global garment industry are generally booked three to six months in advance, the immediate impact shows only limited volume adjustment. By Quarter 4, roughly one year on, supply chains will have fully adjusted and old contracts will have been re-priced. What may take place during Q4 is that international buyers will not limit their supply portfolios to competitor nations such as Vietnam or India and so will make full use of Bangladesh’s competitiveness. For this reason, Bangladesh peaks higher than a highly dollarized Cambodia which diminishes pure exchange rate pass-through or Pakistan who suffers from extreme domestic energy constraints and supply chain frictions.

Posterior Distribution

Whereas frequentist models (e.g., OLS, VAR) are normally used to provide a single point estimate of each model parameter, the Bayesian DSGE models provide an entire posterior distribution, thus capturing ambiguity over the actual values of the parameters (Edge & Gürkaynak, 2010). In this regard, the researchers used the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm - a typical Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method - to simulate and draw upon the posterior distribution. Rather than providing a single estimate of the export elasticity, the model produces a probability distribution, which indicates the probability of a set of parameter values, as given in the data from 2000 to 2025. The Bayesian posterior distribution of DSGE parameters is presented in Table 7. The posterior mode provides the most likely value of each parameter whereas the credible intervals show the accuracy of the estimates and the level of uncertainty (Bolker, 2008; Fernández‐Villaverde & Guerrón-Quintana, 2021). The acceptance rate indicates the convergence of the MCMC simulation to acceptable levels raising the confidence in the results. Parameters including monetary policy reaction coefficient (φ1) and the export elasticity with regard to the exchange rate (β1) show somewhat tight credible intervals, which indicate strong estimates. The parameter of risk-aversion (γ) represents a larger credible range, indicating increased uncertainty. The parameters of the output shock (σ3) and fiscal-policy shock (σ2) have smaller posterior means and, consequently, smaller credible intervals suggesting their less significant impact on the dynamics of the model. The fact that the posterior mean of 0.35 has a very narrow credible interval means that the influence of the monetary policy in the economy is moderately strong and considerably significant. This finding corroborates the hypothesis that fluctuations in interest rates or other monetary instruments exert a quantifiable effect on export performance.

Table 7.

Bayesian posterior distribution for DSGE model parameters

Parameter Posterior Mean Standard Deviation 95% Credible Interval 90% Credible Interval 68% Credible Interval Acceptance Rate (%)
Monetary Policy Reaction (ϕ₁) 1.502 0.105 [1.296, 1.708] [1.329, 1.675] [1.397, 1.607] 31.2
Exchange Rate Sensitivity (α₁) 0.425 0.082 [0.264, 0.586] [0.290, 0.560] [0.343, 0.507] 28.4
Export Elasticity to EXR (β₁) 1.185 0.150 [0.891, 1.479] [0.938, 1.432] [1.035, 1.335] 29.5
Monetary Policy Shock (σ₁) 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.021] [0.010, 0.020] [0.012, 0.018] 32.1
Fiscal Policy Shock (σ₂) 0.028 0.005 [0.018, 0.038] [0.020, 0.036] [0.023, 0.033] 30.8
Inflation Targeting Parameter (π₁) 1.654 0.120 [1.419, 1.889] [1.457, 1.851] [1.534, 1.774] 33.5
Risk Aversion Parameter (γ) 2.450 0.300 [1.862, 3.038] [1.956, 2.944] [2.150, 2.750] 27.6
Export Demand Sensitivity (η₁) 0.852 0.115 [0.627, 1.077] [0.663, 1.041] [0.737, 0.967] 29.9
Price Stickiness (φ₁) 0.520 0.065 [0.393, 0.647] [0.413, 0.627] [0.455, 0.585] 31.0
Output Shock (σ₃) 0.022 0.004 [0.014, 0.030] [0.015, 0.029] [0.018, 0.026] 34.2
Informal Sector Expansion Shock (σinf) 0.045 0.008 [0.029, 0.061] [0.032, 0.058] [0.037, 0.053] 26.8
Barter Friction Shock (σbar) 0.038 0.007 [0.024, 0.052] [0.026, 0.050] [0.031, 0.045] 27.1
Non-Monetized Trade Shock (σnmt) 0.032 0.006 [0.020, 0.044] [0.022, 0.042] [0.026, 0.038] 28.5

The small confidence interval indicates the extent to which the effectiveness of monetary policy is certain, making it a key tool for controlling economic fluctuations. With an exchange rate posterior mean estimate of 0.425, policymakers can conclude that it has a significant impact on the economy’s openness and competitiveness in international markets. The credible interval indicates that there is some uncertainty, but the overall effect is significant. The exchange rate management, whether by interventions into the foreign exchange markets or by modifying capital controls, can influence export performance and trade balances (Sekkat & Varoudakis, 2000). The estimated posterior of 0.23 indicates a medium sensitivity of exports to exchange-rate changes, which gives important information to the policy makers who may want to stabilize export growth in the presence of changes in exchange rates. The narrow credible interval also adds confidence in this relationship.

The credible intervals of the pertinent parameters are observed in order to assess the temporal propagation of various economic shocks, including monetary policy shocks or fiscal policy shocks, throughout the economy. In reference to the monetary policy shock (σ₁) it is evident that a posterior mean (1.5) coupled with a fairly narrow credible interval indicates that monetary policy shocks (say, changes in interest rates) can bring about quantifiable differences in the economy, for example, an interest rate cut should promote consumption and investment (Juhro et al., 2023). The high acceptance rate indicates strong confidence in this outcome, meaning that policy interventions could be more reliable. Regarding the fiscal policy shock (σ₂), the posterior mean of 0.028 with a narrow 95% credible interval suggests that fiscal policy, government expenditure and tax cuts have a significant impact on the economy. This parameter is particularly useful for determining the effects of expansionary fiscal policy, especially during periods of economic contraction.

In terms of risk management and policy uncertainty, the model can absorb uncertainty, enabling policymakers to tolerate the constant risks associated with any economic intervention. Taking into account the risk-aversion parameter (γ), the posterior mean of 2.45 and the wide credible interval (2.1, 2.7) indicate that there is significant uncertainty surrounding the level of risk aversion in the economy. Central banks use signaling mechanisms to inform markets of policy actions and shape investors’ expectations (Wolski et al., 2023). Regarding the inflation-targeting parameter (π₁), the posterior mean is 1.50, and the narrow credible interval suggests a strong dependence on inflation expectations. This implies that citizens trust the inflation levels set by the central bank. This finding enables policymakers to calibrate inflation-targeting policies and ensure that people’s expectations regarding the central bank’s goals are not overly optimistic.

In order to design long-term structural policies, the posterior mean of export demand sensitivity (η₁) of 0.65, with a narrow confidence interval, indicates that exports are susceptible to external demand shocks, such as changes in global economic conditions or trade policy. Policymakers can use this information to design trade policies that stabilise exports, particularly when global demand fluctuates. Furthermore, the posterior mean of price stickiness (φ₁) of 0.50 indicates a high degree of price rigidity, meaning that prices do not change immediately in response to a shock. This result has significant implications for monetary policy and inflation targeting. In a setting where prices are difficult to change, the response to changes in monetary policy due to inflation may not be instantaneous (Mankiw & Reis, 2002). This is why central banks must consider the time lag between implementing a policy and its impact on inflation.

The fiscal policy shock has a mean of 0.028. This reflects the fiscal constraints faced by frontier economies (Christensen, 2016). Most importantly, the quantitative landscape also changes drastically, when examining the newly integrated structural frictions, which have much larger shock magnitudes than traditional macroeconomic variables do. The informal sector expansion shock is the strongest exogenous shock in the model, which has a tremendous posterior mean of 0.045. This parameter with a credible interval of 90 percent (0.032 to 0.058) demonstrates that the unrecorded shadow economy is an extremely volatile and powerful drain on national resources (Nguyen et al., 2020). This harsh scale measures how fast capital and labor can circumvent the regulatory structures and vigorously deprive the formal manufacturing industry of its productive ability. The barter friction shock is a highly disruptive structural bottleneck in the rural and agricultural sector. With a high posterior mean of 0.038, this is a metric of friction that validates the fact that the search costs relate to matching non-fiat trades are not only widespread but as well as volatile. The credible interval of this barter shock ranges between 0.024 and 0.052, which statistically encapsulate how weak and localized subsistence supply chains fail to scale. Adding to this rural isolation is the non-monetized trade shock that has a significant posterior mean of 0.032. The parameter has a standard deviation of 0.006; this is used to measure the deep-rooted cultural and structural attainment of domestic agents to shun the official fiat currency completely. With the 90 percent credible range between 0.022 and 0.042 being attained in its entirety, it shows the precise extent to which the formal export sector is systematically deprived of the domestic liquidity.

Table 8 reports the disaggregated Bayesian posterior estimates for 16 frontier Asian economies and 90% HPD credible intervals. These disaggregated findings capture the expected structural posterior means for each of the 16 frontier Asian economies, precisely in line with their observed macroeconomic and institutional settings.

Table 8.

Disaggregated Bayesian posterior estimates for 16 frontier Asian economies and 90% HPD credible intervals

Country ϕ1​ (Monetary Rxn) α1​ (EXR Sens.) β1​ (Export Elast.) σ1 (Monetary Shock) σ2 (Fiscal Shock) π1 (Inflation Target) γ (Risk Aversion)
Afghanistan 1.10 [0.98, 1.22] 0.25 [0.18, 0.32] 0.85 [0.71, 0.99] 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] 0.045 [0.035, 0.055] 1.15 [1.02, 1.28] 2.95 [2.65, 3.25]
Bangladesh 1.65 [1.48, 1.82] 0.45 [0.38, 0.52] 1.45 [1.25, 1.65] 0.015 [0.011, 0.019] 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] 1.75 [1.58, 1.92] 2.10 [1.85, 2.35]
Bhutan 1.55 [1.41, 1.69] 0.35 [0.29, 0.41] 1.10 [0.95, 1.25] 0.012 [0.008, 0.016] 0.022 [0.016, 0.028] 1.85 [1.65, 2.05] 2.25 [1.98, 2.52]
Cambodia 1.45 [1.32, 1.58] 0.55 [0.46, 0.64] 1.35 [1.18, 1.52] 0.014 [0.010, 0.018] 0.020 [0.015, 0.025] 1.65 [1.49, 1.81] 2.15 [1.92, 2.38]
Kyrgyzstan 1.50 [1.36, 1.64] 0.42 [0.35, 0.49] 1.15 [1.02, 1.28] 0.015 [0.011, 0.019] 0.028 [0.021, 0.035] 1.60 [1.45, 1.75] 2.45 [2.21, 2.69]
Laos 1.42 [1.29, 1.55] 0.40 [0.33, 0.47] 1.05 [0.92, 1.18] 0.016 [0.011, 0.021] 0.030 [0.024, 0.036] 1.55 [1.40, 1.70] 2.50 [2.25, 2.75]
Myanmar 1.25 [1.12, 1.38] 0.38 [0.31, 0.45] 0.95 [0.82, 1.08] 0.020 [0.014, 0.026] 0.035 [0.027, 0.043] 1.35 [1.21, 1.49] 2.75 [2.48, 3.02]
Nepal 1.48 [1.34, 1.62] 0.35 [0.28, 0.42] 1.08 [0.94, 1.22] 0.014 [0.010, 0.018] 0.026 [0.020, 0.032] 1.62 [1.46, 1.78] 2.35 [2.12, 2.58]
Pakistan 1.58 [1.43, 1.73] 0.48 [0.40, 0.56] 1.25 [1.10, 1.40] 0.018 [0.013, 0.023] 0.032 [0.025, 0.039] 1.70 [1.54, 1.86] 2.40 [2.16, 2.64]
Papua N. G. 1.35 [1.21, 1.49] 0.32 [0.26, 0.38] 1.12 [0.98, 1.26] 0.015 [0.011, 0.019] 0.034 [0.027, 0.041] 1.50 [1.35, 1.65] 2.75 [2.48, 3.02]
Sri Lanka 1.62 [1.47, 1.77] 0.50 [0.42, 0.58] 1.30 [1.15, 1.45] 0.019 [0.014, 0.024] 0.031 [0.024, 0.038] 1.80 [1.64, 1.96] 2.30 [2.07, 2.53]
Syria 1.05 [0.93, 1.17] 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 0.75 [0.61, 0.89] 0.028 [0.021, 0.035] 0.050 [0.039, 0.061] 1.10 [0.98, 1.22] 3.00 [2.70, 3.30]
Tajikistan 1.40 [1.26, 1.54] 0.38 [0.31, 0.45] 1.02 [0.89, 1.15] 0.016 [0.011, 0.021] 0.029 [0.022, 0.036] 1.52 [1.38, 1.66] 2.60 [2.35, 2.85]
Timor-Leste 1.38 [1.25, 1.51] 0.30 [0.24, 0.36] 0.98 [0.85, 1.11] 0.015 [0.010, 0.020] 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] 1.48 [1.33, 1.63] 2.80 [2.53, 3.07]
Uzbekistan 1.52 [1.38, 1.66] 0.45 [0.38, 0.52] 1.22 [1.08, 1.36] 0.014 [0.010, 0.018] 0.025 [0.019, 0.031] 1.68 [1.52, 1.84] 2.20 [1.98, 2.42]
Yemen 1.15 [1.03, 1.27] 0.22 [0.16, 0.28] 0.80 [0.66, 0.94] 0.026 [0.019, 0.033] 0.048 [0.038, 0.058] 1.20 [1.08, 1.32] 2.90 [2.62, 3.18]
Country η1​ (Demand Sens.) φ1​ (Price Stickiness) σ3​ (Output Shock) σinf​ (Informal Shock) σbar​ (Barter Shock) σnmt​ (Non-Monetized) σrem​ (Remittance Shock)
Afghanistan 0.65 [0.55, 0.75] 0.21 [0.15, 0.27] 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] 0.068 [0.055, 0.081] 0.085 [0.072, 0.098] 0.092 [0.081, 0.103] 0.055 [0.045, 0.065]
Bangladesh 0.95 [0.85, 1.05] 0.52 [0.44, 0.60] 0.020 [0.015, 0.025] 0.058 [0.048, 0.068] 0.018 [0.012, 0.024] 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] 0.042 [0.035, 0.049]
Bhutan 0.82 [0.72, 0.92] 0.72 [0.65, 0.79] 0.018 [0.012, 0.024] 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] 0.045 [0.036, 0.054] 0.031 [0.024, 0.038] 0.015 [0.010, 0.020]
Cambodia 0.92 [0.82, 1.02] 0.65 [0.57, 0.73] 0.019 [0.014, 0.024] 0.048 [0.039, 0.057] 0.021 [0.015, 0.027] 0.015 [0.010, 0.020] 0.022 [0.016, 0.028]
Kyrgyzstan 0.85 [0.75, 0.95] 0.55 [0.47, 0.63] 0.022 [0.016, 0.028] 0.045 [0.036, 0.054] 0.038 [0.030, 0.046] 0.030 [0.023, 0.037] 0.062 [0.052, 0.072]
Laos 0.80 [0.71, 0.89] 0.58 [0.50, 0.66] 0.024 [0.018, 0.030] 0.044 [0.035, 0.053] 0.052 [0.043, 0.061] 0.040 [0.032, 0.048] 0.025 [0.018, 0.032]
Myanmar 0.75 [0.65, 0.85] 0.35 [0.28, 0.42] 0.030 [0.023, 0.037] 0.055 [0.045, 0.065] 0.060 [0.049, 0.071] 0.078 [0.066, 0.090] 0.035 [0.027, 0.043]
Nepal 0.84 [0.74, 0.94] 0.51 [0.43, 0.59] 0.021 [0.015, 0.027] 0.050 [0.041, 0.059] 0.045 [0.037, 0.053] 0.038 [0.031, 0.045] 0.085 [0.075, 0.095]
Pakistan 0.88 [0.78, 0.98] 0.49 [0.41, 0.57] 0.025 [0.019, 0.031] 0.049 [0.040, 0.058] 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] 0.062 [0.052, 0.072] 0.052 [0.044, 0.060]
Papua N. G. 0.81 [0.72, 0.90] 0.50 [0.42, 0.58] 0.026 [0.020, 0.032] 0.038 [0.030, 0.046] 0.072 [0.061, 0.083] 0.065 [0.055, 0.075] 0.018 [0.012, 0.024]
Sri Lanka 0.90 [0.80, 1.00] 0.41 [0.34, 0.48] 0.028 [0.022, 0.034] 0.042 [0.034, 0.050] 0.020 [0.014, 0.026] 0.048 [0.039, 0.057] 0.045 [0.037, 0.053]
Syria 0.60 [0.50, 0.70] 0.25 [0.19, 0.31] 0.040 [0.032, 0.048] 0.065 [0.053, 0.077] 0.070 [0.058, 0.082] 0.088 [0.076, 0.100] 0.065 [0.054, 0.076]
Tajikistan 0.78 [0.68, 0.88] 0.48 [0.40, 0.56] 0.023 [0.017, 0.029] 0.052 [0.042, 0.062] 0.041 [0.033, 0.049] 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] 0.088 [0.078, 0.098]
Timor-Leste 0.72 [0.63, 0.81] 0.45 [0.37, 0.53] 0.025 [0.019, 0.031] 0.041 [0.033, 0.049] 0.065 [0.055, 0.075] 0.055 [0.046, 0.064] 0.028 [0.021, 0.035]
Uzbekistan 0.86 [0.77, 0.95] 0.61 [0.53, 0.69] 0.020 [0.015, 0.025] 0.035 [0.028, 0.042] 0.028 [0.022, 0.034] 0.022 [0.016, 0.028] 0.040 [0.032, 0.048]
Yemen 0.62 [0.52, 0.72] 0.28 [0.22, 0.34] 0.038 [0.030, 0.046] 0.062 [0.050, 0.074] 0.075 [0.063, 0.087] 0.081 [0.069, 0.093] 0.058 [0.047, 0.069]

Disaggregated Posterior Estimates: The disaggregated posterior estimates irrefutably show that a one-size-fits-all macroeconomic policy is structurally unsustainable for the diverse institutional landscapes of the sixteen frontier Asian economies. Working with the traditional posts in this dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, remarkable structural differences immediately arise. The inflation targeting coefficient (π1) shows a clear distinction between economies whose central banks have imploded and those with functional central banks. Countries such as Bangladesh with a posterior mean of 1.75, HPD [1.58, 1.92] and Bhutan with 1.85, HPD [1.65, 2.05] exhibit a strong commitment to the Taylor principle, with parameters far exceeding the crucial threshold of 1.0 to aggressively tackle price fluctuations. By contrast, countries in the midst of civil war, such as Afghanistan (1.15, HPD [1.02, 1.28]) and Syria (1.10, HPD [0.98, 1.22]) reveal inflation targeting parameters close to one, suggesting that their central banks are scientifically impotent to anchor inflation expectations. This monetary impotence is compounded by the wide range of price stickiness (φ1) observed in the regional panel. For well-behaved transitioning economies such as Bhutan (0.72) with relative stiffness in prices, there is sufficient time for the traditional monetary policies to boost real economic activity before local prices respond. But in highly fragmented markets such as Afghanistan (0.21, HPD [0.15, 0.27]); the price adjustment is hyper-flexible. As a result, any monetary stimulus (σ1) in these at-risk economies is quickly sterilized by local inflation without benefiting the productive capacity of the economy.

Risk aversion and Exchange Rate Dynamics: The conventional fiscal policy shocks (σ2) also show tremendous variance from Bangladesh’s 0.025 to Syria’s 0.050 reflecting the widely different taxation and public expenditure policies of each country. The risk aversion (γ) coefficient highlights the ingrained risk averse attitudes of local households in an ever changing game of chance that reaches a dangerous level in the case of Syria (3.00) and Afghanistan (2.95). Large risk aversion affects mathematical domestic consumption and investment, and leaves the export sector to bear the burden of economic growth. This proves the importance of the parameters relating to the sensitivity to the exchange rate (α1) and the elasticity of exports (β1). Countries with fledgling manufacturing sectors (e.g. Bangladesh), have a very elastic export response to exchange rate depreciations (1.45, HPD [1.25, 1.65]) - clearly demonstrating that their industrialization can take advantage of low currency valuations in the long term. However, the initial cost of depreciations is still devastating in terms of increasing the cost of imports of raw materials (Dornbusch et al., 1976).

Size of structural frictions: As the policy focus shifts from conventional levers to frictions, the expansion of the informal sector (σinf) stands out as a universal virus. This informal economy feeds voraciously upon both labour and capital resources, imposing a hard mathematical constraint on the formal export expansion. Countries with large informal workforces, like Afghanistan and Bangladesh, utilize low-cost informal labor as a key comparative advantage for participation in manufacturing value chains (Narula, 2020). The informality penalty is what explains why money injections do not lead to commensurate increases in global trade. Working alongside the informal work sector is the massive sting of the barter friction shock (σbar). In institutionally-fractured or geographically isolated countries such as Afghanistan (0.085) and Papua New Guinea (0.072), vast rural populations completely eschew fiat money in favor of physical barter. This practice of non-standardized bartering creates prohibitive search costs that lock agricultural and mineral surpluses into subsistence-based local exchange. These goods cannot be monetized efficiently and are therefore posited as being beyond the national supply chain necessary for global trade. Moreover, the non-monetized trade shock (σnmt) measures a different but equally pernicious preference. When domestic agents choose not to record the value of transactions in the official banking ledger, effectively withdrawing core deposits from the banking system, this can reach critical thresholds in countries such as Afghanistan (0.092) and Syria (0.088). This insidious liquidity crisis erodes commercial banks’ capital base for extending trade finance to formal exporters, which renders domestic firms ineffective on the world stage.

Remittance Paradox and Policy Inferences: Amidst such substantial domestic distortions, the inclusion of foreign remittance inflows (σrem) introduces a policy paradox. Remittance shocks provide a much-needed financial buffer, reaching their peak in highly dependent economies such as Tajikistan (0.088, HPD [0.078, 0.098]) and Nepal (0.085, HPD [0.075, 0.095]). This is achieved by directly injecting foreign exchange income into the hands of the poor, thereby lifting domestic consumption. These regular financial transfers temporarily paper over the dysfunctionalities of the national labour market by artificially driving aggregate demand. But the model shows that excessive dependence on these remittances creates extensive moral hazard that erodes local industry. With these sustained transfers of unearned income, households’ reservation wage rises. This effect directly undermines labor supply in the labor-intensive and hardworking low-wage formal manufacturing sector, compounding the brain drain in the informal sector. While remittances ease short-term poverty, they are a structural hindrance to the long-term industrialisation required for export-led growth. The complex dynamics of high risk aversion, pervasive informality and remittance inflows form an economic conundrum that conventional interest rate adjustments cannot cure.

Policies to stimulate these economies through traditional output shocks (σ3) or price sensitivities (η1) are lost causes when the transmission mechanisms are cut off by non-monetized transactions. Economic revival in this region requires a radical departure from status quo monetary tweaking. The only area that should receive policy attention is that of deep institutional shocks, which eliminate barter frictions through the information and financial sectors. Shadow economy formalization and diversion of remittance into domestic productive investment are the only quantifiable ways to return policy effectiveness. This structural diagnosis informs us that frontier Asian economies cannot be treated as macroeconomic entities, and require highly disaggregated, quantitative and frictional interventions.

Posterior Diagnostics

We provide posterior estimates and conversion to convergence diagnostics (Table 9) in order to justify the validity of the DSGE estimates in Table 5. The Brooks-Gelman-Rubin statistic indicates that simulation chains have converged because the values are close to unity (e.g., 1.002, 1.008), far below the critical value, at 1.05, supporting the results of Ting (2025). As a result, the statistical significance represented by the asterisks in Table 2 indicates a consistent posterior distribution rather than noise. This confirms that the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm has achieved successful convergence and that the significance asterisks in Table 2 are not random but demonstrate a fixed posterior distribution. The comparison of high-posterior-density (HPD) intervals with prior means is an internal identification check. For example, the Calvo price-stickiness parameter (θp) has a prior mean of 0.50 and a posteriori mean of 0.67. Similarly, the policy-certainty parameter (ρPOLUNC) has a prior mean of 0.50 and and a posteriori mean of 0.89. These substantive posterior estimates indicate that the empirical quarterly series of 2000Q1 through 2025Q4 of Asian countries have provided meaningfully informative and updated empirics of the DSGE model. It would be a sign of identification failure and therefore invalidate the model if the posterior were equal to the prior values.

Table 9.

Posterior estimates and convergence diagnostics (16 Asian countries)

Parameter Description Prior Dist. Prior Mean Prior S. D. Post. Mean 90% HPD Interval R-stat
Panel A: Structural Parameters
σc Inv. Inter-temporal Elast. Gamma 1.50 0.37 1.82 [1.65, 2.01] 1.002
h Habit Formation Beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 [0.76, 0.85] 1.001
θp Calvo Price Stickiness Beta 0.50 0.10 0.67 [0.59, 0.74] 1.004
φπ Taylor Rule: Inflation Normal 1.50 0.25 1.94 [1.78, 2.12] 1.003
φy Taylor Rule: Output Normal 0.12 0.05 0.18 [0.14, 0.23] 1.001
φer Taylor Rule: Exch. Rate Gamma 0.10 0.05 0.22 [0.16, 0.28] 1.005
α Openness (Import Share) Beta 0.30 0.05 0.34 [0.31, 0.37] 1.000
Parameter Description Prior Dist. Prior Mean Prior S. D. Post. Mean 90% HPD Interval R-stat
Panel B: Shock Processes
ρexp AR(1) Export Demand Beta 0.50 0.20 0.76 [0.68, 0.82] 1.008
ρmpr AR(1) Monetary Policy Beta 0.50 0.20 0.62 [0.55, 0.69] 1.002
ρPOLUNC AR(1) Policy Uncertainty Beta 0.50 0.20 0.89 [0.84, 0.93] 1.011
ρinf AR(1) Informal Sector Beta 0.50 0.20 0.85 [0.78, 0.91] 1.004
ρbar AR(1) Barter Friction Beta 0.50 0.20 0.72 [0.65, 0.79] 1.002
ρnmt AR(1) Non-Monetized Trade Beta 0.50 0.20 0.81 [0.74, 0.88] 1.005
σexp Volatility: Export InvG 0.10 2.00 0.45 [0.38, 0.52] 1.003
σer Volatility: Exch. Rate InvG 0.10 2.00 0.87 [0.76, 0.99] 1.006
εinf Volatility: Informal Sector InvG 0.10 2.00 0.45 [0.39, 0.51] 1.003
εbar Volatility: Barter Friction InvG 0.10 2.00 0.38 [0.32, 0.45] 1.001
εnmt Volatility: Non-Monetized InvG 0.10 2.00 0.32 [0.26, 0.38] 1.004
Panel C: Model Fit Statistics
Statistic Description Value Target / Threshold
Log Data Density (Modified Harmonic Mean) -2456.8 N/A
Acceptance Rate (Metropolis-Hastings) 28.4% (Target: 20-40%)
Brooks-Gelman-Rubin (Overall Convergence) Converged (< 1.05)

The measure of acceptance rate is a proxy for efficiency and is defined as the ratio of accepted parameter draws to the number of proposed parameter draws in Monte Carlo simulations. Table 3 below shows an acceptance rate of 28.4%, comfortably within the optimum range of 20–40% (Geyer & Thompson, 1995). Acceptance rates that are significantly outside the recommended range may indicate inefficient proposal mechanisms, which could lead to slow convergence or poor exploration of the posterior distribution (Ting, 2025). Consequently, the interval and moment sequences were validated as having stabilized at 80,000 draws by performing multivariate convergence diagnostics according to the steps of Brooks and Gelman (1998). This validated the result of the simulation in Table 2.

The inclusion of the informal economy, barter and non-monetized trade in the DSGE offers a pragmatic view of institutional frictions constraining frontier Asia. These three elements differ from the usual cyclical macroeconomic shocks that reflect institutional frictions able to undermine conventional monetary and fiscal policy. The effects of these shocks, their sizes and persistence limits expose structural problems beyond the scope of traditional economic policy. The informal sector stands out as the largest sink of resources in the model, eclipsing the impact of traditional policy shocks. A 1% migration of workers into the informal economy leads to a sharp decline in exports, reaching -0.52% in the second quarter. This implies that the informal economy does not merely serve as a safety net but competes with the formal economy, diverting labor, resources and capital from export-oriented manufacturing. Moreover, the persistence of the shock (with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.85) reveals persistence of informality. Once employed workers and capital move to the informal sector to evade taxes or regulations, it is difficult to reintegrate these workers and firms into the formal sector, which ultimately undermines export capacity.

In contrast, frictions in barter highlight the impact of a hard medium of exchange on village supply chains. The barter shock in terms of search cost leads to a sharp fall in formal exports, with a maximum of -0.22%. This suggests the isolationist nature of barter systems, with local and subsistence forms of trade, and the failure to integrate agricultural or mineral surpluses into national supply chains limits global exports. The shock’s variance of 0.38 highlights the sensitivity of these informal markets to slight variations in their operation. Lack of monetization, where a cultural or structural preference exists to avoid currency, results in a delayed but often more intense liquidity shock. This shock, as opposed to the immediate impacts of barter or informality, has a delayed effect, with a magnitude of -0.35% in the fourth quarter. This lagged pattern casts the steady loss of domestic currency. As more domestic agents shift away from the formal financial system, the banking sector suffers from a lack of capital and is unable to issue letters of credit, trade finance and loans for formal exporters. The persistence of this shock with an AR(1) parameter of 0.81 implies that this form of behavioral risk aversion to the formal currency is deeply rooted, and that institutional change can only be long-term. The cumulative effects of these three factors imply that a central bank can set interest rates or print money, but it will be ineffective if significant proportion of the population is involved in informal trade, barter or non-monetized transactions. The scale of these institutional frictions suggests that solving export stagnation requires more than just monetary policy adjustments. A holistic strategy is required, incorporating financial inclusion, the modernization of rural payment systems and the elimination of regulatory restraints that could stimulate the underground economy.

According to Table 10, the estimated coefficient of 0.384 reflects a very high rate of adjustment at 61.6 percent of any change in total exports out of the long-run equilibrium is being restored in a year. The low value of persistence coefficient suggests that the system is more sensitive to modern shocks. When stochastic changes in the exchange rate reflect undesirable changes, there is an immediate and substantial drop in exports, which highlights the vulnerability of the sector without long-term contractual buffers. Therefore, the evidence suggests that a monetary-fiscal synergy is required. The absence of an integrated policy framework means that the export sector, which has a small internal inertia, is the sector that depends most on external policy stability. The synergistic growth acts as a counterbalance to the stochastic risks of exchange rate volatility, which substantially stabilizes the export sector. In short, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable at the one percentile level highlights the significance of the 61.6 percent adjustment rate. This suggests that the Asian export sector is characterised by low inertia and high agility, indicating low path dependence, whereby historical values account for less than 18 percent of current outcomes. Contemporaneous macroeconomic fundamentals and shocks are key drivers of export performance, and concurrent monetary and fiscal expansions have an immediate and powerful impact via their transmission channels. Though the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies and improvement of exports seemingly generates almost immediate results, its sustainability depends on the continuity of policy implementation; the flywheel effect is not present, and unless a steady stimulus is applied, the benefits will not automatically be self-renewing. To this end, there is an urgent need to maintain long-term synergistic policy actions to maintain export booms and reduce the high exposure of these economies to stochastic exchange rate changes.

Table 10.

Dynamic system GMM estimation of Asian export growth including informal and non-monetized economy frictions

Variables Coefficient Standard Error p-value Significance
Baseline Dynamics & Macro Variables
Lagged Export Growth (EXPi,t-1) 0.384 0.082 0.000 ***
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REERi,t) -0.142 0.045 0.002 ***
Monetary Policy Rate (MPRi,t) -0.215 0.061 0.001 ***
Broad Money Supply (MSi,t) 0.088 0.039 0.024 **
Credit to Private Sector (CREDi,t) 0.176 0.052 0.001 ***
Financial Development (FINDEVi,t) 0.112 0.047 0.017 **
Policy Uncertainty (POLUNCi,t) -0.095 0.033 0.004 ***
Government Expenditure (GOVEXPi,t) 0.064 0.028 0.022 **
Tax Revenue (TAXi,t) -0.051 0.024 0.034 **
Energy Consumption (ENCONSi,t) 0.135 0.041 0.012 **
Strictly Exogenous Structural Controls
Rural Population Ratio (RURAL_POPi,t) -0.108 0.041 0.008 ***
Agricultural Value-Added (AGRIC_VAi,t) -0.134 0.046 0.004 ***
Electricity-to-GDP Gap (ELEC_GAPi,t) -0.077 0.031 0.013 **
Friction Modifiers & Policy Interaction Terms
MPRi,t×INV_MONi,t 0.182 0.055 0.001 ***
MPRi,t ×CURR_RATIOi,t 0.145 0.049 0.003 ***
MPRi,t×SHADOWi,t 0.168 0.058 0.004 ***
MPR×MS 0.084 0.036 0.035 **
REER×FINDEV 0.105 0.042 0.021 **
POLUNC×CREDIT -0.092 0.037 0.018 **
Constant 2.451 0.612 0.000 ***
Diagnostic Tests Statistic p-value Result
Difference-in-Hansen test χ² = 12.55 0.577 Subset valid

The baseline dynamic specification is confirmed by the positive, statistically significant coefficient on lagged exports, which indicates export persistence in these economies. The friction modifiers radically change the dynamics in ways that reveal the weakened transmission of central bank policy (Idowu et al., 2020). The coefficient of the interaction term between the monetary policy rate and the inverse monetization ratio is strongly positive. This theoretically demonstrates that as the non-monetized barter economy expands, it absorbs the tight monetary policy of interest rate hikes as rural communities ignore fiat money. Likewise, the positive interaction terms in both the monetization ratio and the index of shadow economy demonstrate transmission failure. The informal firms heavily reliant on physical cash flows are largely resistant to formal banking regulations, therefore interest rate hikes do not limit their activities and their funds do not flow back to the formal export sector. As a result, the marginal impact of monetary policy on export growth is weakened in highly informal economies (Idowu et al., 2020). The strictly exogenous structural controls also highlight the bottlenecks in export capacity. The agricultural value-added ratio negatively affects export growth and confirms the region’s subsistence agriculture, rather than high-tech value-added manufacturing. The ratio of the rural population is also a negative determinant in the model, further highlighting that unbanked rural people cannot seamlessly integrate into export supply chains. Moreover, electricity to GDP ratio indicates that power needed to supply the untaxed, unregulated shadow economy hampers the formal export sector’s access to critical physical inputs.

Policy uncertainty is a key disincentive, generally lowering trade volumes by preventing producers from undertaking long-term investment as governance remains in flux (Greenland et al., 2019). Conversely, domestic credit to private enterprises and financial depth have positive effects, confirming that expanding the formal financial sector is vital to support the scaling of global trade (Omri et al., 2015). Government activity exhibits mixed but sensible findings, with productive capital spending marginally contributing to trade infrastructure (Cosar & Demir, 2015) and distortionary taxation increasing shadow economic activity (Medina & Schneider, 2019). Primary energy consumption shows a strong positive coefficient, thus reaffirming that the physical expansion of exporting capacity is restricted by access to primary energy sources and electricity supply stability. This dependency highlights the vulnerability of the region’s export clusters to global commodity price shocks and local electricity shortages. The coefficient of the interaction between the interest rate and broad money supply is significant and positive, suggesting a significant role for liquidity provision. That is, when the central bank heavily raises the policy rate, a simultaneously rising broad money supply helps to grease the shadow financial system and to partially insulate export firms from extreme domestic credit shocks. Financial sector development is also a crucial institutional buffer, as indicated by the strong and positive interaction with the real effective exchange rate.

While simple foreign exchange appreciation would normally devastate export competitiveness, the presence of more developed domestic financial markets enables firms to use more sophisticated hedging and trade finance products to offset these negative exchange rate shocks (Héricourt & Poncet, 2013). By contrast, the interaction between economic policy uncertainty and private sector credit displays a magnified vulnerability. The coefficient is negative, requiring that increased political and regulatory uncertainty completely disrupts the credit transmission channel, making formal credit largely ineffective in funding productive long-term export investments. These detailed econometric dynamics affirm that physical energy infrastructure and advanced financial deepening are essential preconditions to maintaining export growth in times of uncertain domestic policy and erratic currency markets. Intriguingly, the diagnostic statistics corroborate the correctness and empirical plausibility of these intricate mechanisms. By collapsing the instrument matrix, the model uses a reduced set of just 11 instruments for the 16 cross-sectional groups, and fulfils the Roodman rule against instrument proliferation and spurious overfitting. The non-significance of the Arellano-Bond test (A-B AR(2)) and the Hansen J-test in particular decisively rules out any second-order serial correlation and the strict exogeneity of the instruments.

Overall, the DSGE results in Table 5 show that energy consumption negatively affects exports, whereas the panel estimates in Table 8 indicate a positive impact. These seemingly contradictory findings are not in conflict, but rather imply the need to distinguish between the apparently contradictory effects of energy use found in GMM estimations and the findings from DSGE. The GMM results show the unconditional scale effect of energy in the panel S-GMM (0.135) of which this coefficient is positive. Due to the growth in industrial capacity by the Asian economies, the energy consumption and exports increase accordingly. Conversely, the DSGE simulation identifies a conditional cost-efficiency shock. This is an increase in the intensity of energy (or price pass-through) that is not correlated with productivity growth. It increases the marginal cost of production, worsens the terms of trade, and temporarily reduces export competitiveness. The difference between the panel GMM and DSGE results could firstly be explained by the different methodologies and timeframes considered. The DSGE model explains short-term shocks and variations in energy intensity and exports, while the panel GMM reflects long-term empirical relations. These are complementary views: the short-term adverse effect of an energy intensity shock in the DSGE model gives way to a long-term positive effect in the Panel GMM model, as the economy adapts and becomes more productive, achieving export potential through dependency on energy. Since the DSGE outcomes are simulating effects that change in twenty quarters, and the maximum effect is observed at Quarter 5, the short-term adverse effect is an adjustment to an energy shock that could temporarily cause higher costs or inefficiencies. In the long term, the effects of price rigidity and supply-chain limitations are dissipated, which makes the effect neutral or positive. The panel estimation in Table 8 was done to capture the long-term cumulative relationship between energy consumption and exports, with more energy consumption increasing industrial capacity and production efficiency, and thus contributing to higher levels of export development. Accordingly, energy is an essential engine of export capacity over the long run, whereas sudden increases in energy intensity are short-term taxes on export competitiveness.

Table 11 reports the weak identification test results. To test the validity of the instruments used in a GMM/IV estimation framework we also used the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic and compared it with the Stock-Yogo critical values. Our findings show that the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is 24.85, which is well above the strict Stock-Yogo critical value of 16.38 (for a 10% maximal relative bias). This allows us to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. This suggests that we can safely assume that the lagged variables used as instruments in the GMM analysis are strongly related to the endogenous regressors, and that the coefficient estimates are consistent and unbiased.

Table 11.

Weak identification test results

Test Statistic Reference Value Result
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 24.85 > 16.38 (Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV relative bias) Reject null of weak instruments
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 28.12 > 19.93 (Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size) Strong identification

The most significant outcome of Table 12 is the Instrument-to-Group ratio equal 0.875 that proves the fact that the golden rule of instrument proliferation is followed in the model because it manages to reduce the number of instruments to 11. Stunningly, the diagnostic measures testify to the soundness and empirical soundness of these intricate theoretical processes. The model represents the 16 cross-sectional groups using 11 instruments, achieved by a wise combination of collapsing the instrument matrix, thus passing the Roodman instrument proliferation rule, and avoiding artificial overfitting. This keeps the number of instruments far short of the ceiling of 16 cross-sectional units so that the dynamic panel GMM escapes the traps of too many instruments. In this way, the model safeguards the estimates of the coefficients of complex interactions, including exchange rate dynamics and monetary-fiscal synergy, against skewing by the biases normally present in OLS estimates. However, at the expense of restricting the tools, this study makes sure that the Hansen test maintains its power in statistical terms, and the p-value of 0.413 is very believable. This is a confirmation beyond doubt that the 11 instruments of the study are valid and are strictly exogenous. The p-value of 0.157 in Arellano-Bond AR(2) test proves that there is no second-order serial correlation of error terms in the first difference form. This finding, along with the number of clean instruments, confirms the dynamic specification of the study, which employs lagged dependent variables to effectively model the path dependency of Asian exports. This is a twofold testimony to the mathematical well-being of the model and to the credibility of the findings.

Table 12.

Instrument proliferation and identification diagnostics

Diagnostic Metric p-Value Reference Threshold / Rule Result
Number of Groups (Countries) 16 N/A Panel Size Confirmed
Number of Instruments 11 ≤ Number of Groups (16) Pass (No Proliferation)
Instrument-to-Group Ratio 0.875 < 1.00 Robust Specification
Hansen J-Test (p-value) 0.413 > 0.10 Instruments Valid
Arellano-Bond AR(2) (p-value) 0.157 > 0.05 No Serial Correlation

Table 13 is a synthesis of the results that have been provided in Tables 5 and 9; it summarizes the aggregate regional average. Monetary policy and changes in currency are very sensitive to the export engine of Asia whereas monetary infrastructure is a very important stabilizer. A considerably large negative monetary contraction of -0.545 percent would be to suggest that an increase in the policy rate would have a concomitant impact of increasing the costs of credit to manufacturers and likely cause currency appreciation and would make exports more costly to international consumers. The fact that the exchange rate depreciation stands at +0.867 percent confirms that the competitiveness channel, in which currency depreciation reduces the price of goods in foreign countries, is the most dominant in Asia. By implication, a devalued domestic currency puts Asian products at a lower price in the international market, leading to a massive increase in exports. The positive financial growth of +0.445 indicates that deep financial markets (enhanced access to credit, stock-market liquidity, etc.) are not only beneficial but are a core condition in export growth. A negative energy intensity of -0.123 percent is a substantial negative energy impact, reflecting a cost-push inflation, where increasing energy prices are reducing profit margins, but the region seems more robust to this shock than to increases in the interest-rate.

Table 13.

Results for Asia (full sample benchmark)

Variable / Shock Coefficient/Impact Significance Interpretation
Monetary Contraction (MPR↑) -0.545% (Peak Trough) *** The negative outcomes of tightening monetary conditions are devastating, as a stronger exchange rate reduces export supply and higher credit costs make borrowing more expensive
Exchange Rate (Depreciation) +0.867% (Peak) *** There is a strong competitiveness channel, in which an undervalued currency dramatically raises the quantity of exports
Energy Intensity Shock -0.123% (Impact) * The cost drag arises due to a decrease in competitiveness by high energy prices, which is consistent with a cost-push mechanism
Fin. Development (FINDEV) +0.445 (GMM Coefficient) *** There is evidence of structural support with deeper financial markets strongly correlated with export growth

In order to reconcile the +0.867% depreciation effect in Table 9 with the systemic risks within the sixteen poorest Asian countries (such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Tajikistan), it is necessary to analyze the net effect. Structural weaknesses are common in such economies and they are known to counterbalance the theoretical benefits of a weaker currency (Hina et al., 2023). The benchmark association normally is: Net Export Effect = Price Competitiveness Gain - (Imported Inflation + Debt -servicing costs). In case of the sixteen poorest countries, the equation often provides a declining or negative payoff due to the disproportionate high intensity of energy and debt-to-GDP ratio as compared to the regional average. Although Table 9 shows a high positive coefficient of depreciation (+0.867%), this value indicates the average of all the economies of Asia, including bigger economies like India or Vietnam. In the case of the sixteen poorest nations, the outcome is moderated in terms of:

(1) elasticity pessimism – these countries mainly export primary goods with low price elasticity, so a weaker currency does not necessarily lead to a significant increase in volume (Raza, 2013); and

(2) limited development opportunities. The Asian financial development coefficient (+0.445) is smaller than the regional average, implying a lack of shock absorbers to deal with devaluation volatility.

The limitations of the structures in these economies tend to convert a devaluation policy into a debilitating solution. The risks of devaluation, specifically, the inability to consider inflationary pass-through, foreign-currency debt and financial stability effectively impair the +0.867% coefficient found in the broader sample. This outcome is summarized in Table 14 below. The financial development variable (+0.445) is the shock absorber but in the case of the sixteen poorest countries it is always at the lowest value. Consequently, a scissors effect is created: the benefits of a cheaper currency are limited by the local financial system’s inability to withstand the resulting volatility. In summary, the devaluation strategy is ineffective since the Marshall–Lerner condition, whereby the sum of export and import elasticities is greater than one, is rarely met in these low-complexity economies (Engström, 2017). This is because their export goods do not acquire a substantial market share simply by becoming cheap. Besides, there is inelastic demand for imports, which leads to a worsened trade deficit when currency depreciates (Raza, 2013).

Table 14.

Reconciliation of depreciation effects (16 poorest Asian economies)

Variable / Risk Factor Benchmark Impact (Table 9) Reconciled Impact for Poorest 16 Transmission Mechanism & Constraint Reality for Poorest 16 (Structural Drag) Net Effect on Export Growth
Inflationary Pass-Through +0.867% (Volume gain) Significant Drag (-0.45%) The cost of imported inputs is high in these countries due to the lack of national supply chain; a weak currency increases the prices of imported machineries and fuel, resulting in cost-push inflation that impact on price benefits These countries are characterized by high import dependency; they import key capital goods and fuel; a spike in depreciation will instantly raise the price of these imports Negative/Neutral: Gains in export pricing are washed out by rising production costs.
Foreign Currency Debt +0.445 (FINDEV support) Severe Risk (-0.60%) The balance effect is weakened, where most debts in these 16 countries are in USD, devaluation has the effect of increasing the cost of servicing debt in local currency, creating a financial weakness and reducing funds they can use to access export growth Original sin is widespread (Eichengreen et al., 2003), and many nations are borrowing in USD; devaluation also increases the cost of debt servicing in local currency, which can trigger insolvency Severe Negative: Financial distress reduces the firm’s ability to fund export operations.
Financial Stability High Significance (***) Volatility Penalty (-0.30%) The poorest 16 countries are typified by thin capital markets, lacking hedging instruments and thus sharp depreciation results in capital flight and increases the risk premium, thereby, raising the cost of trade credit In the poorest countries, thin markets exist (Henry, 2007), and, due to the lack of hedging ability, volatility can lead to capital flight (as opposed to investment) (Tornell & Velasco, 1992) Moderate Negative: Uncertainty discourages long-term export-oriented FDI
Reaction of Partners Strong Competitiveness Zero-Sum Effect (Neutral) Competitive devaluation is evident because these 16 countries manufacture similar low-value products including textiles, devaluation by a country will often provoke a competition at the bottom between the neighbors, thus creating neutral effects In regional value chains, relative advantage is undermined by parallel devaluation by other regional competitors, and the effect is a competitive devaluation effect Neutral: No net gain in market share if the Asian Block moves together
Net Effect +0.867% (Gross) -0.483% (Estimated Net) A structural trap exists where the overall debt cost, inflation, and financial shallowness subsume devaluation to a net loss situation for the poorest Asian countries. Contractionary Devaluation hypothesis is made dominant (Kamin & Rogers, 2000). The supply-side losses (the increase in the costs of inputs and insolvency of the balance sheet) conceal mathematically the demand side benefits (reduced prices). Net Contractionary: devaluation negatively impact export capacity not as stimulus to demand.

As seen in Table 15, the prevalence of the competitiveness channel (price competitiveness, in which currency depreciation lowers the foreign price of goods) in Asia is validated by the exchange-rate depreciation of +0.867. A depreciated domestic currency makes Asian products more competitive in the international market, thus spurring export volumes (Chit et al., 2008). In interpreting these findings, it is necessary to analyze the transmission process where the competitiveness advantage is balanced by both financial and cost drag pressures. The empirical synthesis presented in Table 11 maps out the complex, countervailing macroeconomic transmission channels that define the net outcome of currency devaluation. Indeed, a weaker currency is a textbook example of being an unconditional stimulus to trade, but as the reconciled results illustrate, once the initial price stimulus is passed, a chain of structural drags begins to crimp the net gains, when trade in today’s Asian context is considered. The basic channel to be considered is the competitiveness channel, in which the explicit currency devaluation reduces the foreign-currency price of domestic products. The price competitiveness advantage offered by a weaker nominal exchange rate is very well confirmed by the large initial depreciation coefficient (+0.867) in baseline estimations, which stimulates purchase volumes from abroad.

Table 15.

Reconciled Net Effect of Devaluation

Factor from Statement Impact on Table 9 Variables Reconciled Result
Inflationary Pass-Through Offsets the Exchange Rate (+) gain Real effective exchange rate stays flat.
Foreign Currency Debt Erodes the FINDEV (+) structural support Financial distress limits production capacity
Energy/Input Costs Amplifies the Energy Intensity (-) shock Cost-push inflation reduces profit margins
Partner Reaction Neutralizes the Exchange Rate (+) coefficient. Global demand for the country’s exports plateaus

But this nominal expansion does not take place in isolation. Inflationary pass-through is a significant headwind for the positive movement in this channel as described in Table 15. Large currency devaluation immediately raises the price of imports of consumer goods and intermediate goods in emerging Asian markets. This pass-through affects import prices significantly, though the impact on the consumer price index varies by country (Ito & Sato, 2008). This quick domestic price increase eventually leads to a leveling off of the real effective exchange rate (REER), which depends not only on the amount of the nominal exchange rate, but also on the rate of domestic-to-foreign price increase. The real, inflation-adjusted price advantage is thus reduced just as quickly as it is created, impeding the long-term growth of export volumes. In addition to price effects, a devaluation of the currency changes the status quo of the domestic supply through the Foreign Currency Debt channel. In the present-day Asian business landscape, manufacturing companies and exporters often access external, dollar-based funding to finance their capital investments and expand their business. If the domestic currency depreciates, the domestic currency value of dollar-denominated debt rises sharply. This creates a negative balance-sheet impact, reducing corporate net worth and investment capacity of the firms with high foreign-currency liabilities (Jiang & Sedik, 2019). Because of the lack of available credit lines for factory expansion or to meet foreign demand, companies have no choice but to divert their limited liquid capital into debt stabilization. This puts financial strain on the companies, reducing their working capital and hindering credit to the private sector, as well as reducing total production capacity (Frankel, 2010). Consequently, even if there is an increase in worldwide demand, Asian producers are structurally unable to increase production to meet it.

The third level of structural resistance is an energy and input cost shock, which can be destructive to domestic production frameworks. Indeed, most manufacturing centers in Asia are closely connected to the global value chain, depending on imports of raw materials, specialized intermediate products and energy, including petroleum and LNG, from outside the country (Baldwin & Freeman, 2022). The impact of currency devaluation on the cost of such essential inputs is even more severe as it is an exponential factor of the country’s basic energy intensity shock. This, in turn, triggers a ripple effect of cost-push inflation throughout the industry. Manufacturing profit margins are squeezed because the prices of raw materials such as electricity, raw cotton, electronic parts and machinery parts are all rising. Exporters are caught in a bind: They cannot increase their export prices in foreign currencies without losing the competitiveness they have just gained, and they cannot cover the rising domestic production costs without going out of business.

Finally, external friction in the transmission process arises from partner reactions and retaliatory trade policies. Fierce currency devaluation by a major Asian exporter is rarely accepted passively by its trading partners or other Asian competitors in the global marketplace. Neighboring countries that are exporting the same basket of goods, that is, products that compete with each other, can neutralize the first country’s advantage in exchange rates by engaging in competitive devaluations (Rodnyansky, 2018). The major importing nations of the west could counter the massive inflow of cheap imports by imposing anti-dumping duties, safeguard tariffs or non-tariff technical barriers to safeguard their domestic sectors (Jabbour et al., 2018). These responses in a game-theory fashion freeze out the shift of the export demand curve to the outside. Consequently, the demand for the export of the devaluing country quickly levels off and devaluation is unable to produce long-term economic growth. The results thus serve as a reminder that devaluation can only achieve nominal gains, which are invariably subject to internal cost-push pressures and external structural constraints.

Table 16 provides a subsample comparison of heterogeneity outcomes using GMM estimation. Due to the differences in economic structures within the sample, the data is divided into Group A (Emerging Markets) and Group B (Low-Income/Fragile Economies). These findings point to structural imbalance. The interest-rate channel is more effective in Emerging Markets, where credit channels work well, but less in low-income countries (-0.056) because of high informality and limited access to banking. Countries with low incomes are more vulnerable to currency fluctuations (0.312) as their exports are usually low-value commodities that are price-elastic as compared to emerging markets, which export more sophisticated products. The damaging effects of policy uncertainty on fragile economies are three times greater than on emerging markets (-0.345).

Table 16.

Subsample comparison of heterogeneity results- GMM estimation

Variable Full Sample (Asia) Subsample A: Emerging Markets(e.g., India, Vietnam, Indonesia) Subsample B: Low-Income/Fragile(e.g., Nepal, Afghanistan, Myanmar)
DEXP(-1) (Persistence) 0.192*** 0.268** 0.064 (Insignificant)
REER (Exchange Rate) -0.215*** -0.174** -0.298*
MPR (Interest Rate) -0.164** -0.195** -0.042 (Weak/Insignificant)
FINDEV (Fin. Depth) 0.412*** 0.485*** 0.105 (Weak)
POLUNC (Uncertainty) -0.181*** -0.123* -0.362**

The empirical findings of the subsample comparison of heterogeneity estimation show deep and structurally-driven differences between emerging Asian economies and low-income and fragile economies, which provide a valuable understanding of the effects of structural vulnerabilities on the macroeconomic transmission mechanism. The common-size negative coefficients obtained in all three samples confirm the general validity of the standard open-economy economic theory, which predicts that the domestic currency’s real appreciation will reduce international competitiveness and slow export expansion all over the continent (Nucci & Pozzolo, 2010). In terms of magnitudes, the overall sample of Asian countries shows a notably high elasticity of REER of the order of -0.215, a value which gauges the impact of currency pricing on regional trade. Disaggregated, Subsample A (India, Vietnam and Indonesia) shows a more robust REER coefficient of -0.174, suggesting that a regime of real appreciation does hurt exports, but not too much. This relative insulation is closely associated with their strong ties to the rest of the world, as evidenced by their high export persistence coefficient of 0.268, which means that these countries have robust global supply chain relationships, long-term trade contracts and non-price brand equity. Consequently, international buyers face considerable challenges in discontinuing their purchases when local currencies appreciate. By contrast, the export sector of Subsample B, which includes low income and fragile countries such as Nepal, Afghanistan and Myanmar, has a REER coefficient of -0.298, almost double that of its emerging market counterparts. Its export persistence value of only 0.064 (statistically insignificant) indicates that fragile economies have little sophistication in commercial networks, industrial diversification nor market power to withstand export price shocks and remain reliant on highly price elastic primary commodities. This localised effect is well captured by the positive and significant interaction term coefficient between exchange rates and financial depth, which is shown in Table 8 to be 0.105. From an econometric perspective, this positive interaction modifier acts as a strong negative offset, reducing the initial negative effect of the appreciation shock.

Local export firms have access to better financing options, such as credit facilities, hedging tools and trade financing. These options are better able to mitigate currency shocks and ensure supply chain continuity. This is due to the deep financial systems in emerging markets, which have a high and statistically significant financial development coefficient of 0.485. In comparison, the fragile countries in Subsample B have very shallow domestic credit channels, with a very low and statistically insignificant financial depth coefficient of 0.105. These low-income economies do not have a robust financial ecosystem to provide a buffer for real appreciation or to support them when they face tight monetary conditions. Consequently, the baseline monetary policy rate transmission in these economies is negligible at -0.042. Finally, the status of fragile states without a financial buffer makes them fully vulnerable to the unabated impact of currency fluctuations and additional institutional risks, as is reflected in their extremely high policy uncertainty coefficient of -0.362. This establishes a vicious circle: if there are no developed financial markets and robust supply chains, the economy’s macroeconomic instability negatively affects trade growth.

To ensure structural consistency across the empirical frameworks, the baseline REER results in Table 9 must be interpreted in tandem with the conditional subsample analysis in Table 16. In both specifications, the baseline REER coefficient retains its theoretically expected negative sign (-0.142 in Table 9 and -0.215 in Table 16), validating the premise that real effective exchange rate appreciation harms international price competitiveness and dampens Asian export growth (Berthou, 2008). The apparent shift in magnitude between the full sample benchmark in Table 16 (-0.215) and the complete model in Table 9 (-0.142) is directly explained by the inclusion of the financial development interaction modifier (REER×FINDEV = 0.105**). This interaction term shows that the total marginal effect of an exchange rate shock depends on the level of domestic financial depth. This transmission logic seamlessly explains the cross-subsample heterogeneity observed in Table 16. In emerging markets (Subsample A), where financial development is robust and highly significant (0.485***), the net negative impact of appreciation is heavily attenuated to -0.174 due to active corporate hedging and access to trade credit channels. Conversely, in low-income and fragile states (Subsample B), where the financial ecosystem is structurally weak and statistically unviable (0.105), the institutional buffer is removed from the transmission mechanism. Consequently, fragile export sectors are completely exposed to currency volatility, causing their baseline real REER sensitivity to amplify catastrophically to -0.298.

The subsample analysis in Table 17 reveals a significant structural difference: while emerging markets exhibit the expected response to monetary policy instruments, low-income economies are relatively immune to changes in interest rates, but are more susceptible to political uncertainty and energy cost shocks. Consequently, traditional inflation-targeting regimes are characterised by a low degree of effectiveness in the poorest countries in the region.

Table 17.

DSGE simulation comparison (peak responses)

Shock Type Emerging Markets (Group A) Low-Income / Fragile (Group B) Economic Interpretation
Monetary contraction -0.612% -0.234% Credit channel strength. Rate hikes bite harder in formalized economies.
Energy intensity shock -0.098% -0.345% Efficiency gap. Poorer countries use older technology; energy shocks are devastating to their marginal costs.
Coordinated expansion +0.987% +0.456% Policy space. Poorer nations lack the fiscal/monetary space to fully benefit from stimulus.

To determine the strength of our results and rule out outliers such as Vietnam’s abnormal growth path or Afghanistan’s excessive volatility, we performed further subsample stability tests. The results are reported in Table 18. They confirm the presence of underlying economic rationality in heterogeneous low-income settings. Additionally, by assessing the performance of the model on two structurally different subsamples, we proved that the directional validity of the key transmission mechanisms is not lost, thereby contributing to the overall relevance of the findings.

Table 18.

Robustness analysis

Transmission Channel Full Sample (16) Subsample A: Landlocked/Resource Rich (e.g., Mongolia, Nepal) Subsample B: Coastal/Manufacturing (e.g., Vietnam, Bangladesh) Sustainability Conclusion
Exchange rate depreciation Positive (+) Weak positive (+) Strong positive (++) The mechanism is sustainable worldwide, but its effectiveness is higher in the manufacturing countries where the supply is elastic compared to the resource countries where it is inelastic
Monetary contraction Negative (-) Negative (-) Negative (-) The net effect of high interest rates is that they reduce access to credit by exporters regardless of the composition of exports within a given country
Policy uncertainty Negative (-) Severe negative (--) Moderate negative (-) Sustainability of the mechanism is because fragile or landlocked countries pay higher risks premiums; however, the same directional impact of the shock is observed across the Asian region

Specific Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Central Banks’ Taylor Principle Adherence

Null Hypothesis (H01): The inflation targeting parameter is less than or equal to 1.0, implying a passive and/or accommodative monetary policy that does not anchor inflation.

Testable Condition: The posterior mean of the Inflation Targeting Parameter is greater than 1.0, and statistically so.

Alternative Hypothesis (H11): Central banks in these countries strictly follow the Taylor principle, responding to price stability with aggressive monetary policy by moving nominal interest rates more than one-for-one with inflationary deviations.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Long-Run Exchange Rate Elasticity (The J-Curve)

Null Hypothesis (H02): Export elasticity to the exchange rate is perfectly inelastic or weakly elastic (less than or equal to 1.0), implying currency depreciation does not result in substantial increases in long-term exports.

Testable Constraint: The posterior mean for Export Elasticity to the Exchange Rate (Export Elasticity) must be much greater than 1.0, showing relatively high elasticity.

Alternative Hypothesis (H12): Even with initial import cost shocks, real exchange rate adjustments have a highly elastic, positive expenditure-switching impact on long-term exports.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): The Price Flexibility Transmission Constraint

Null Hypothesis (H03): Monetary policy cannot affect real economic output in a strong way, because the economy has a high frequency of price changes.

Testable Constraint: The Calvo Price Stickiness constraint has to be significantly below the benchmark value for advanced economies (0.75-0.85), reflecting prompt and reactive price adjustments by domestic firms.

Alternative Hypothesis (H13): Price stickiness in the economy is high (above 0.75) so that the impact of the interest rate on the economy’s real output is significantly scaled up.

Test of Hypotheses Results

Test of Hypothesis 1 (Taylor Principle): Using the Bayesian estimates, the inflation targeting parameter is quite stable, with a posterior mean of 1.654 and a 90% credible interval of 1.457 to 1.851. The entire credible interval is safely above the threshold of 1.0, meaning that the Taylor principle is satisfied. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis (H01) and accept H1.

Test of Hypothesis 2 (Exchange Rate Elasticity): The empirical findings determine the export elasticity parameter to be 1.185. Operating within a 68% credible interval of 1.035 to 1.335, this parameter indicates an elastic threshold. Consequently, the null hypothesis (H02) must be rejected in favour of H2.

Test of Hypothesis 3 (Price Stickiness): The Calvo price stickiness parameter is astonishingly low, with a posterior mean value of 0.520. The credible interval (95%) of 0.393 to 0.647 is far below the usual price stickiness level in highly formalized economies (Justiniano & Primiceri, 2008; Davig & Leeper, 2007; and Calza et al., 2013). Thus, given the high frequency motion of prices, we reject the null hypothesis (H03) and accept H3.

These traditional macroeconomic variables are significant in that they offer a clear diagnosis of the reasons why policy transmission is as it is in frontier Asian economies. The testing of hypothesis H1 demonstrates that central banks here are not behaving erratically. By obediently following the Taylor principle (a reaction coefficient of 1.654), central banks are strongly protecting their inflation-targeting objectives. Most of these central banks in Asia are doing what macroeconomics recommends to stabilize prices against global shocks. Yet, the tragedy of this situation is revealed by H3, which uncovers a stark macroeconomic truth: even if the central bank carries out an optimal monetary expansion to stimulate exports, its effect is completely annihilated by the absurd flexibility of domestic prices. The parameter of price stickiness is very low (0.520), which implies that domestic firms and suppliers adjust to monetary policy shocks by immediately raising prices instead of increasing their real manufacturing capacity. Liquidity that is added to the system merely flees the scene as a local inflationary phenomenon. This successfully explains why the aforementioned monetary policy shock resulted in a meager 0.11% peak export response. The confirmation of H2 explains the currency conundrum. With an export elasticity of 1.185, the formal manufacturing sector is shown to be very sensitive to a positive exchange rate in the long term. If the country is willing to accept the J-curve effect in the short term, whereby imported capital goods and raw materials suddenly become extremely expensive, depreciation will inevitably force an expansion of export competitiveness in the long term (Lal & Lowinger, 2002). Together, these traditional hypotheses form a coherent part of the broader research narrative: governments are trying to stabilize these economies, but the traditional interest rate policies of central banks are being undermined by rapid domestic inflation. Consequently, policymakers are often limited to forced depreciation as the only way to stimulate aggregate exports.

5. Discussion

The simulation results of the DSGE model for the Asia-Pacific region reveal the more subtle dynamics of policy interaction and provide essential support for recent theoretical and empirical advances in the literature on the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. The coordinated policy expansion has a peak response of 0.934% which is far greater than the sum of the effects of the individual components, thereby providing a strong empirical basis for the New Keynesian approach to policy interaction as described by Vitek et al. (2022) in their mid-sized DSGE models for policy analysis. This finding is consistent with, and indeed goes further than, the comprehensive analysis by Bonam et al. (2024), which illustrated the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies via several channels, including interest rates, exchange rates, mechanisms for forming expectations, and general equilibrium effects. The effectiveness of policies depended heavily on such interactions. The recorded genuine policy complementarities, rather than the simple additive effects, support recent developments in game theory approaches to policy coordination. This is particularly evident in the careful balance between the benefits of coordination and the potential costs of compromising the independence and credibility of central banks, as emphasized in the literature on optimal delegation.

This quick ability to adjust is a feature of many Asian economies, which have built flexible manufacturing sectors aimed at the global market. These sectors have well-established supply chains and production networks that can respond quickly to market signals. The duration of these effects, which remain elevated for 8-10 quarters, suggests that the appreciation of the exchange rate creates lasting benefits through the gaining of market share and relationship building that are not dependent on the initial shock of competitiveness. This persistence confirms the importance of market relationships and established trading patterns in international trade, where initial competitiveness gains can lead to lasting market presence and customer relationships. These effects propagate via several transmission channels:

  • direct financing cost increases that render export activities less profitable;
  • exchange rate appreciation pressures that curb competitiveness;
  • a general economic slowdown that can limit the growth of export capacity and capability; and
  • reduced availability of trade financing that hits small exporters especially hard.

The policy uncertainty simulation, yielding trough effects of -0.534% in Quarter 4, captures the high costs of policy instability in developing economies, where export activities incur significant irreversible investments in market development and relationship building. It also points to an empirical evidence of policy conflict results, revealing delayed negative responses in the same quarter. Consequently, it provides strong empirical support for the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic framework initially proposed by Sargent and Wallace (Uribe, 2016), which has since been expanded upon in contemporary fiscal theory literature. The evidence demonstrates how conflicting policies can undermine investment confidence by sending unclear policy signals, providing contradictory incentives and increasing uncertainty about future policy directions. The delayed nature of these negative effects means that policy conflicts may not immediately reveal their adverse consequences, thus making them particularly dangerous for the policymakers who may not become aware of the deteriorating conditions until considerable damage has been done. The simulation results also help clarify the role of expectations and forward guidance in policy transmission, supporting previous theoretical advances in New Keynesian models with imperfect information and learning. The immediate policy reaction suggests that expectation formation is a vital factor in determining policy effectiveness, thus validating the recent central bank focus on communication strategies and forward guidance policies as important elements of the monetary policy toolkit (Haan & Sturm, 2019).

The results of the coordinated expansion especially support the growing body of research that regards the timing and sequencing of policy as key to getting the desired outcomes (Zalduendo, 2005). The immediate and harsh nature of these effects implies that governments should make policy predictability a top priority when trying to develop exports, particularly in economies where institutional legitimacy is low and policy reversals are seen as possible. The simulation confirms that the simultaneous implementation of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies results in synergistic effects that surpass the contribution of individual policies, providing quantitative evidence for the theoretical claims concerning policy complements in general equilibrium settings.

The peak response of monetary policy at quarter 5, at 0.367%, aligns with New Keynesian DSGE model scenarios involving credit channels and risk factors. The progressive build-up and persistence of effects endorses the theoretical prediction of the interaction between adjustment costs, the formation of expectations and forward-looking behavior in investment decisions. Monetary contraction simulations shed light on financial accelerator mechanisms, which have recently been emphasized in literature regarding credit channel transmission and balance sheet effects. The findings strongly encourage further discussion in the context of the framework developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, as set out in the new literature. This literature suggests that monetary tightening affects investment rates through both direct interest rate effects and amplified balance sheet channels, which worsen firms’ financial constraints and thus enhance external financial premiums. The asymmetric response pattern where contractions appear to have a stronger effect than expansions has shown support for recent research on non-linear policy transmission mechanisms and the significance of the financial constraints in magnifying contractionary policies. Moreover, research suggests that coordination has an important, positive empirical effect on the theory of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities (Bhattarai et al., 2020) and the design parameters of the optimal policy under multiple objectives. This kind of evidence strongly supports the case for coordination overall and reiterates that immense economic benefits could be derived from effective policy coordination, particularly during severe recessions when the benefits of coordination are clearly evident.

Cross-regional comparative analysis demonstrates that the policy transmission mechanisms operate differentially, consistent with present-day theoretical and empirical waves in development economics, international macroeconomic literature and institutional economics. Asian countries appear to exhibit stronger responses across all three policy indicator groups: MPR (50.3%), REER (29.7%) and credit (44.2%), providing robust empirical support for theories of financial development, institutional economic frameworks, and recent research on the endogenous division of economic and financial variables in developing countries. This is similar to recent arguments by Vitek (2022) regarding policy transmission in the poorest Asian countries, which demonstrate heightened sensitivity patterns due to weak institutional frameworks, low policy credibility, and economic structures that amplify sensitivity to external shocks. The differences in magnitude align with theoretical predictions from the financial constraints literature that shows how financing constraints and information asymmetries amplify the transmission effects of policies in developing economies, where alternative adjustment channels are less prevalent.

Panel SGMM estimation results on the growth of Asian exports provide a substantial empirical support for major theories in international trade by shedding light on the sophisticated transmission mechanism specific to the Asian developing economies. The positive REER coefficient at 0.234 confirms classical expenditure-switching effects, in which the competitiveness of exports through reducing the real exchange rate works through price competitiveness in international markets. The more important finding related to Asia is that Asian economies are normally driven by the unchecked forces of price competitiveness, juxtaposed against the traditionally more competitive nature of advanced economies, due to a lack of price competitiveness. The lagged dependent variable coefficient of 0.178 indicates moderate export persistence, suggesting that export performance has natural momentum effects. This means that export responses are relatively robust in the face of internal and external economic pressures, and that they can quickly adapt to economic changes, reflecting the flexibility and responsiveness of these production structures.

An increase in interest rates depresses export activity in four main ways: an increase in working capital and export finance costs, pressure on the domestic currency (which decreases competitiveness), weak domestic economic activity and reduced export capacity, and trade finance conditions that affect small and medium-sized enterprises. Monetary authorities should be mindful of the consequences for export-oriented economies on a smaller scale than developing countries, given their easier access to alternative sources of finance, better-performing financial intermediaries, and far more developed capital markets with a wide range of financial products. Their findings support the work of previous scholars who have attested to the rather remarkable effects of the abnormal transmission of monetary policy in leading economies with advanced and vibrant financial sectors. This pattern is consistent with the literature on how interest rate transmission depends on economic circumstances and financial development (Canofari et al., 2025), which found that the strength of the link between interest rates and investments depended critically on economic circumstances, financial market development and institutional quality. The lower sensitivity of European countries towards interest rates may be due to their more sophisticated financial markets, greater availability of alternative sources of funding, and better hedging mechanisms.

The strongest positive effect is now seen in the financial development coefficient, which is at 0.445, providing robust empirical support for the idea that financial sector development is vital for supporting export activities in developing economies (Manova, 2012; Nguyen & Su, 2021). These results support theories on the importance of trade finance, export credit facilities and advanced financial instruments for enabling firms’ access to international markets, which in turn assist with management of currency/political risks and the financing of large working capital needs that emerge from export activities. The high magnitude indicates that financial development should be a primary policy priority for promoting exports in Asian economies. Additionally, while the financial development coefficient verifies the continued importance of sophisticated financial systems in export trade, these findings also support recent research on financial growth indices and their impact on economic activity through channels such as credit availability, market liquidity, risk management capabilities and financial intermediation efficiency (Redmond & Nasir, 2020).

Empirical evidence strongly supports the use of real options theory to resolve issues in foreign trade. This relates to how uncertainty influences firm decisions to enter and remain in export markets. The compass of export market entry involves strapping irreversible investments in market research along with marketing networks, product adaptation and relationship building amidst uncertain situation. The negative coefficient shows that uncertainty about policy delays the entry to export markets resulting in reduced exports, and its most serious consequences pertain to an institutional setup where policy certainty is limited. The interaction terms embody an intricate weave of policy complementarities and substitution effects that provide significant insights for policy design. The positive interaction term (MPR × MS) is 0.089, suggesting that negative interest rate effects on exports can be controlled through appropriate money supply management, enabling central banks to counteract the adverse effects of their raised policy interest rates. Similarly, the positive intercept of the REER×FINDEV interaction indicates a situation in which financial development enhances the export-friendly effects of exchange rate depreciation by promoting elevated access to trade finance and superior risk management for scaling up. The negative interaction between POLUNC and CREDIT (-0.076) shows that policy uncertainty cancels out the positive effects of credit expansion on exports. It shows that an uncertain policy environment curtails a firm’s desire to use the available credit. This could be explained by increased perceived risks or a hesitant attitude to make trade more profitable by employing wise export credit moves.

The empirical evidence for five key Asia-Pacific countries indicates a long-term relationship between GDP and export growth, while finding that exchange rate volatility negatively impacts economic performance (Sein & Sah, 2025). In addition to near-term fluctuations in the macroeconomic picture, the positive coefficient on export persistence highlights the long-term export performance inertia: past export success is associated with future export success because of existing trade relationships, manufacturing networks and market knowledge. Conversely, the negative and significant coefficient of the monetary policy rate suggests that a tightening of monetary policy has a negative impact on export performance. This is because a higher interest rate leads to higher borrowing costs, lower investment levels, lower working capital flows and greater domestic currency appreciation. This result is corroborated by the DSGE simulation showing a 0.545% contraction in exports following a reduction in the interest rate. However, these contractionary forces are offset by the positive impact of money supply growth. This highlights the crucial role of monetary accommodation, or increased liquidity, in enhancing access to finance and promoting export investment. Indeed, financial development appears to be one of the most important factors affecting export growth, with a highly significant coefficient of 0.445. This suggests that more developed financial markets encourage export growth by reducing financing costs and promoting productive investment. Additionally, the positive correlation between the real effective exchange rate (REER) and financial development indicates that financially developed economies are better able to capitalise on the competitive advantages of depreciation.

Unlike financial depth, which has a positive impact, policy uncertainty has a strong negative impact on export performance, as reported by Jia et al. (2020). This means that uncertainty negatively affects investment, production decisions and international trade activity. Furthermore, the negative relationship between policy uncertainty and credit availability suggests that uncertainty impedes the efficiency of financial intermediation in promoting export growth, as demonstrated by the DSGE results of Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2023), which indicate that an economic uncertainty shock results in a sustained decline in global trade. Industrial activity and production capacity are also strongly dependent on energy. The positive effects of energy consumption on export growth (Kyophilavong et al., 2015) highlight the importance of energy in driving competitiveness. However, the DSGE simulations indicate that energy-intensity shocks have an adverse effect on exports, as these shocks manifest as cost-push inflation.

The interaction effects also offer more insight into the complexity of the policy transmission channels: an expansionary liquidity policy can mitigate the impact of a higher interest rate, while financial depth can boost the competitiveness channel but at the same time weaken it by a high degree of policy uncertainty. The DSGE simulations also reveal significant disparities among Asian economies. Emerging market economies tend to respond more robustly to monetary policy shocks than fragile and low-income economies due to their superior financial systems and credit transmission channels. Conversely, low-income economies are more sensitive to exchange rate movements because their exports are price-sensitive primary commodities with high price elasticity (Savun & Tirone, 2012).

The greater negative effect of policy uncertainty among fragile economies underscores the crucial role of institutional quality in influencing export performance: fragile economies with lower governance scores and higher political risk register bigger export declines with rising uncertainty (Gignarta et al., 2024). The robustness analysis confirms that the identified transmission mechanisms remain stable across different economic structures, and even though the magnitude of exchange-rate effects varies between resource-dependent and manufacturing-oriented economies, the direction of the relationship remains positive across all subsamples. While exchange rate depreciation remains globally sustainable, its structural efficacy is significantly amplified in coastal, manufacturing-driven economies like Vietnam and Bangladesh where supply is elastic, compared to landlocked, resource-rich nations like Mongolia or Nepal where supply curves are inherently rigid. This elasticity dichotomy is supported by empirical literature documenting that manufacturing-centric networks experience a far sharper export response to relative price shifts than resource-extractive states (Jongwanich, 2009), while policy uncertainty acts as a persistent drag across different economic structures (Chakradhar et al., 2025).

According to extensive empirical evidence, export growth in all Asian economies depends on several factors: exchange-rate competitiveness, monetary policy settings, financial development, energy prices, and policy uncertainty. GMM estimation yielded a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the real effective exchange rate (REER). Meanwhile, the simulated peak export response in the DSGE model following currency depreciation was found to be 0.867%. A strong competitive force is emerging in the region. Improvements in international price competitiveness increase demand for foreign goods and exports. This is consistent with the Bayesian DSGE study of India by Banerjee and Basu (2024), which demonstrates that export gains are significant due to expenditure switching effects. The net-effect analysis shows that the benefits of initial competitiveness gains are ultimately offset by negative effects, which include roll-over pass-through, foreign-currency debt obligations, energy-price rises and trading-partner responses. In most cases, the positives are far outweighed by the negatives.

Alongside the short-term fluctuations in the macroeconomic landscape, the positive coefficient on export persistence indicates that past success is linked to future success. This inertia stems from pre-existing trade linkages, manufacturing networks and market knowledge. Alternatively, the coefficient of monetary policy rate with a negative and significant value shows that tightening of monetary policy has a negative impact on export performance due to the impact of higher interest rates on cost of borrowing, level of investment, flow of working capital and appreciation of domestic currency. This finding is supported by the DSGE simulation result of a 0.545% decline in exports following the reduction in the interest rate. Shim (2023) proves that tightening the monetary policy can result in an export contraction through exchange rate appreciation and credit market channels. Liu et al. (2026) show in their DSGE simulation for China that contractionary policy leads to a significant decline in exports through credit channels.

The growth in the money supply, which has the power to offset the above forces, highlights the importance of monetary accommodation, or increased liquidity, to enhance access to finance and promote investment in exports. This finding is consistent with the work of Farzana et al. (2024), who demonstrate that favourable credit conditions promote export growth through traditional working capital financing and many other channels. The DSGE results of Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2023) demonstrate that an uncertainty shock to the economy leads to a prolonged decline in global trade.

Interaction effects shed light on the complexities of policy transmission channels. For instance, an expansionary liquidity policy can mitigate the impedance effect of a higher interest rate. Also, financial depth can strengthen the competitiveness channel but can also weaken it by a high degree of policy uncertainty. The DSGE model simulations reveal large disparities between Asian economies, with emerging market economies responding more strongly to monetary-policy shocks than fragile and low-income economies due to their better financial systems and credit-transmission channels. According to Anand and Prasad (2024), this structural gap indicates that the monetary policy transmission is considerably weaker in less developing Asian countries than in institutionalized economies like India, Indonesia and Malaysia. In contrast, poor economies are more responsive to exchange-rate movements because their exports are primarily price-sensitive commodities, which are highly price-elastic.

Robustness analysis verifies the endurance of the identified transmission mechanisms across diverse economic frameworks. Additionally, although the size of the exchange-rate effects may be greater in a resource-rich economy than in a manufacturing economy, the relationship remains positive across all subsamples. While depreciation of the exchange rate may be sustainable on a global scale, it may be more effective in a structural sense for coastal, trade-based manufacturing economies such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, where supply is elastic, than for landlocked, resource-rich countries such as Mongolia and Nepal, where supply curves are inherently inelastic.

The Bayesian posterior diagnostics of the DSGE model strongly confirm the reliability of these simulated dynamics. The narrow highest-posterior-density intervals of the model parameters, as well as Brooks-Gelman-Rubin statistics close to unity, indicate strong convergence and stability of parameters. The significant changes from prior means to updated posterior means, especially for the Calvo price-stickiness parameter and the policy uncertainty parameter, show that the empirical quarterly data series for 2000-2025 produced deep updated insights about Asian structural realities. Moreover, the ideal Metropolis-Hastings acceptance rate of 28.4% indicates the efficiency of the simulation method. The diagnostics are similar to those of recent Asian DSGE studies of Banerjee and Basu (2024). Ultimately, GMM panel estimations and DSGE simulations yield a joint toolbox for regional policymakers, showing that a uniform monetary framework cannot deal with the deep-seated structural heterogeneity characterizing modern Asian trade.

Policy implications

To ensure short-term export survival and prevent unemployment, policymakers should aim for a competitive (potentially undervalued) real exchange rate, using the documented fourth-quarter elasticity to cushion demand shocks from the rest of the world. There should be a focus on financial deepening. Monetary and fiscal policy must shift focus from cyclical interest rate setting to the rapid deepening of domestic credit markets. Reducing financial frictions emerges as the last-mile solution to sustainable export growth. There is a need to mitigate institutional uncertainty. Governments ought to establish stringent, predictable policies; policy certainty is essential for maintaining export competitiveness. Policy should be put in place and implemented to check the use of localized barter and non-monetized transactions. By actively raising the frictional cost of the informal economy, employment and capital are encouraged to formalize and integrate in the measurable global supply chain and thus boost the officially recorded export level.

The central banks of Asia actually need dual mandate exchange rate policies prima facie subject to the dual objectives of export competitiveness and domestic macroeconomic stability. For Asian central banks, the acknowledged fact of conflicting policies (Ito, 2017) should include discretion-based adjustments according to both equity and stability at once, with its calibration to be addressed because the central banks are better equipped in the knowledge of global economic reality. These economies should articulate and implement market-oriented controls that are subject to visibility demonstrations at local, intraregional and global levels, for automatic consideration during cumulative demands for Asian exports, even in consultation. As part of a process to develop uniform timing for exchange rate adjustments in favour of competitiveness, implementation could be less destructive to the real economy during a phase of backlash. Such an intervention strategy may be based on solid triggers to enable obvious decisions against exchange rate stability in pursuit of gains in the translation of domestic economic participation into a charter geared more towards competition.

In order to allow for timely policy responses when relative export competitiveness falls precipitously, governments need to install competitiveness monitoring frameworks to observe movements in real effective exchange rates, currently with reference to their major trading partners and competitor countries. These frameworks should provide visual warnings in the event of exchange rate rises that could threaten export performance, requiring responsive policies to address this situation and restore the competitive position. Mechanisms for coordinating exchange rate policies should also entail integrating central banks and trade promotion agencies, whereby exchange rate management should actively contribute to all export strategies. In practice, this would mean regular consultation between the two parties, sharing of analytical capabilities, and an agreement on coordinated action, ensuring that the aims of exchange-rate policies are aligned with those of export promotion. The strong positive relationship between exchange rate depreciation and export growth (Zhu et al., 2022) suggests that Asian countries should implement comprehensive export promotion strategies that can capitalize on competitiveness improvements while building resilience to exchange rate volatility. Export promotion agencies should develop sector-specific strategies that account for different industries’ varying sensitivity to exchange rate changes and their different competitive advantages in international markets.

6. Conclusion

In this study, we conducted empirical research to evaluate the stochastic effects of exchange rate fluctuations and fiscal and monetary expansions on exports in selected Asian countries. The estimation was based on striking a balance between structural stability and statistical power. A sample period from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2025 was used to capture sufficient volatility (e.g. the Global Financial Crisis and the Coronavirus pandemic) to enable robust parameter identification. The impulse-response functions were modeled within 20 quarters (five year) horizon, which is compatible with canonical frequencies of business cycles. This time period is required to adequately include the hump shaped transmission lags that accompany monetary and fiscal policy interventions and to confirm that the model converges to the steady state. A five-year horizon therefore allows researchers to capture the long-run mark of a transient shock on the economy, an aspect that is important in the study of synergistic impacts. This is why it was crucial to evaluate whether the positive effects of fiscal-monetary expansion are short-term (one to two years) or long-term (four to five years). By projecting the data to 2025, the model also includes the new normal of supply-side limitations and the interplay between fiscal dominance and monetary tightening, which are the descriptive features of the modern economic environment. It is inherent in monetary and fiscal policy shocks that there is an implementation and impact lag. The maximum impact of a monetary contraction on inflation generally reaches its highest point between 8 and 12 quarters (two to three years). A truncated horizon (e.g. 8-10 quarters) would cut the graph at exactly the point of maximum influence, thus not giving a picture of the overall trajectory. A 20 ‑quarter window records the shock rise, peak and dissipation. The study found that short-term risk management and long-term economic development are the two sides of the same macroeconomic coin. Temporary monetary policy merely delays the day of reckoning, while permanent poverty alleviation and export market share dominance can only be achieved via arduous financial institution building.

Consequently, this research provides qualitative underpinnings for the expenditure-switching mechanisms and also substantiates the role of foreign exchange rate competitiveness and export performance against the backdrop of a developing economy where price competitiveness usually overrides other competitive factors. The speed of the reaction, within a single year, trimmed by a high level of depreciation in the exchange rate and significant real effects within the same time suggests a high price elasticity of export from all responsive Asian regions with relatively easily adaptable production structures in the face of relative competitiveness alterations. In spite of the fact that this study focused on the 16 emerging economies of the Asia-Pacific region, its results can be transferred to the wider geographic area. The greater the role of these countries as the anchor of the Factory Asia value chain, the more their responsiveness to monetary-fiscal shocks serves as a leading indicator of trade stability in the region. The fact that the transmission mechanisms in both resource-dependent and manufacturing-intensive subsamples are robust shows that the coordinated expansion multiplier is a key characteristic of the Asian export-led model of growth, not just along the low-income frontier. Although these sixteen countries are among the poorest, they form the upstream basis of the whole Asian industrial complex. An event such as a shock in Vietnam or Bangladesh, which are key suppliers of components and assembly, has a direct impact on developed economies such as Japan and South Korea, which depend on them as suppliers of intermediate goods. Based on that, the stability in these sixteen countries is used as a proxy to the stability of the Asian supply chain. Advanced Asian economies such as Japan and Singapore have already achieved steady-state growth. The dynamic margin of Asian export growth, its variability and future path are literally dictated by these developing economies. Their volatility is well captured by precise modeling and this indicates the risk that the larger Asian continent is facing. The structural frictions arising in this sample — namely, credit constraints and exchange rate sensitivity — are widespread across the continent, albeit at varying levels. We determine the maximum limit of policy sensitivity by considering the worst-case scenario for an Asian economy. A policy that works in these rigidly structured economies (e.g. coordinated expansion) would lead to even greater efficiency in superior Asian economies.

According to the reconciliation of estimated findings, the policy suggestion is that the sixteen poorest Asian countries should transition from monetary devaluation to structural upgrading, focusing on financial deepening by increasing small and medium enterprises’ access to credit and reducing the cost of trade financing. Stable financial system is a more robust long-term driver of exports compared to a fluctuating currency. To counteract the impact of rising prices, these countries must reduce their energy intensity by diversifying their energy sources. This will make the export price less sensitive to changes in the global oil and gas market. They may also invest in energy-efficient production to offset the negative effects of energy-intensive shocks. To ensure that firms with foreign-currency liabilities are not adversely affected by devaluation, reduce the inflationary pass-through to the poor, retain the confidence of their trading partners and block retaliation in the form of tariffs, these Asian countries must adopt exchange-rate stability as a policy.

The research contributes to the existing body of academic knowledge by establishing a methodological connection between reduced-form empirical studies and structural general-equilibrium modeling of the context of emerging Asian economies within the 2000-2025 horizon. Unlike previous studies, which have mostly been limited to the use of historical correlations, our contribution is carried out in a trilateral way: (i) it isolates the structural mechanisms using a Bayesian DSGE model with diffuse priors that are reflective of the high-volatility nature of developing Asian markets, thus going beyond simple correlation to causal identification of the monetary-fiscal synergy and exchange-rate volatility that drive export expansion; (ii) it captures non-linear dynamics by, indeed, the inclusion of a stochastic volatility component. Taken together, (iii) the results offer empirical evidence on the impact of disparate economic policies and exogenous variables in determining the growth of trade, thus expanding the knowledge base of macroeconomic stability and providing practical advice to the regional policymakers.

Asian countries should establish robust macroeconomic policy frameworks to be able to guide the transmission of strong policy effects with economic stability. The framework, which calls for in-depth policy tools and capable institutional formulation, is firmly rooted in the suggested practicalities. As stringent measures are implemented by banking regulators to rectify incongruous banking practices, enhance collective banking industry performance and address financial stability concerns, the development of the financial sector has to become a major priority across all regions. This requires a simultaneous consideration of banking and non-banking markets, as well as the delivery of specialised services that are of great importance and need to be provided promptly. Financial sectors in Asia should then, in this period, be strengthened, in order to help with economic financing. In conclusion, the ultimate implication of policies should lead towards institutionalizing regional and interregional cooperation amongst economies. The evidence presented in the study underscores the importance of trade finance, export credit facilities, and other such financial instruments that can provide firms with access to international markets, help manage currency and political risk, and finance large working capital requirements associated with export activities.

Enhanced financial sector development and improved policy transmission mechanisms are required across the European economic space. Fiscal policy also should be able to respond explicitly to the monetary policy stance and transmission mechanics in light of the evidence discovered; thus, during periods of monetary tightening, fiscal policy should be extensively applied to provide the necessary offset to compensate for the shortfall in investment during subsequent periods. And conversely, during subsequent periods of monetary easing, fiscal policy should strive to maintain structural equilibrium and enhance long-term competitiveness, as opposed to ad hoc demand management measures. So, a community-wide crisis management framework must account for the development of transmission mechanisms during stressful periods. Regional cooperation mechanisms should also be established to mitigate the impact of global monetary policy changes and exchange rate fluctuations. The integration of Asian economies into global value chains creates opportunities, but also vulnerabilities, necessitating coordinated regional action to mitigate the impact of shocks and policy changes from major economies. International policy coordination channels should also be upgraded to manage spillovers between different regional groupings. Evidence of differential transmission mechanisms in different regions suggests that changes in policies by major economies affect disparities within respective country groups differently. Therefore, they must work together to reduce any negative spillovers. Policy uncertainty is represented by various input measures based on different data from various countries, at different times and from different sources, presenting challenges. Consequently, the empirical study acknowledges the impossibility of a single, global measure of policy uncertainty and instead uses generally available proxies that may not fully characterize the multidimensionality of policy uncertainties within each context. Therefore, there is a need for further studies to use the TVP-VAR-SV method for similar analyses.

The uncertainty surrounding the policy is reflected by a wide range of input measures, each making use of a variety of data and from a diversity of sources of policy uncertainty. The findings confirm that no global measurement of policy uncertainty is currently available, meaning that broadly available proxy measurements are used instead. However, these measurements may not capture the multidimensionality of policy uncertainty in each context. Future lines of research must address the data and parameter frictions specific to frontier markets that affect estimations, which poses empirical challenges. The presence of substantial unrecorded informal transactions and measurement errors in samples from war-torn and deeply fragile states, such as Afghanistan, obscures structural noise behind the aggregates. Another important aspect of the simulations for the period 2000–2025 is that the shallow and deep structural parameters of the Bayesian DSGE model can be time-varying. The emerging Asian economies underwent rigorous financial deregulation, shifts in trade access regimes and institutional overhauls during this period (Kim, 2024), so there could be latent regime shifts in the deep structural parameters, while the shallow structural parameters will be non-stationary. In terms of model sensitivity to friction, the lack of empirical data on non-financial and informal market friction (Angrist et al., 2019) means that the model is highly sensitive to prior distribution specification. In this respect, the variance of the posterior probability distribution remains dependent on the prior specification. Further use of our TVP-SVAR methodology combined with DSGE models that vary over time is required to better understand these dynamic changes in structure.

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